State v. Britt’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

58 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 58 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. ““This argument suffers from several flaws. In the first place, it assumes that murderers necessarily receive more lenient sentences in Kansas than violators of Jessica’s Law. This is not the case. In fact, the Kansas Criminal Code sets out a list of transgressions that constitute capital murder, which is an off-grid offense. K.S.A. 21-3439. Capital murder is subject to punishment by death. K.S.A. 21- 4624. The penalty for homicide in Kansas may thus be much more severe than the penalties under Jessica’s Law. See K.S.A. 21-4638; K.S.A. 21-4643. The fact that the penalty for certain categories of homicide may be less severe than the penalties for other, nonhomicide crimes does not automatically render die penalties for the nonhomicide crimes unconstitutional. There is no strict linear order of criminal activity tiiat ranks all homicides as the most serious crimes and all nonhomicide crimes as less serious, with the corresponding penalties necessarily ranking in diminishing durations of imprisonment. “Furthermore .. . Jessica’s Law is not the only Kansas statute tiiat provides for more severe penalties for nonhomicide crimes than for certain categories of homicide. Compare, e.g., rape, K.S.A. 21-3502, and aggravated kidnapping, K.S.A. 21-3420, which are severity level 1 offenses, with reckless second-degree murder, K.S.A. 21-3402(b), which is a severity level 2 offense.” Woodard, 294 Kan. at 723-24 .”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. State v. Ochs · State v. Collier

2. ““The actus reus of the sexual intercourse reference in the rape statute is ‘penetration.’ The alternative methods of penetrating the female sex organ set forth in tire statute—by a finger, the male sex organ,... or an object—merely describe ‘the factual circumstances in which a material element may be proven,’ i.e., the different ways in which penetration may occur. [Citation omitted.] Thus, these are not alternative means, but options within a means and the inclusion of this language in the jury instructions does not make this an alternative means case triggering concerns of jury unanimity.” 295 Kan. at 1027.”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. State v. Weber · State v. Miller

3. ““In examining legislative intent, a court must determine for each statute what the legislature’s use of a disjunctive ‘or’ is intended to accomplish. Is it to list alternative distinct, material elements of a crime—that is, the necessary mens rea, actus reus, and, in some statutes, a causation element? Or is it to merely describe a material element or a factual circumstance that would prove the crime? The listing of alternative distinct, material elements, when incorporated into an elements instruction, creates an alternative means issue demanding super-sufficiency of the evidence. But merely describing a material element or a factual circumstance that would prove the crime does not create alternative means, even if the description is included in a jury instruction.” 295 Kan. at 194.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. State v. Nunez