Levin v. Morales’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

7 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 7 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “I write separately only to note some uncertainty in our law about the extent to which Gregory A. Levin and others like him may be retried, their convictions having been set aside on habeas or appeal. When a conviction is set aside for a mere trial error-inaccurate jury instructions, for instance, or the admission of inadmissible evidence-the State generally is permitted a retrial, and the constitutional prohibition of double jeopardy does not preclude it. See State v. Caffee , 291 Ga. 31 , 34 (3), 728 S.E.2d 171 (2012). When a conviction is set aside, however, upon the failure of the State to have adduced evidence legally sufficient to sustain the conviction, the constitutional prohibition of double jeopardy ordinarily bars a retrial. See Burks v. United States , 437 U.S. 1 , 98 S.Ct. 2141 , 57 LE2d [L.Ed.2d] 1 (1978). See also Green v. State , 291 Ga. 287 , 288 (1), 728 S.E.2d 668 (2012) ; Prater v. State , 273 Ga. 477 , 481 (4), 545 S.E.2d 864 (2001). Today, we hold that the State failed to present evidence legally sufficient to sustain the conviction of Levin for kidnapping, and on that basis, we direct that his conviction must be set aside. If this were an ordinary sufficiency case, our decision would preclude a retrial. But it might not be so ordinary.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 346 Ga. App. 340 - LEVIN v. the STATE.

2. “where a reviewing court determines that the evidence presented at trial has been rendered insufficient only by a post-trial change in law, double jeopardy concerns do not preclude the government from retrying the defendant. United States v. Ford , 703 F.3d 708 , 711 (II) (A) (4th Cir. 2013) (citations omitted). See also United States v. Wacker , 72 F.3d 1453 , 1465 (II) (A) (10th Cir. 1996) ; United States v. Weems , 49 F.3d 528 , 531 (II) (9th Cir. 1995) ; State v. Liberty , 370 S.W.3d 537 , 554 (IV) (Mo. 2012) ; State v. Drupals , 306 Conn. 149 , 49 A.3d 962 , 976, n. 12 (Conn. 2012).”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the concurrence
   e.g. 346 Ga. App. 340 - LEVIN v. the STATE.

3. “When the State can know what proof the law requires, but fails to offer such proof at trial, the State ought not have another chance to convict the accused. But when the State relies on a longstanding and settled understanding of the law, and it offers evidence sufficient to carry its burden consistent with that understanding-only to have that understanding suddenly upended years later by an appellate court undertaking a course correction-it is not so clear that the State should be denied a second chance.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the concurrence
   e.g. 346 Ga. App. 340 - LEVIN v. the STATE.