Volume 294 — Federal Reporter

<p>In Error to the District Court of the United States for the District of New Mexico; Colin Neblett, Judge.</p> <p>Action at law by the American National Bank of Oklahoma City, Old., against Board of Education of.the City of Albuquerque. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant brings error.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of the United States for the District of Colorado; John Foster Symes, Judge.</p> <p>' Suit in equity by G. F. Park and others against Morris Hazard and others. Decree for complainants, and defendants appeal.</p>

Suit in equity by William Edward Harris, executor of the will of W. R. Harris, deceased, and others, against David Monroe Harper, by Hiram M. Dow, his guardian ad litetn. Decree for complainants, and defendant appeals.

Petition to Revise Order of the District Court of the United States for the District of New Mexico; Colin Neblett, Judge. Petition by C. J. Roberts and others under Bankruptcy Act, § 24b (Comp. St. § 9608), to review and correct an order of the District Court, permitting the State of New Mexico to file a claim.

t of the United States for the District of Utah; Tillman D. Johnson, Judge. Suit in equity by the Everfresh Food Company against the Phoenix Insurance Company. Decree for complainant, and defendant appeals.

<p>3.Appeal and error <&wkey;927(7) — Evidence considered in aspect most favorable to plaintiff against whom verdict directed.</p> <p>In determining whether trial court erred in directing verdict for defendant, the evidence must be considered in the aspect most favorable to the plaintiff.</p> <p>2. Master and servant <&wkey;2l 0(4) — Brakeman held not to assume risk of injury at station.</p> <p>A head brakeman, whose foot was caught between step on engine and a station platform, as he was alighting, held not to have assumed the risk.</p> <p>3. Master and servant t&wkey;285(2) — Cause of injury to brakeman held for jury.</p> <p>In an action for death of brakeman, held, that it was error to direct verdict on ground that cause of accident was speculative and conjectural, in view of permissible inference that deceased had his foot caught between step on engine and waving contour line of the platform while alighting.</p> <p>4. Master and servant <&wkey;286( 15) — Railroad’s negligence in maintaining platform held for jury.</p> <p>In action for death of brakeman, whose heel caught on station platform as he was standing on engine step, preparatory to alighting in the performance of his duties, whether the master was negligent in providing a place for the deceased to do his work held for the jury.</p> <p>5. Master and servant &wkey;>I0l, 102(8) — Master must exercise reasonable care to provide safe place.</p> <p>It is a duty of a master to exercise reasonable care to provide a proper and safe place for a servant to do his work.</p>

<p>Í. Insurance <&wkey;635 — Allegation as to goods jettisoned ambiguous.</p> <p>A libel on a marine insurance policy, alleging that libelants sold goods shipped in 343 separate packages, separately insured, that the vessel encountered heavy storm, and sprung a leak, and it became necessary to throw overboard the greater part of the cargo, which was composed of consignments of merchandise to various consignees, was ambiguous as to what goods were jettisoned, and should be made plain by amendment.</p> <p>2. Insurance <3=>635 — Insurer held not let out as far as loss was subject to general average.</p> <p>Where libel alleged that insured goods were perishable and were jettisoned, lost, or destroyed by stranding, or, if not so lost or destroyed-, were taken possession of and kept by the insurer, which demanded and received premium with knowledge of the situation, in so far as the loss was subject, to general average, the insurer was not let out, and court erred in sustaining exception to the libel.</p> <p>3. insurance <&wkey;470 — Insurer cannot take and keep insured goods for months without being liable.</p> <p>An insurer, after a shipwreck, cannot take and keep insured goods for months without being held liable therefor, especially where the goods are perishable. -</p> <p>4. Admiralty c&wkey;79— Practice should be simple.</p> <p>Admiralty practice and procedure should be simple and untechnieal.</p>

<p>t. Criminal law <&wkey;369 (I) — Admission of evidence merely creating suspicion of another offense held error.</p> <p>On trial of a defendant charged with sale of narcotic drugs, where the evidence tended to show delivery to the purchaser on the street, admission of evidence that defendant delivered a package to another person on 'the street at a different time, the contents of which package was not shown, held prejudicial error.</p> <p>2. Criminál law <&wkey;374 — Proof of other offenses, when admissible, must be clear and definite.</p> <p>The scope and purpose of testimony of similar offenses is limited, and only in exceptional cases is such proof admissible, and, when admissible, it must be clear and convincing, and not merely proof of suspicious circumstances.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of the United States for the Eastern Division of the Northern District of Illinois.</p> <p>In the matter of the estate of the O’Gara Coal Company, bankrupt. Claim by the New York Central Railroad Company against Frank G. Gardner, trustee. From an adverse decree, claimant appeals.</p>

<p>J„ Army and navy <§=>51¡/2, New, vol. I2A Key-No. Series — Findings of Bureau of War Risk Insurance competent evidence.</p> <p>Determinations of the suceesive bureaus in charge of the administration of war risk insurance are competent evidence in an action to determine rights under the statute; but are not conclusive.</p> <p>2. Army and navy <@=>51 /2, New,, vol. I2A Key-No. Ser.ies — Plaintiff held entitled to compensation under War Risk Insurance Act for total permanent disability.</p> <p>Evidence helA to show that the condition of plaintiff was one of total permanent disability, within the meaning of War Risk Insurance Act (Comp. St. 1918, Comp. St. Ann. Supp. 1919, § 514u) from the time of his discharge.</p> <p>3. Army and navy <@=>511/2, New, vol. I2A Key-No. Series — Lapse of time as evidence of permanency of disability.</p> <p>As permanency of a condition of total disability involves the element of time, its continuance during a considerable period of time is competent and cogent evidence.</p> <p>4. Army and navy <@=551/2, New, vol. I2A Key-No. Series — Possibility of recovery from what is rated as total permanent disability does not change such status for insurance purposes.</p> <p>That the condition of an insured under War Risk Insurance Act (Comp. St. 1918, Comp. St. Ann. Supp. 1919, § 514u) which is rated as total permanent disability may improve under certain conditions does not change liis status or right to compensation on that rating, so long as such disability continues.</p> <p>5. Army and navy <S==>5 f J/2, New, vol. I2A Key-No. Series — Soldier is entitled under War Risk Insurance Act, to compensation for any disability not sclf-inflinted.</p> <p>Disabilities which entitle a soldier or navy man to compensation under War Risk Insurance Act (Comp. St. 1918, Comp. St. Ann. Supp. 1919, § 514 u) are not limited to those due to war service, but include any and all so long as not intentionally self-inflicted.</p> <p>6. Army and navy <@=»5n/2. New, vol. !2A Key-No. Series — Alter rig'll to compensation under War Risk Insurance Act for total permanent disability lias accrued, premiums are no longer due.</p> <p>After the right to compensation has accrued under War' Risk Insurance Act (Comp. St. 1918*, Comp. St. Ann. Supp. 1919, § 511u) for total permanent disability, premiums are no longer due from insured.</p> <p>7. Army and nayy <S=f5 I /¿, New, vol. 12A Key-No. Series — Ten per cent, of recovery under War Risk Insurance Act reasonable attorney’s fee.</p> <p>Under War Risk Insurance Act, an attorney’s fee to the amount of 10 per cent, of recovery is reasonable.</p>

<p>In Equity. Suit by the Perkins Glue Company against the Crandall Panel Company, Inc. Decree for defendant.</p>

In Equity. Suits by Samuel M. Kintner and Halsey M. Barrett, receivers of the National Electric Signaling Company, against the Atlantic Communication Company and others, and by the Marconi Wireless Telegraph Company against the Atlantic Communication Company, Incorporated. For brevity the parties will be referred to as Marconi, Nesco, and Atlantic.

<p>In Error to' the District Court of the United States for the Southern Division of the District of Idaho; Frank S. Dietrich, Judge.</p> <p>Ii. Goodfriend and others were convicted of violating the prohibition laws, and they bring error.</p>

Action by the Bradford Company against the Edwards Manufacturing Company. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant brings error. Writ of error to a judgment for $31,200 in favor of defendant in error, which was plaintiff below. The parties will be referred to as aligned below. The facts will be stated only so far as necessary to present the questions of law here reviewable.

<p>In Error to the District Court of the United Stales for the Northern Division of the Western District of Washington; Edward E. Cushman, Judge.</p> <p>Action at law by J. W. Maxwell against Eva, R. Ricks. Judgment for defendant, and plaintiff brings error.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of the United States for the District of Arizona; Maurice T. Dooling, Judge.</p> <p>Suit by T. M. Caldwell against Albert Steinfeld and others. Decree for defendants (289 Fed. 521), and complainant appeals.</p> <p>The appellant brought a suit to establish and foreclose a lien upon a certain irrigation system known as the Valley Farms Water Company project, consisting of canals and water ditches, together with the flumes, culverts, gates, dams, etc., appurtenant thereto. The complaint alleged that the appellee Post was one of the owners of said system, that with the knowledge and consent of the other owners he had charge of the construction of the same, and that on October 16, 1919, he, acting for himself individually and as agent for the other owners, entered into a contract with the appellant whereby the latter agreed to furnish the labor of certain horses and mules, and certain machinery, fixtures, and tools to be used in the construction of said canals and water ditches, and that on April 1, 1920, a supplemental agreement was entered into between said parties for the further use by said Post of said horses, mules, and machinery, etc., described in the prior contract. The complaint alleged that the reasonable as well as the agreed value for the use of said property so furnished by the appellant was $9,692.55, which became payable on August 5, 1920, of which sum $4,341.50 and no more has been paid. It was further alleged that the proper and necessary notices to create a lien under the Arizona statute were duly given and filed. The complaint was dismissed for want of sufficient facts to constitute a cause of suit.</p>

<p>In Error to the District Court of the United States for the Northern Division of the District of Idaho; Frank S. Dietrich, Judge.</p> <p>Dominic Constantine Montague was convicted of illegally selling narcotic drugs, and he brings error.</p>

<p>Criminal prosecution by the United States against Robert Hamp-den, alias Wade C. Fox'. On petition for modification of judgment.</p>

Peck, Judge. Suit in equity by Catherine Horst against the United "States, Robert Helmholz, and others. From the decree rendered (283 Fed. 600), all of the defendants, except the United States, appeal. This is an appeal from the decree of, the District Court awarding to the appellee Catherine Horst the benefits accruing and to accrue from and after December 31, 1920, of war risk insurance issued by tho United States government on the life of Albert R. Marshall.

<p>Í. Copyrights <§=>24 — Publisher held not “proprietor,” entitled to copyright.</p> <p>Where the principal stockholder in a publishing company agreed in writing with the author to write a book, to be copyrighted in the name of either stockholder or author, held,, that the writer and the stockholder were the “proprietors,” and that the publishing company had no right to secure copyrights on installments published in its paper, and that the copyrights obtained by it were void, under Act March 4, 1909, § 8 (Comp. St. § 9524), though the stockholder owned all but five shares of the stock of the publishing company.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, First and Second Series, Proprietor.]</p> <p>2„ Copyrights <§=>45 — Literary property <§=>6 — Written assignment necessary.</p> <p>A written assignment is necessary to transfer the proprietorship of a literary work, or the copyright to it, after the copyright has been secured.</p> <p>3. Copyrights <@=>75 — Defendant held not estopped to deny validity of copyright.</p> <p>Defendant held in no way estopped to claim that plaintiff’s copyright was void, because it was not proprietor; there being no false representation, action of plaintiff in reliance on false representation to its injury, or other elements.</p> <p>4. Copyrights <§=>83 — Burden on plaintiff in infringement suit.</p> <p>In suit for infringement of copyright, the burden was on the plaintiff to prove a valid copyright in itself.</p> <p>5. Appeal and error <§=>931 (I) — Conclusions of court of equity presumptively correct.</p> <p>When a court of equity has considered conflicting'evidence and made a finding and decree, it is presumptively correct, and unless some obvious error of law has intervened, or some serious mistake of fact has been made, the finding and decree should be permitted to stand.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of the United States for the District of Colorado; John Foster Symes, Judge.</p> <p>Suit by Alice Brown Martin and another against Frederick Sidney Brown and others. Motions to strike matter from the bill and to dismiss were granted (282 Fed. 717), and plaintiffs appeal.</p>

<p>1. Sales <§=>477(3) — Title to property purchased held to pass on execution of chattel mortgage securing purchase price.</p> <p>Where certain printing machinery and equipment were sold under an agreement reserving title, the seller taking notes for the balance of the purchase price, the buyer to give a chattel mortgage at vendor’s election, and such a chattel mortgage was given, held, that, while the sales contract was a conditional sales agreement, which created a lien under the state Personal Property Paw, such Hen was superseded by the subsequent execution of the chattel mortgage creating the status of mortgagor and mortgagee; title to the property passing at the time of such execution.</p> <p>2. Bankruptcy <®=>184(2) —Bankrupt’s chattel mortgage held not a valid lien on • proceeds of trustee’s sale.</p> <p>Where a seller of printing machinery and equipment took a chattel mortgage from the purchaser to secure the balance of the purchase price, but unreasonably delayed in filing it, as required by the state statute, such chattel mortgage was void, and conferred no lien or prior interest in the proceeds of a sale of the machinery by the trustee in bankruptcy of the purchaser.</p>

<p>In Error to the District Court of the United States for the Western District of Pennsylvania; W. H. Seward Thomson, Judge.</p> <p>William A. Kelton and others were found guilty of contempt, and bring error.</p>

Suit in equity by Bentley Gardiner and another, as sole acting executors of the will of George N. Gardiner, deceased, against the Equitable Office Building Corporation. Decree for plaintiffs, and both parties appeal.

Action by John E. Fernald against Henry Gillen’s Sons Lighterage, Incorporated. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant brings error. Writ of error to a judgment of the District Court for the Southern District of New York for $3,032.35, entered after a jury verdict in favor of plaintiff below. The parties will be referred to as aligned below.

In the matter of the estate of J. Menist Co., Inc., bankrupt. Claim of the United States for additional income tax for the year 1917, in the sum of $4,526.84, and for unpaid income taxes for the year 1918, for the sum of $9,955, plus interest. From an order of the referee, denying the motion of the trustee in bankruptcy, Edward H. Childs, to expunge the claims, said trustee appeals.

<p>At Law. Action by Lula Young against the Clyde Steamship Company.. On demurrer to declaration.</p>

<p>In Equity. Suit by the Maryland Casualty Company against the Davis Trust Company and others. On motion for preliminary injunction.</p>

In Admiralty. Petition of the Southern Pacific Company for limitation of its liability as owner of the steamship El Mundo. Petition of the Ruckenbach Steamship Compairy, Inc., for exoneration from or limitation of-its liability as owner of the steamship Frederick Rucken-bach. Petition, of the Union Sulphur Company, owner of the steamship Hewitt, for .limitation of liability. Stays were granted petitioners in all three cases, and claimants moVe to vacate the stays.

<p>In Equity. Suit by the Real Silk Hosiery Mills, Incorporated,, against the City of Portland and others. Decree for defendants.</p>

<p>Evidence @=3450(5) — Writing giving option to purchase timber at a certain price, less commission, held not so ambiguous, as to permit parol evidence to show it was not an option, but agency contract.</p> <p>A writing in terms giving plaintiff an option for 10 days to purchase certain timber at a price of $3.50- per thousand, “less a commission to you of 25 cents a thousand,” held not so ambiguous as to permit parol evidence to show that it was not an option, but a contract employing plaintiff as agent to make the sale on commission.</p>

<p>In Error to the District Court of the United States for the Western District of New York.</p> <p>Harvey Anderson was convicted of violating the National Prohibition Act, and he brings error.</p>

Suit in equity by the Westinghouse Electric & Manufacturing Company against the Cutting & Washington Radio Corporation. From a decree granting a preliminary injunction, and from an order refusing to reform the decree, defendant appeals.

<p>Appeal from the District Court of the United States ipr the Southern District of New York. ’</p> <p>Suit in equity by the Tupman Thurlow Company, Incorporated, against the Drueding Bros. Company. Decree for plaintiff, and defendant appeals.</p>

In Equity. Suit by the Riberty Highway Company, an Ohio corporation, and Edward Kabel, a citizen of Ohio, against the Michigan Public Utilities Commission, the five members of the Commission as,individuals, Andrew B. Dougherty, Attorney General of the state of Michigan, the prosecuting attorneys of Wayne, Ingham, Oakland, and Monroe Gpunties, Mich., and the commander and one of the members of the Michigan state police, to enjoin the enforcement by the defendants of an act of…

In Equity. Suit by the Pacific Spruce Corporation against Newton McCoy and others, and the Public Service Commission of Oregon. Decree for complainant.

<p>Appeal from the District Court of the United States for the Western District of Pennsylvania; Frederic P. Schoonmaker, Judge.</p> <p>■ Suit in equity by the United States against the Westmoreland Brewing’ Company, Inc., and others. From an order (294 Fed. 735) adjudging defendants guilty of contempt, they appeal.</p>

<p>Albert K. Ball and others, indicted for violation of Penal Code, § 215, demur to the indictment.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of the United States for the Southern District of, Ohio; Smith Hickenlooper, Judge.</p> <p>Suits in equity by James E. Johnstone against the P. Goldsmith Company and against John A. Spinney. Decrees for complainant, and defendants appeal.</p>

Libel by E. H. Ransom, as trustee in mortgage on steamship Egeria, her masts, bowsprit, 'boats, anchors, rigging, tackle, apparel, and furniture, to foreclose the mortgage, in which suit the Bankers’ Discount Corporation and others intervene. From the decree, the named inter-vener and another appeal.

<p>In Error to the District Court of the United States for the District of Nebraska.</p> <p>Proceeding by" the United States against Walter U. Shekel. To review the judgment rendered, the defendant brings error. On application of. defendant for order extending time to settle bill of exceptions and to file record.</p>

<p>In Error to the District Court of the United States for the District of Nebraska.</p>

<p>1. Bankruptcy <S=»440 — Order denying priority, but allowing claim as unsecured, reviewable by appeal.</p> <p>An order denying priority or a lien, and allowing the claim as an unsecured claim, is reviewable by appeal, under Bankruptcy Act, § 25a (3), being Comp. St. § 9609.</p> <p>2. .Bankruptcy <®=»3I0 — A claimant held estopped to assert a lien.</p> <p>Claimant, holding an assignment from bankrupt of a part of a sum due him on account, filed its claim as an unsecured creditor. Afterward the trustee negotiated a settlement with bankrupt’s debtor and notified all creditors, requiring any claiming liens on the proceeds to present their claims before the settlement was ratified by the referee. Claimant did not disclose its assignment, and the settlement was ratified in .ignorance Of it. Held,, that claimant was estopped to thereafter assert a lien on the fund.</p>

<p>In Error to the District Court of the United States for the Western District of Pennsylvania; Robert M. Gibson, Judge. ,</p> <p>Action at law by Alberto Venturini against A. M. Johnston and others. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendants bring error.</p>

Suit in equity by'the Associated Newspapers against Henry I. Phillips; the name “Henry” being fictitious, defendant’s real name being unknown to complainant. From an order granting a preliminary injunction, defendant appeals.

<p>1. Courts <§=»259 — • Federal courts not affected by state statute excluding unlicensed foreign corporations from “courts.”</p> <p>Rev. St. Tex. art. 1318, providing that no foreign corporation, which has not filed copies of its articles of incorporation in the office of the secretary of state shall maintain a suit “in any of the courts of this state,” does not apply to federal courts within the state.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, First and Second Series, Court (of Justice).]</p> <p>2. Trade-marks and trade-names and unfair competition <&wkey;92 — Protection given in use of trade-name which has acquired secondary meaning.</p> <p>A bill alleging that the name “Morris Plan Bank” has acquired such a meaning as to indicate to the public a bank organized by complainant, and to be no longer associated in the public mind with the originator of that plan, held to state a cause of action for an injunction to restrain defendants from advertising and representing to the public that a bank they are organizing is a “Morris Plan” bank.</p>

<p>In Error to the District Court o£ the United States for the Northern District of Texas; James C. Wilson, Judge.</p> <p>Action at law by the Prairie Oil & Gas Company against Louis F. Shanblum and William L. Wilson. Judgment for defendants, and plaintiff brings error.</p>

<p>!. Shipping <©==>(6- — 'Vessel whose destination is another vessel on high sea not engaging ,in coastwise trade.</p> <p>Where a vessel licensed for coastwise trade, under Rev. 'St. title 50, victualed a British ship on the high seas hovering oft the port of New York to sell contraband spirits she was employed in a trade other than that for which she was licensed, in violation of Rev. St. § 4377 (Comp. St. § 8132), as the trade must terminate in a port of the United States or the vessel must be registered under title 48, c. 1 (Comp. St. §§ 7707-7788).</p> <p>2. Shipping <®=»16 — Voyage for purpose of victualing another vessel on high seas is a “foreign voyage.”</p> <p>Where a vessel1 licensed for coastwise trade, under Rev. St. tit. 50 (Comp. St. §§ 8057-8146), victualed a British ship on the high sea hovering off the port of New York, she was proceeding on a “foreign voyage,” in vio-latlon of Rev. St. § 4337 (Comp. St. § 8080), as such a voyage is not necessarily to a foreign port and all places on the high seas are foreign to the United States, though not within the dominion of any other power.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — Kbr other definitions, see Words and Phrases, Foreign Voyage.]</p>

<p>I„ Courts <§=3511/2 — Alleged bankrupt’s motion to make involuntary petition more specific considered as motion to dismiss.</p> <p>Under equity rule No. 29 providing that every defense in point of law for insufficiency of fact to constitute a valid cause of action shall be made by motion to dismiss or in the answer, a motion by alleged bankrupt for order requiring petitioning creditor to make involuntary petition in bankruptcy more definite will be considered as a motion to dismiss.</p> <p>2. Bankruptcy <§=>81 (3) — Involuntary petition held sufficient for failure to state whether contract was written or oral and parties thereto.</p> <p>An involuntary petition in bankruptcy against a corporation, alleging that petitioner’s claim was based on a loan for a specified amount to alleged bankrupt, held insufficient for failure to state whether the contract was oral or in writing, to specify person with whom contract was made, and to set out a copy if in writing.</p> <p>3. Bankruptcy <§=>81 (I) — General rules of pleading and practice applicable.</p> <p>The general rules of pleading and practice apply to pleadings in bankruptcy.</p>

<p>1. Towage <§=515(2) — Evidence held sufficient to show negligence of tugs, but not of tug master directing tugs.</p> <p>In libel for damages to a ship in tow of tugs by collision with a pier, evidence held sufficient to sbow that negligence of tlie tugs caused the collision, but insufficient to show that the tug master, directing the tugs from the ship, was negligent.</p> <p>2. Towage <®=>l I (3)- — Tug, obeying improvident order, held at fault.</p> <p>Even if one of several tugs, towing a ship through a gap into a basin, permitted the hawser to become slack, because of an order to stop by some one on the ship, held, that the tug would have been at fault in obeying such an improvident order, though, if the order had come from one of the ship’s men, without authority of the tug master in command of all the tugs, the ship would have been contributorily negligent.</p> <p>3. Towage <§=sl I (2) — Tugs held not responsible in rem for orders of tug master.</p> <p>For orders of a tug master on board a ship, which came into collision with a pier while being towed through a gap into a basin, held, that the tugs could not be held responsible in rem.</p> <p>4. Towage <§=>! I (2) — Towing company held liable for negligence of its tug master.</p> <p>A towing company, which, because its own tugs were engaged, hired others to tow a steamship to a berth, would be liable for damages to the ship capsed by the orders of its tug master, though as to third parties the ship would be liable.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of the United States for the Southern District of New York.</p>

In Equity. Suit by the Louisiana Water Company against' the Public Service Commission of the' State of Missouri and others, with the City of Louisiana intervening. Decree for complainant.

<p>In Equity. Bill by the Thunder Bay Limestone Company against the Detroit & Mackinac Railway Company.</p>

<p>In Admiralty. Libel by the Kauler Company against the Lucker~bach Steamship Comp2ny, [[Y;425;62;447;81]nc. Decree for respondent.</p>

<p>8, Carriers <©=>105(2) — Notice requisite to render carrier liable for special damages for delay.</p> <p>Special damages are not recoverable from a carrier for delay in delivery of property shipped in carload lots, unless notice of special circumstances making the damage likely to occur on delay was given the carrier on receiving the goods for transportation.</p> <p>?.. Carriers <©=! 86 — Connecting carrier not affected, by notice to initial carrier of special damages likely to result from delay.</p> <p>The contract made by the initial carrier, so far as its terms are valid and applicable, covers the transportation to destination, and such carrier is liable in damages for unreasonable delay by a connecting carrier; but notice of special damages likely to result from delay, which might charge the initial carrier with liability, is not an element of the through contract, such as will affect the connecting carrier, unless noted on the waybill or otherwise brought home to it.</p> <p>S. Carriers <©=105(2) — Requisites of notice to charge carrier with liability for special damages for delay stated.</p> <p>Notice to a carrier tha.t; special damages will result from delay in shipment should be given at or before the time it receives the shipment, and to an agent in position to act thereon, or .one whose duty it is to receive such knowledge and cause others to act; and the agent who receives the shipment is the obvious, and generally the proper, person to serve as a medium for such notice.</p> <p>4. Carriers <©=>105(2) — Notice during transit may charge carrier with liability for special damages for subsequent delay.</p> <p>Where the cause and place of delay in a shipment are known, failure to use diligence to expedite delivery after notice given during transit may subject the carrier to liability for special damages subsequently accruing.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of the United States for the Southern District of West Virginia, at Huntington; George W. McClintie, Judge.</p>

<p>In Error to the District Court of the United States for the District of Minnesota.</p>

<p>In Error to the District Court of the United States for the Distiret of Minnesota.</p>

<p>In Error to the District Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Missouri.</p>

<p>In Error to the District Court of the United States for the Western District of Arkansas.</p>

<p>In Error to the District Court of the United States Cor the Southern District of Iowa.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of the United States for the District of Kansas.</p>

<p>In Error to the Dise triet Court of the United States for the Western District of Tennessee; ,T. W.</p> <p>Ross, Judge.</p>

<p>Petition to Revise an Order of the District Court of the United States for the Northern District of Ohio; John M. Killits, Judge.</p>

<p>In Error to the District Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Missouri.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of the United States for the Eastern District of New York.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Norfolk; D. Lawrence Groner, Judge.</p>

<p>In Error to the District Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Missouri.</p>

<p>In Error to the District Court oC the United States for the Eastern District of Missouri.</p>

<p>In Error to the District Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Missouri.</p>

<p>In Error to the District Court of the United States for the District of Nebraska.</p>

<p>In Error to the District Court of the United States for the Western Distinct of Tennessee; X W. Ross, Judge.</p>

<p>In Error to the District Court of the United States for the Western District ‘of Michigan; Clarence W. Sessions, Judge.</p>