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293 U.S. 55

Pflueger v. Sherman

Supreme Court of the United States

Argued October 15, 16, 1934.

Decided November 5, 1934.

Supreme Court of the United States · decided 1934-11-05

2 counsel of record

Relies on United States v. Mayer · United States v. Mayer · California Artificial Stone Paving Co. v. Molitor

Cited in Case Law’s definition of “certified question”

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Petition denied / appeal dismissed · 9–0 · Decided 1934-11-05

How this case has been cited

Cited by 26 later decisions (6 by the Supreme Court) — most recently March 1965 · most notably Carumbo v. Cape Cod S. S. Co. (1941), Flournoy v. Wiener (1944)

18 federal appellate ·

1201934194019501960decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

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¶1*56Mr. John Francis Neylan, with whom Mr. Bartley C. Crum was on the brief, for Pflueger et al.

¶2Mr. W. H. Lawrence, with whom Messrs. Alfred Sutro, Eugene M. Prince, and W. L. Stanley were on the brief, for Sherman et al.

¶3Per Curiam.

¶4After an extended recital of the allegations of the bill of complaint herein (a copy of which, consisting of seventy-three printed pages, is attached to the certificate) with the statement that it is not clear to the court whether this is a stockholders’ suit or one on behalf of the individual complainants, and after a further recital of proceedings in the cause, of the decree rendered in the District Court, and of certain documents filed in the Circuit Court of Appeals after a motion to dismiss an appeal from that decree, the Circuit Court of Appeals has certified to this Court the following question:

“ Has the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Ninth Judicial Circuit jurisdiction to hear and determine the questions of law and fact involved in said decree of said United States District Court for the Territory of Hawaii, from which decree said appeal was prosecuted and is now pending?
“[The answer to the foregoing question will, we assume, necessarily involve the validity and effect of the above so called ‘ appearances and waivers ’ filed by certain of the complainants in this court: the question of whether or not complainants J. D. Isenberg, Mrs. Paul Isenberg, R. M. Isenberg, Julia Barckhausen Reschke, *57Paula Volkmann, Clara Sielcken Schwarz, J. F. Hum-burg, August Humburg, B. von Damm, F. W. Klebahn, Herman P. F. Schultze, Julie Rudolphi, formerly Julie Hegeler, and Marie Feine, formerly Marie Hackfeld, whose counsel withdrew before the entry of the joint decree against them, and who have not appealed or entered their appearance in this court, are necessary parties, and whether or not the Supreme Court will look beyond the decree to determine whether the suit is a stockholders’ suit, and if it is, whether three of the stockholders of the dissolved corporation (appellants) may appeal from the decree without a summons and severance in the lower court.]”

¶5If the decree, set forth in the certificate, be deemed to be joint, and the persons above named, in the absence of summons and severance, to be necessary parties to the appeal, the Circuit Court of Appeals would be without jurisdiction. In that aspect, there would be no occasion for the submission of the question. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. Bunn, 285 U. S. 169, 178, 182; Elliot v. Lombard, 292 U. S. 139, 141, 142.

¶6The question has been certified apparently in order to obtain the decision of several underlying questions, and in the view that the various proceedings, facts and circumstances detailed in the certificate must be examined by this Court to the end that it may determine what effect shall be given to certain “ appearances and waivers ” filed in the Circuit Court of Appeals, and what effect shall be given to a statement and withdrawal of counsel for certain parties before the entry of the decree against them in the District Court, and that the Court may also determine the nature of the suit, and whether, in the light of these determinations, summons and severance of those not parties to the appeal were necessary.

¶7The certificate fails to conform to the requirement that questions submitted must be questions of law and not *58mixed questions of law and fact, and not such as involve or imply conclusions or judgment by the Court upon the effect of facts adduced in the cause, and must be distinct and definite. The Court cannot be called upon to answer questions of objectionable generality, or to review proceedings, facts and circumstances for the purpose of deciding a variety of preliminary questions in order to reach and decide an ultimate question submitted. Rule 37. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Ry. Co. v. Williams, 205 U. S. 444, 451-453; United States v. Mayer, 235 U. S. 55, 66; Cleveland-Cliffs Iron Co. v. Arctic Iron Co., 248 U. S. 178, 179; United States v. John Barth Co., 276 U. S. 606; White v. Johnson, 282 TJ. S. 367, 371; Wells v. Commissioner, 286 TJ. S. 529. See, also, Dennistoun v. Stewart, 18 How. 565, 568; California Paving Co. v. Molitor, 113 U. S. 609, 616; Jewell v. Knight, 123 U. S. 426, 432.

¶8The certificate is

¶9Dismissed.

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