¶1(dissenting in Part II of the opinion).
¶2At the outset it may appear to the reader of this opinion that it is somewhat peculiar for me to be writing the majority opinion on one issue, while at the same time writing the dissenting opinion as to the other issue. This calls for an explanation. The case was originally assigned to me for preparation of the opinion of the court. The majority of the court agreed with my views on the minimal due process issue. Likewise, a majority of the court disagreed with my view on the issue involving the uncorroborated testimony of accomplices.
¶3Even though the probation officer referred to Armstrong’s managing a place of ill repute, and having been found guilty of selling beer on Sunday in violation of law, two seemingly valid reasons for revoking probation, it is obvious the probation officer was concerned only with the robbery and kidnaping charges. His recommendation is, “If testimony is offered implicating Armstrong in the robbery and kidnaping of Mr. and Mrs. Lewis Faucett, it is my recommendation that his probation be revoked.” As noted above, the only testimony implicating Armstrong in the crimes came from accomplices.
¶4The Court of Criminal Appeals concluded that while a felony conviction cannot be had on the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice, probation may be revoked based upon such testimony. I do not agree with this conclusion. I am of the opinion that the “reasonable satisfaction from the evidence” standard applied by a trial judge in a revocation hearing would not include uncorroborated testimony of accomplices. That standard would at least be equal to evidence of probable cause required to bind a person over to the grand jury.
¶5In State v. Smith, 138 Ala. 111, 35 So. 42 (1902), Chief Justice McClellan wrote to the question whether the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice may be sufficient to show probable cause to believe that a felony has been committed and that the party under inquiry is guilty thereof. The Chief Justice stated:
“Can there be said to be even probable cause shown in any case by testimony which the law expressly and positively *107declares to be insufficient to support a conviction? We think not. The whole theory of holding accused persons to the grand jury is that the evidence before the examining magistrate or the judge on habeas corpus is sufficient to sustain a finding of guilt by a petit jury when he shall be indicted and brought to the bar of the court. When there is not such evidence, it is not the contemplation of the law that the accused shall be held. To hold him would be a vain and useless thing, involving his incarceration not as a punishment for crime, and not really to the end that he should be tried for a crime charged of his probable guilt of which there is evidence to prove, but at. the best upon a mere speculation that evidence may be found to corroborate that of the accomplice-.”
¶6I would not be as unkind to Smith as Mr. Justice Bloodworth. If Smith is going to be buried it should have a decent funeral — maybe not a requiem mass — but at least, a few kind words before it is lowered in a grave.
¶7It does not appear that Armstrong has ever been tried for the charges in the indictment. The position of the State in this case may be as that described in Morrissey by Chief Justice Burger speaking of revocation of parole:
“Sometimes revocation occurs when the parolee is accused of another crime; it is often preferred to a new prosecution because of the procedural ease of recommitting the individual on the basis of a lesser showing by the State.”
¶8Because of the danger that accomplice’s testimony may be polluted, it is my opinion that such testimony must be corroborated in order to warrant revocation of probation when that is the sole basis of revocation. Here it appears that the probationer was implicated in a crime only on the accomplices’ testimony, which was not corroborated.
¶9I respectfully dissent to the ruling of the court as to Issue II.
¶10(concurring in part and dissenting in part).
¶11I concur in Part I.
¶12Because of that portion of the opinion dealing with the uncorroborated testimony question (Part II), with which I cannot agree, I am constrained to address myself to this issue.
¶13Assume, for example (which is more . factual than hypothetical), that the only violation of the conditions of probation is the alleged robbery of the drugstore. At the revocation hearing, the only evidence adduced is that of a confessed accomplice who says, “I robbed the store but he knew about it and helped in planning the act.” The defendant’s probation is revoked. He is never brought to trial for robbery for the obvious reason that the state cannot obtain a conviction. Without this charge, the defendant could still be on probation for the prior conviction. He is now, in effect, serving time for the commission of an offense for which he could not be tried and convicted. The same policy reason for not permitting a conviction on the testimony of an accomplice, unless corroborated, equally obtains here. Its reliability is not increased by the nature of the hearing, whether to determine if his probation will be revoked or his guilt or innocence of the offense. The “corroboration” rule is not a mere rule of evidence, but a substantive rule going to the burden of proof — an essential element of the offense, legislatively mandated by Tit. 15, § 307, Alabama Code.
¶14This does not mean, of course, that the trial judge is held to the more strict standard of “convinced beyond a reasonable doubt,” the “hearsay” rule, and other procedural and substantive rights of the defendant which would govern in a jury trial of the alleged offense. But, in my opinion, it ought to mean that where a criminal violation is the basis for revocation of proba*108tion, there should be sufficient proof of each of the elements of the offense to reasonably satisfy the trial court that the defendant has in fact committed the offense, and thus violated the terms of his probation. Otherwise, we are right back to przGagnon and Morrissey, saying, as we did then, that because probation is a matter of grace in the first place, it can be revoked at will; so why the necessity for any degree of proof with respect to the violation charged?
¶15To be sure, many states and the federal system do not have the “uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice” rule, but we do, and for good reason. It is the wisdom of this rule that such testimony, by its very nature, is so unreliable as to require corroboration to convict for a felony. Because of the lack of the full panoply of constitutional rights at a revocation hearing (e. g., trial by jury), there is even more reason to preserve and apply this rule.
¶16Therefore, I concur in Part I and dissent with respect to Part II.
¶17(concurring specially in Part I of the opinion).
¶18I agree that the case needs to go back to trial court to allow the trial judge to put into the record a written statement as to the evidence he relied on and the reasons why he revoked Armstrong’s probation. Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 93 S.Ct. 1756, 36 L.Ed.2d 656 (1973). I think we all know that the trial judge relied on the testimony of Armstrong’s alleged co-conspirators and that of the probation officer in revoking Armstrong’s probation because of the robbery and kidnapping charges, but one of the Gagnonstandards does say that the factfinder (that would be the trial judge in probation matters) must make a written statement; therefore, I think this written record needs to be made for whatever benefit, if any, it will be to Armstrong. Cf. Foy v. Bounds, 481 F.2d 286, 4 Cir., 1973.
¶19I also agree in that portion of the majority opinion which affirms the Court of Criminal Appeals in its conclusion that no corroboration of the testimony of accomplices is required in probation revocation hearings.
¶20I do not agree with the holding of the majority that minimal due process was not accorded Armstrong in all other respects. I will detail each standard set out in Gag-non and attempt to show why Armstrong was accorded “due process,” in all other respects.
¶21(1) Written notice of the claimed violation of probation.
¶22I believe Armstrong received written notice of the claimed violations of probation. Armstrong was actually arrested on an order of 'his probation officer. The order was issued pursuant to Title 42, § 24, Code 1940 (Recomp. 1958) which provides:
“The period of probation or suspension of execution of sentence shall be determined by the court and such period may be continued, extended or terminated. Upon the satisfactory fulfillment of the conditions of probation or suspension of sentence the court shall by order duly entered on its minutes discharge the defendant. At any time during the period of probation or suspension of execution of sentence, the court may issue a warrant and cause the defendant to be arrested for violating any of the conditions of probation or suspension of sentence. Any probation officer, police officer or other officer with power of arrest upon the request of the probation officer, may arrest a probationer without a warrant. In case of an arrest without a warrant the arresting officer shall have a written statement by said probation officer setting forth that the probationer has, in his judgment, violated the conditions of probation and said statement shall be sufficient warrant for the detention of said probationer in the county jail, or other appropriate place of detention, until such probationer shall be brought be*109fore the court. Such probation officer shall forthwith report such arrest and detention to the court and submit in writing a report showing in what manner the probationer has .violated, probation. Thereupon the court, after a hearing, may revoke the probation or suspension of execution of sentence and shall proceed to deal with the case as if there had been no probation or suspension of execution of sentence; and, in cases certified from a court of inferior jurisdiction, shall order and adjudge that the sentence be immediately executed.” [Emphasis added.]
¶23The trial judge had ordered a warrant to issue to arrest Armstrong on November 15, 1973. The minute entry reads:
“It being made to appear to the Court that the Probationer herein is delinquent as such, is reputed to have violated the criminal laws, and consorting with associates of bad repute and that a hearing should be,, had to determine whether probation herein should be revoked or other action taken by the Court.
“It is therefore the order and judgment of the court and it is ordered and adjudged by the court that probationer herein is delinquent as such, and that probationer be, and hereby is, declared delinquent and that the running of probationers probationary period be and hereby is tolled and stopped and that capias and warrant forthwith issue for arrest of probationer and that when apprehended probationer be brought before the court for hearing for the determination of the truth of charges made against probationer herein and what action should be taken by the court and whether probation herein should be revoked and order suspending sentence herein set aside. Done and ordered this 15th day of November, 1973. Aubrey Dominick, Judge Presiding
“It being brought to the attention of the court that Probationer has been arrested, and has an attorney to represent him, the probation revocation hearing is hereby set for November 19, 1973, at 9:00 o’clock A.M. before the undersigned. Done and ordered this 15th day of November, 1973.
Aubrey Dominick, Circuit Judge.”
¶24In Foy v. Bounds, supra, Judge Haynes-worth said: “The warrant gave him written notice of the conduct with which he was charged as violating the terms of his probation.” I do not know how specific the warrant in Foy v. Bounds,'was, but I think the procedure here was specific enough to notify Armstrong, under Gagnonstandards, of the claimed violation. Furthermore, Armstrong’s lawyer was told on Thursday before the Monday hearing that Armstrong’s probation would probably be revoked because of the indictments. This was not written notice, but we are talking about “due process” and fundamental fairness. In short, I think Armstrong’s lawyer had sufficient notice of the alleged claims of violation of probation. I think he knew on Thursday that the trial judge would probably revoke probation because of the criminal charges.
¶25(2) Disclosure to probationer of evidence against him.
¶26The delinquency report prepared by the probation officer was given to Armstrong’s attorneys on the morning of the revocation hearing. The record reflects as far as I can determine, no attempt was made by Armstrong’s attorneys to get more speciics about the alleged claims of violation of probation during the four days prior to the hearing. Armstrong’s attorney asserted before the hearing began that he “assumed” the delinquency report constituted the charges. I am not sure this is a correct assumption. I believe that Title 42, § 24 contemplates that the warrant, or the probation officer’s statement, whichever is used, are the charges. Armstrong was given a copy of the delinquency report. Oral testimony was also presented at the hear*110ing, and Armstrong was confronted by witnesses against him. Consequently, “due process” was accorded Armstrong in this respect, in my opinion.
(3) Opportunity to be heard in person and to present witnesses and documentary evidence.
(4) The right to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses.
¶27Both of these rights were given to Armstrong, in my opinion.
(5) A neutral and detached hearing body.
¶28I believe that a hearing before a trial judge, even if he is the one who gave probation initially, satisfies this requirement of neutrality and impartiality.
(6) A written statement by factfinders as to evidence relied on and reasons for revoking probation.
¶29The trial judge failed to do this. I. do not understand why a trial judge should be required to do this, but Gagnondoes set it out as a standard.
¶30What about a two-stage proceeding? Gagnon speaks of a two-step procedure — a preliminary hearing and a revocation hearing. In most cases, a two-step procedure will be required, especially if the probationer will be detained for a substantial period of time on a warrant or statement awaiting the revocation hearing. But is every probationer entitled to a two-stage proceeding, especially if he has been charged by a grand jury with the commission of a felony? I think not. Other courts which have considered the question agree with me. In fact, I do not believe Morrissey or Gagnonsay that two hearings must be held in every case. The facts in Morrissey and Gagnonare so different from the facts of this case. As I read those cases, they do not condemn the Alabama procedure. In fact, Alabama’s procedural statute for parole revocation [Title 42, § 12, Code of Alabama, 1940 (Recomp. 1958)] is approvingly cited in the Morrissey case. 408 U.S. at page 488, 92 S.Ct. 2593.
¶31I think Morrissey and Gagnonaddress a serious problem — the detention of a parolee or probationer without minimal “due process.” Those cases are distinguishable from the facts of this case.
¶32Morrissey was a parolee in Iowa, a state in which no law required a hearing before a parole could be revoked. Morrissey was arrested at his parole officer’s direction and held in a county jail until the Board of Parole revoked his parole after review of the parole officer’s written report. The Supreme Court of the United States held that federal procedural due process requires a hearing, which can be informal, before a state parole can be revoked and that, (1) where state statutes do not require such a parole revocation hearing [Alabama does], and (2) wheré there is a substantial time lag between arrest and final determination by the parole board [there was no time lag here], and (3) where the parolee is arrested at a place distant from the state institution to which he may be returned béfore the final revocation decision is made [probationer arrested in Tuscaloosa], given these factors, due process also requires a minimal inquiry preliminary hearing [hearing here was full blown], as promptly as convenient after the arrest [hearing held four days after arrest], and at or near the place of arrest or place of the alleged violation [held in Tuscaloosa where violation allegedly occurred] .
¶33Morrissey further held that this hearing to determine probable cause to believe the parolee had committed acts violating his parole could be held before any neutral and detached independent hearing officer, even a parole officer other than the one recommending revocation [hearing here before a circuit judge]. Other minimal re*111quirements for such initial hearing are detailed in the opinion.
¶34Gagnon v. Scarpelli was a Wisconsin case. Wisconsin, unlike Alabama, had no law requiring a probation revocation hearing. Scarpelli was sentenced to prison but the sentence was suspended and he was placed on probation and permitted to reside in Illinois. The day after Scarpelli was accepted for supervision in Illinois, he was apprehended in the process of a house burglary. The Wisconsin department, apparently an administrative agency, forthwith revoked probation without a hearing [a hearing was held here], and Scarpelli was taken directly to prison in Wisconsin to begin serving his sentence. The Supreme Court held that probation, where sentence has been imposed, is constitutionally indistinguishable from parole, and that Scarpelli was entitled to a preliminary and final revocation hearing as specified in Morrissey v. Brewer.
¶35In Gagnon, there was no hearing, preliminary or final.
¶36Some state courts have addressed the question of the necessity for a preliminary hearing in every case. In Singletary v. State, Fla.App., 290 So.2d 116, the District Court of Appeals certified the following question to the Supreme Court of Florida. “Does the decision of the United States Supreme Court in Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 93 S.Ct. 1756, 36 L.Ed.2d 656 (1973), create an absolute requirement for a separate and distinct preliminary hearing prior to a formal probation revocation hearing?” The Supreme Court of Florida dismissed the certiorari on April 1, 1974, 293 So.2d 361.
¶37What is the purpose of the preliminary hearing suggested in Morrissey and Gag-non? In my opinion, the sole purpose of the preliminary hearing is to determine whether there is probable cause to believe that a probationer has violated the terms of his probation. See Stevenson v. State of Fla., Fla.App., 300 So.2d 281; Bernhardt v. State, 288 So.2d 490 (Fla.). As a matter of fact, the hearing is so informal that it can be held before a probation officer other than the one who is supervising the probationer.
¶38See Singletary v. State, Fla.App., 290 So.2d 116; Annotation, 29 A.L.R.2d 1132, Nature and Sufficiency of Notice in a Probation Revocation Hearing.
¶39In Genung v. Nuckolls, 292 So.2d 587 (Fla.), Justice Roberts held that under Florida law a subsequent arrest on a felony charge of a probationer is prima facie evidence of violation of condition of parole and that an adjudication of guilt on the charge is unnecessary to a revocation of probation. The Genungcase stands for the proposition that no preliminary hearing is necessary when there has been a subsequent arrest on a felony warrant. Judge Haynesworth, in Foy v. Bounds, 481 F.2d 286, 289 (4 Cir., 1973), discussed the standards set out in Gagnon, including the necessity for a preliminary hearing. He said:
“Within recent weeks, the Supreme Court in Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 93 S.Ct. 1756, 36 L.Ed.2d 656 announced due process standards governing probation revocation hearings. In effect, the Court adopted standards enunciated earlier for parole revocation hearings in Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 92 S.Ct. 2593, 33 L.Ed.2d 484. Except that there was no preliminary hearing in Ohio to determine probable cause for a later full revocation hearing, and with the possible exception of the matter of confrontation, to be discussed presently, Foy’s hearing abundantly complied with all of the due process requirements. The warrant gave him written notice of the conduct with which he was charged as violating the terms of his probation. There was full disclosure of all of the *112evidence against him, and the entire file was opened to his lawyer. The hearing was before an impartial trial judge, who filed a written opinion stating his findings of fact upon which he based the revocation order.”
% ‡ ‡ ‡ *
“The absence of an earlier preliminary hearing in Ohio before an impartial officer, not necessarily a judicial one, would have provided immediate assurance against inappropriate recommendations by an over-zealous supervising probation officer, but the absence of such a hearing hardly can be said to have infected the integrity of the factfinding process in the North Carolina hearing.”
¶40We have grand jury indictments here. A grand jury indictment satisfies any requirement of probable cause that the defendant violated the.law and a condition of probation, in my opinion. Why does the state have to hold another independent hearing to decide whether there is probable cause to detain the probationer until the time a revocation - hearing can be held when a grand jury has found an indictment? In other words, “due process” does require that the defendant not be at the complete mercy of the parole or probation officer as was true in both Morrisseyand Gagnon. However, Armstrong is in a different position. A grand jury indictment charged that Armstrong had violated the law. The indictment was enough, in my opinion, to hold him until the revocation hearing set four days hence. In fact, the indictment authorized the state to arrest and hold Armstrong until he could make bond. The revocation hearing was held promptly, as required by law, so I see no denial of fundamental fairness.
¶41Except as indicated, I think the trial judge complied substantially with Gagnon. I, therefore, thought it desirable to set forth my separate views in this special concurrence.