State v. Winot’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

95 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 95 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “Because direct evidence of an accused's state of mind typically is not available, his intent often must be inferred from his conduct, other circumstantial evidence and rational inferences that may be drawn there-from..... For example, intent may be inferred from the events leading up to, and immediately following, the conduct in question ... the accused's physical acts and the general surrounding circumstances.... An accused's own words, however, constitute particularly compelling, direct evidence of his intent.... Finally, when a jury evaluates evidence of a defendant's intent, it properly rel[ies] on its common sense, experience and knowledge of human nature in drawing inferences and reaching conclusions of fact.”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. 172 Conn. App. 820 - State v. Williams · 167 Conn. App. 615 - State v. Rice

2. “A statute ... [that] forbids or requires conduct in terms so vague that persons of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application violates the first essential of due process.... Laws must give a person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited so that he may act accordingly.... Unless a vagueness claim implicates the first amendment right to free speech, [a] defendant whose conduct clearly comes within a statute's unmistakable core of prohibited conduct may not challenge the statute because it is vague as applied to some hypothetical situation .... In contrast, [i]n a facial vagueness challenge, we ... examine the challenged statute to see if it is impermissibly vague in all of its applications. A statute that is impermissibly vague in all its applications is vague, not in the sense that it requires a person to conform his conduct to an imprecise but comprehensible normative standard, but rather in the sense that no standard of conduct is specified at all.... Such a provision simply has no core.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 190 Conn. App. 353 - State v. Dojnia

3. “a remand of [the] matter for an instruction on the incidental rule in relation to risk of injury would [have been] illogical and wholly confusing to the jury. See Walker v. Commonwealth, 47 Va.App. 114, 122-24 , 622 S.E.2d 282 (2005) (incidental rule inapplicable [when] defendant acquitted of robbery), aff'd, 272 Va. 511 , 636 S.E.2d 476 (2006); see also People v. Robbins, 131 Mich.App. 429, 433 , 346 N.W.2d 333 (1984) (incidental rule inapplicable [when] trial court granted defendant's motion for directed verdict on underlying assault charge); State v. French, 139 Vt. 320, 321 , 428 A.2d 1087 (1981) (incidental rule inapplicable [when] defendants acquitted of sexual assault). . . .”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. State v. Kitchens