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← 294 F.2d 841 - Goldberg v. Sorvas

Goldberg v. Sorvas’s Empirical Analysis

294 F.2d 841 · 1961

Citation profile

28
cited by 28 later decisions
1
states following
July 1999
most recently cited

18 federal appellate · 3 district · 1 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 28 later decisions — most recently July 1999 · most notably United States v. Jefferson County Board of Education (1966), The Industrial Development Board of the Town of Section, Alabama v. Fuqua Industries, Inc., the Industrial Development Board of the City of Fort Payne, Alabama v. Fuqua Industries, Inc. (1975)

18 federal appellate · 3 district · 1 state decisions

1201961197019801990decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Applies 29 U.S.C. § 201 (American Samoa Labor Standards Amendments of 1956) · 29 U.S.C. § 206 (Equal Pay Act of 1963) · 29 U.S.C. § 207 · 29 U.S.C. § 213

Relies on Skidmore v. Swift & Co. · Arnold v. Ben Kanowsky, Inc. · Kirschbaum v. Walling US Arsenal Bldg Corporation · Mitchell v. Kentucky Finance Co. · Roland Electrical Co. v. Walling

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 28 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. ““There is no statutory provision as to what, if any, deference courts should pay to the Administrator’s conclusions. And, while we have given them notice, we have had no occasion to try to prescribe their influence. The rulings of this Administrator are not reached as a result of hearing adversary proceedings in which he finds facts from evidence and reaches conclusions of law from findings of fact. They are not, of course, conclusive, even in the cases with which they directly deal, much less in those to which they apply only by analogy. They do not constitute an interpretation of the Act or a standard for judging factual situations which binds a district court’s processes, as an authoritative pronouncement of a higher court might do. But the Administrator’s policies are made in pursuance of official duty, based upon more specialized experience and broader investigations and information than is likely to come to a judge in a particular case. They do determine the policy which will guide applications for enforcement by injunction on behalf of the Government. Good administration of the Act and good judicial administration alike require that the standards of public enforcement and those for determining private rights shall be at variance only where justified by very good reasons. The fact that the Administrator’s policies and standards are not reached by trial in adversary form does not mean that they are not entitled to respect. This Court has long given considerable and in so”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  2. ““Prior to 1949 the Administrator had not specifically named ‘shop ping service’ establishments as excluded from the Section 13(a) (2) exemption. However, as early as 1941 the following service type businesses among others, were listed by the Administrator as not in the ordinary case sufficiently similar in character to retail establishments to be considered service establishments within the meaning of § 13(a) (2): * * [ E ] stablishments engaged in supplying business, financial, and statistical reporting data; * * * adjustment and credit bureaus and collection agencies; credit-rating agencies; * * * [and] employment agencies.’ “The analogy between ‘establishments engaged in supplying business, financial, and statistical reporting data,’ ‘adjustment and credit bureaus and collection agencies', ‘credit rating agencies’ and the services offered by Sorvas is so striking as to be obvious. Clearly the Administrator was not attempting to name every form of ‘retail and service’ business in his interpretative regulation. He was giving illustrations of categories into which this case fits. “Congress made plain its intention that in adopting the 1949 amendment to Section 13(a) (2) it was only clarifying the existing exemption by defining the term retail or service establishment and stating the conditions under which the exemption shall apply in order to obviate the sweeping ruling of the Administrator and the courts that no sale of goods or services for business use is retail. Its only ”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
  3. “(a) The provisions of sections 206 and 207 of this title shall not apply with respect to * * * (2) any employee employed by any retail or service establishment, more than 50 per centum of which establishment's annual dollar volume of sales of goods or services is made within the State in which the establishment is located. A `retail or service establishment' shall mean an establishment 75 per centum of whose annual dollar volume of sales of goods or services (or of both) is not for resale and is recognized as retail sales or services in the particular industry; * * *.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.