Schnell v. The Vallescura’s Empirical Analysis
293 U.S. 296 · 1934
Citation profile
208 federal appellate · 37 district · 71 state decisions
How this case has been cited
Cited by 652 later decisions (9 by the Supreme Court) — most recently April 2008 · most notably Missouri Pacific Railroad v. Elmore & Stahl (1964), Commercial Molasses Corp. v. New York Tank Barge Corp. (1941)
208 federal appellate · 37 district · 71 state decisions — followed in 12 states
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Appellate journey
reviewedThe Vallescura (from Second Circuit Court of Appeals)
Relationships
Relies on Liverpool & Great Western Steam Co. v. Phenix Insurance · The Victory & The Plymothian · Railroad Company v. Lockwood · The Edwin Morrison Bradley Fertilizer Co v. Lavender
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 652 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
““Here the stipulation was for exemption from liability for a particular kind of injury, decay. But the decay of a perishable cargo is not a cause; it is an effect. It may be the result of a number of causes, for some of which, such as the inherent defects of the cargo, or, under the contract, sea peril making it impossible to ventilate properly, the carrier is not liable. For others, such as' negligent stowage, or failure to care for the cargo properly during the voyage, he is liable. The stipulation thus did not add to the causes of injury from which the carrier could claim immunity. It could not relieve him from liability for want of diligence in the stowage or care of the cargo. “It is unnecessary for us to consider whether the effect of the clause is to relieve the carrier from the necessity, in the first instance, of offering evidence of due diligence in caring for a cargo received in good condition, and delivered in a state of decay. [Cases cited.] For here want of diligence in providing proper ventilation is established and it is found that the failure to ventilate lias caused the damage. It is enough that the clause plainly cannot be taken to relieve the vessel from bringing itself within the exception from liability for damage by sea peril where the shipper has carried the burden of showing that the decay is due either to sea peril, In that bad weather prevented ventilation, or to the vessel’s negligence. Where the state of the proof is such as to show that the damag”
11 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority“[T]he law casts upon [the carrier] the burden of the loss which he cannot explain or, explaining, bring within the exceptional case in which he is relieved from liability.”
11 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority“[T]he burden rests upon the carrier of goods by sea to bring himself within any exception relieving him from the liability which the law otherwise imposes on him.”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.