¶1Appellant Elliott appeals from a judgment of the circuit court permitting appel-lee Light to rent boat-docking facilities for the 1978 season. We reverse.
¶2Appellant operates and manages Lewis and Clark Marina as lessee from the State of South Dakota. Appellee sought to rent marina slip space for his boat, as he had done since 1967. Appellant refused to rent him slip space, claiming appellee had not paid his previous year’s bill in full, owing $5.68. Appellee contested this charge in writing, whereupon appellant made no effort to settle or close appellee’s account, nor to resolve the dispute over the $5.68 charge. It is questionable whether appellant ever billed appellee for this amount after receiving written challenge of that charge.
¶3Appellee sought and obtained a temporary injunction restraining appellant from renting this dock space to anyone other than appellee pending further court order. An interlocutory injunction was later obtained, which continued the effect of the temporary injunction throughout the pend-ency of the action on the merits.
¶4The trial court found that the marina was a public concession controlled by the State of South Dakota, that appellant had followed precedent by giving preference to previous renters of dock space, and that appellee had rented space during the 1976 and 1977 seasons without incident. The court also found that in April of 1977, ap-pellee, an attorney, began representing a former employee of appellant in legal proceedings against him.
¶5The court concluded that because appel-lee tendered full payment for dock space during the 1978 season, and because the *725dock space in question had not been committed to any other renter, appellant’s refusal to rent to appellee was an unfair and discriminatory practice as defined by SDCL 20-13-1(14), and violated the protection afforded appellee by SDCL 20-13-23.
¶6Appellee has failed to exhaust his administrative remedies and thus should not be heard by this court. SDCL 20-13-23 allows the State Commission on Human Rights the power to consider claims of discrimination in the use of public accommodations. This state commission is subject to the supervision of the director of the division of human rights. SDCL 20-13-2.1. This division is clearly considered by the legislature as an “administrative agency” and thus is governed by the Administrative Procedures Act. SDCL 1-26-1(1), as amended, and SDCL 20-13-46 and 20-13-47.
¶7It is imperative for appellee to have presented his grievance to the State Commission on Human Rights before the trial court passed upon the merits. Failure to exhaust administrative remedies should have prompted the trial court to send the matter back for an administrative hearing. SDCL 1-26-30.
¶8The judgment of the trial court is reversed.
¶9This issue was never raised before the trial court or on appeal. However, this court has generally held that where the legislature provides a remedy before an administrative agency, that the administrative agency has exclusive primary jurisdiction which precludes the parties from directly seeking adjudication in a court. Gottschalk v. Hegg, 89 S.D. 89, 228 N.W.2d 640 (1975). Also see Rowen v. LeMars Mut. Ins. Co. of Iowa, 230 N.W.2d 905 (Iowa 1975). Thus, as this involves the jurisdiction of the trial court to hear the matter in the first instance, we must consider it on appeal.