Forrest v. Jack’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

81 federal appellate · 11 district · 37 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 204 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. ““The liability sought to be enforced is purely statutory, and the declaration of the statute is that ‘the shareholders of every national banking association shall be held individually responsible, equally and ratably, and not one for another, for all contracts, debts, and engagements of such association to the extent of the amount of their stock therein at the par value thereof,’ etc. Section 5151, Rev.St. [now 12 U.S.C.A., Sec. 64]. To be liable, the party charged must be a shareholder, and by the construction placed upon these and similar provisions in other statutes it is held that the actual shareholder cannot escape liability by placing the legal title of his shares in the name of a third party.””

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Greaney v. Deitrick · Deitrick v. Crowley

2. ““The appellees, stockholders of the American National Bank of Shreveport, in liquidation, filed in the court below a bill in equity against the appellants, the Comptroller of the Currency and the receiver of that bank appointed by the Comptroller of the Currency, praying relief, including the issuance of a rule requiring appellants to show cause why they should not be temporarily enjoined during the pendency of the suit from enforcing against appellees an assessment made by the Comptroller of the Currency against stockholders of said bank and a final decree anulling said assessment and perpetuating the injunction. Upon the filing of the bill, a rule to show cause at a stated time, at Shreveport, La., why a temporary injunction should not be granted as prayed for, was entered. Service of process on the bill and on the rule to show cause was made on the Comptroller of the Currency in the District of Columbia. The Comptroller of the Currency appeared specially, and moved the court to quash the attempted service on him of the subpoena and the rule to show cause, on the grounds that, at the time of such attempted service, he was a resident of and had his offices in the District of Columbia, and that the court below had no jurisdiction over him. Upon the rule to show cause being submitted upon the bill and exhibits, the answer, of the receiver, and said motion to quash, the court made findings of fact and conclusions of law, overruled the motion to quash, and entered an interlocuto”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Abel v. Hellawell

3. ““In the absence of Federal enactments relating to procedure for enforcement of the liability imposed by Sec. 66, collection is to be made in accordance with State laws governing claims against estates of deceased persons at least to the extent that such laws are not inconsistent with enforcement of the liability imposed by national authority. There is no suggestion that the laws of the State of Utah discriminate against or are inadequate for the just and convenient enforcement of liability imposed (Sec. 66) against estates of deceased stockholders. There can be no liability on account of assessments made after complete administration, final distribution of all the property and the extinguishment of the estate. “Section 102-9-28 provides: ‘When the accounts of the administrator or executor have been settled and an order made for the payment of debts and distribution of the estate, no creditor whose claim was not included in the order for payment has any right to call upon the creditors who have been paid, or upon the heirs, devisees or legatees, to con tribute to the payment of his claim * * *.’ Viewed in the light of that provision it is plain that the distribution fully extinguished the estate. It follows that petitioner’s real estate that had belonged to decedent never became liable for the assessment,””

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Bedenbaugh v. Lawrence