In Re Andrew J. Kontrick, Debtor-Appellant’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

1 federal appellate · 1 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 75 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “(1) that the act complained of was done at a time subsequent to one year before the date of the filing of the petition; (2) with actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud a creditor or an officer of the estate charged with custody of property under the Bankruptcy Code; (3) that the act was that of the debtor or his duly authorized agent; (4) that the act consisted of transferring, removing, destroying or concealing any of the debt- or’s property, or permitting any of these acts to be done.”

   11 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Monty Titling Trust I v. Granrath (In re Granrath) · Brown v. Ferrari (In re Ferrari)

2. “Under Illinois law, waiver is the intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right. Before a party is considered to have waived a right, “a clear and distinct manifestation of such an intent must be found.” A waiver may be explicit or implicit. In particular, implied waiver requires that an intention to waive be plainly inferred from the circumstances and that the waiving party make a “clear, unequivocal, and decisive act” indicating such waiver.... A party to a contract may waive, by express agreement or by its course of conduct, its legal right to strict performance of the terms of the contract.... Where the evidence regarding a party’s conduct during the relevant period is undisputed, the court may determine waiver as a matter of law.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. In re Arns

3. “While the Court in Taylor did stress the importance of deadlines, we believe this emphasis supports our conclusion, rather than undermines it. As the [Taylor ] Court noted, ''[djeadlines may lead to unwelcome results, but they prompt parties to act and promote finality.” This analysis applies with equal force to the doctrine of waiver, which requires parties to put all of their arguments before the appropriate court at the appropriate time for a full resolution of their claims. Here, parties are prompted to action and finality is served by our conclusion that parties may waive any objection to the untimeliness of a creditor’s complaint if the objection is not raised at the proper time.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. In Re Cherry