¶1(concurring specially in part, dissenting in part).
¶2I. While I favor the comparative negligence rule, I think that if it comes it should be ushered in by the General Assembly. This will allow substantial input by the bar and other interested groups, individually and through committees. The General Assembly is in a position to develop and adopt a comprehensive statute which not only makes the basic transition but also treats other vexing problems that accompany comparative negligence, such as those relating to contribution and indemnity. On the other hand, if the General Assembly decides to retain contributory negligence the judiciary should not “overrule” the legislature and force comparative negligence on the state. This is not a constitutional issue on which the General Assembly has no choice; it is a policy issue. I would therefore simply adhere to our pronouncement in Stewart v. Madison, 278 N.W.2d 284 (Iowa 1979).
¶3II. Under the contributory negligence doctrine I dissent from allowing loss of consortium damages of which the negligence of the injured spouse was a proximate cause, for reasons similar to those stated in my dissenting opinion in Hande-land v. Brown, 216 N.W.2d 574 (Iowa 1974).