Johnson v. State’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

10 federal appellate · 4 district · 167 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 183 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “" [E]vidence of criminal conduct for which a defendant has not been convicted is clearly admissible for sentencing purposes when that task is performed by a judge in a case not involving a section 413 death penalty proceeding. Logan v. State, 289 Md. 460, 480-87 , 425 A.2d 632, 642-46 (1981); Purnell v. State, 241 Md. 582 , 217 A.2d 298 (1965). We only a few months ago stated in Logan v. State that: `[i]n considering what is proper punishment, it is now well-settled in this State that a judge is not limited to reviewing past conduct whose occurrence has been judicially established, but may view "reliable evidence of conduct which may be opprobrious although not criminal, as well as details and circumstances of criminal conduct for which the person has not been tried...."[ Logan v. State, supra, 289 Md. at 481 , 425 A.2d at 643 (citations omitted).]' " There is no reason in principle why this concept of sentencing should not apply in a section 413 death penalty proceeding even though the sentencing authority can, by election of the defendant, be reposed in either judge or jury. We observe nothing in the enactment which in any way contradicts this view, and in fact, a fair reading of the statute, particularly section 413 (c), embraces it. ... In our view, part (v) in unambiguous terms authorizes the trial court to admit into evidence before the sentencing jury identical information concerning a defendant's criminal conduct as would normally be considered by the judge if he were”

   7 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Scott v. State · Conyers v. State

2. ““Moreover, under the settled rules of appellate procedure, a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel not presented to the trial court generally is not an issue which will be reviewed initially on direct appeal, Berndt v. Warden, 240 Md. 701 , 213 A.2d 471 (1965); State v. Zimmerman [ 261 Md. 11 , 273 A.2d 156 ], supra; see White v. State [ 17 Md.App. 58 , 299 A.2d 873 ], supra; Bailey v. State, 6 Md.App. 496 , 252 A.2d 85 (1969); Harris v. State [ 2 Md.App. 408 , 234 A.2d 781 ], supra; see also Md.Rules 885, 1085, although competency of counsel may be raised for the first time at a section 645A post conviction proceeding. Davis v. State [ 285 Md. 19 , 400 A.2d 406 ], supra; see Curtis v. State, 284 Md. 132 , 395 A.2d 464 (1978). Upon such a collateral attack, there is presented an opportunity for taking testimony, receiving evidence, and making factual findings concerning the allegations of counsel’s incompetence. Wilson v. State, 284 Md. 664, 675 , 399 A.2d 256, 262 (1979); see Md.Rule BK 44. By having counsel testify and describe his or her reasons for acting or failing to act in the manner complained of, the post conviction court is better able to determine intelligently whether the attorney’s actions met the applicable standard of competence. Where, as here, the record sheds no light on why counsel acted as he did, direct review by this Court would primarily involve ‘the perilous process of second-guessing’ People v. Miller, 7 Cal.3d 562 , 102 Cal.Rptr. 841, 848 , 498 ”

   6 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 191 Md. App. 48 - Washington v. State · Flansburg v. State

3. “"(1) The defendant has not previously (i) been found guilty of a crime of violence; (ii) entered a plea of guilty or nolo contendere to a charge of a crime of violence; or (iii) had a judgment of probation on stay of entry of judgment entered on a charge of a crime of violence. As used in this paragraph, 'crime of violence’ means abduction, arson, escape, kidnapping, manslaughter, except involuntary manslaughter, mayhem, murder, robbery, or rape or sexual offense in the first or second degree, or an attempt to commit any of these offenses, or the use of a handgun in the commission of a felony or another crime of violence. (2) The victim was a participant in the defendant’s conduct or consented to the act which caused the victim’s death. (3) The defendant acted under substantial duress, domination or provocation of another person, but not so substantial as to constitute a complete defense to the prosecution. (4) The murder was committed while the capacity of the defendant to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law was substantially impaired as a result of mental incapacity, mental disorder, emotional disturbance, or intoxication. (5) The youthful age of the defendant at the time of the crime. (6) The act of the defendant was not the sole proximate cause of the victim’s death. (7) It is unlikely that the defendant will engage in further criminal activity that would constitute a continuing threat to society. (8) Any other fa”

   4 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Scott v. State · Tichnell v. State