State v. Love’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

8 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 8 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “[i]f it appears that a defendant or the state is substantially prejudiced by a joinder of the offenses for trial, upon a written motion of the defendant or the state and upon a particularized showing of substantial prejudice, the court may grant a severance of offenses or provide whatever relief justice requires.”

   3 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. State v. McDonald · State v. Scott

2. “Notwithstanding Missouri supreme court rule 24.07, two or more offenses may be charged in the same indictment or information in a separate count for each offense if the offenses charged, whether felonies or misdemeanors or infractions, or any combination thereof, are of the same or similar character or are based on the same act or transaction or on two or more acts or transactions connected together or constituting parts of a common scheme or plan.”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. STATE OF MISSOURI, Plaintiff-Respondent v. SCOTT ALAN ST. GEORGE · State v. McDonald

3. “In determining whether actual prejudice exists when alleging an error with regard to the severance of charges, the court should consider, among other relevant factors, the number of offenses charged, the complexity of the evidence offered, and whether the trier of fact could realistically distinguish the evidence or apply the law to each offense. State v. Conley, 873 S.W.2d 233, 238 (Mo. banc 1994). “The mere fact that juries are apt to regard with a more jaundiced eye a person charged with two crimes than a person charged with one does not call for severance.” [State v.] Bechhold, 65 S.W.3d [591,] 596 [ (Mo.App.2002) ]. In addition, “the general allegation that the jury would likely consider evidence of guilt of one charge as evidence of guilt of another charge is not sufficient to show a particularized showing of substantial prejudice.” [State v.] Chambers, 234 S.W.3d [501,] 509 [ (Mo.App.2007) ]. Severance is not mandated merely because evidence relating to one count would not be admissible in the trial of a second count were the two tried separately. Conley, 873 S.W.2d at 238 . Where the evidence relating to each of the offenses is uncomplicated and distinct, and the jury is properly instructed to return separate verdicts for each offense charged, the trial court does not abuse its discretion in refusing to sever the counts. Chambers, 234 S.W.3d at 509.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. State v. Smith