Mitchell v. State’s Empirical Analysis
1988
Citation profile
57 state decisions
How this case has been cited
Cited by 57 later decisions — most recently May 2010 · most notably Misskelley v. State (1996), MacKintrush v. State (1998)
57 state decisions
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Relies on Batson v. Kentucky · Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp. · Swain v. State of Alabama · Griffith v. Kentucky · Gray v. Mississippi
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 57 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“[W]here the use of a peremptory challenge results in exclusion from the jury of all members of the defendant’s minority race, it is not necessary to show exclusion of more than one minority juror of the same race as the defendant to make a prima facie case of discriminatory use of a peremptory challenge, and thus invoke the “sensitive inquiry” requirement.”
2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the dissente.g. Ford v. State · Rucker v. State“In Gray v. Mississippi, 107 S.Ct. 2045 (1987), the Supreme Court held that it was improper to have allowed the prosecution to strike for cause a prospective juror who was qualified. The Mississippi Supreme Court had affirmed the conviction because the trial judge had admitted he had required the prosecution to use peremptory challenges against jurors subject to challenge for cause due to their opposition to the death penalty, and thus he was only correcting his previous mistake. In response to the argument that the error was harmless, the Supreme Court stated that “because the impartiality of the adjudicator goes to the very integrity of the legal system, the. . . harmless error analysis cannot apply. We have recognized that ‘some constitutional rights [are] so basic to a fair trial that their infraction can never be treated as harmless error.’ ” The same rationale applies here. The right to a jury selected free of the taint of racial discrimination is so fundamental that it cannot be described as harmless error.”
1 later decision quote this exact passagee.g. Peters v. State“Mitchell made a prima facie case of discrimination in the prosecution’s use of its peremptory challenge to remove the only black prospective juror after questioning him closely on whether his race would affect his vote. Absent inquiry by the court, we have before us no factual determination whether the prosecutor was assuming Mr. Petty could not withstand the racial pressures and thus assuming he could not have been answering truthfully on that subject. The court has a duty to go beyond the prosecutor’s explanation and make a sincere and reasoned” effort to evaluate its genuineness and sufficiency “in the light of all the circumstances of the trial. ” Because the trial court accepted the prosecutor’s explanation at face value and made no inquiry, we need not consider the explanation’s validity to decide this case. We must note, however, that the explanation was one which could have been given ivith respect to any venire person and could be used to screen improper motive.”
1 later decision quote this exact passagee.g. Bosquet v. State
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.