Public-domain · open source
OpenJurist
← 294 Md. 183 - Bledsoe v. Bledsoe

Bledsoe v. Bledsoe’s Empirical Analysis

1982

Citation profile

77
cited by 77 later decisions
1
states following
March 2024
most recently cited

77 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 77 later decisions — most recently March 2024 · most notably Tucker v. Fireman's Fund Insurance (1986), Walter v. Gunter (2002)

77 state decisions

48019821990200020102020decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Relies on Police Commissioner v. Dowling · Pitsenberger v. Pitsenberger · State v. Berry · Brown v. Brown · Reed v. Reed

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 77 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “In 1976, Governor Marvin Mandel established the Governor’s Commission on Domestic Relations Laws to study the constitutional, statutory, and common law regarding marriage and the dissolution of marriage in Maryland. Pursuant to its charter the Commission proposed a bill, ultimately Senate Bill 604, Ch. 794 of the Laws of 1978, to the General Assembly to remedy perceived inequities in the then “Maryland law governing the disposition of real and personal property upon divorce” or annulment. Report Accompanying The Commission’s Proposed Bill On The Disposition Of Property In Ccmnection With A Divorce Or Annulment, at 2 (1978). The proposed bill was adopted in substantially the same form as the commission proposed it and the comments of the commission on the bill are, therefore, highly relevant. At page twelve of its report, regarding § 3-6A-06, the commission explains the purposes to be accomplished by the court in awarding use and possession of the family home and family use personal property. Subsection (a) states two primary purposes which the authority conferred by this Section on the family home should be used to accomplish. These are to permit the children of the family to live in an environment and community which is familiar to them and to permit the continued occupancy of the family home by a spouse who has a special need to live in that home. The Commission believes, on the one hand, that these two purposes comprise all that are entitled to priority in the exercise of ”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
  2. “[I]t is the duty of the courts to declare the law as the General Assembly has made it, that is, to ascertain and give effect to the intention of the legislature. This we have said on many occasions is the cardinal rule of statutory construction. In ascertaining the legislative intent we look to the language used, and when such language is clear and unambiguous, it must be held to mean what it expresses. However, where the language is ambiguous and of doubtful import, the duty of the courts is to ascertain and give effect to the true legislative intent. In short, the judicial function of statutory construction lies wholly within the domain of ambiguity and uncertainty. When exercising this function the courts may resort to extrinsic aids such as examining the history of the passage of the law, the reports of committees and commissions, the introduction of amendments and testimony given before legislative committees. As we said in Berry v. State, [ 287 Md. 491, 496 , 413 A.2d 557 (1980)], “where the statutory language is of doubtful meaning, the Court must venture beyond the words of the statute and consider the subject matter of the statute, the purpose underlying its enactment, and the object sought to be accomplished^]””
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
  3. “Donald first contends that the subject property is not a “family home” within the meaning of the term as defined in ... [§ 8-201(c) of the Family Law Article] because he acquired the property prior to his marriage to Pamela____ Donald argues that this section effectively prevents the Bledsoe home from being a “family home” irrespective of his 1977 transfer of the property to Pamela and him as tenants by the entirety. While we have uncovered no Maryland case addressing this exact point, we have recognized on many occasions the proposition that property purchased entirely by one spouse but titled in the names of both as joint tenants or tenants by the entirety amounts to a gift to the other spouse of an ownership interest in the property____ Here, then, though Donald acquired the property prior to the marriage, when he created a tenancy by the entirety he made a valid gift to Pamela of an interest in the property. Therefore, this property, being the principal residence of the spouses, could not be excluded from the definition of “family home” solely because he had initially acquired it prior to the marriage.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.