295 Pa. Super. 467 - Commonwealth v. Freeman’s Empirical Analysis
1982
Citation profile
47 state decisions
How this case has been cited
Cited by 47 later decisions — most recently June 2007 · most notably 8 Cal. 4th 746 - People v. Brown (1994), Commonwealth v. Dillon (2007)
47 state decisions
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Relies on Aguilar v. Texas · Simmons v. United States · Spinelli v. United States · Rakas v. Illinois · Jones v. United States
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 47 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“[t]he challenged testimony of the victim and his sister-in-law, [was] introduced solely to establish that Ms. Eachus immediately reported that she was raped, [and] was neither detailed nor protracted.”
4 later decisions quote this exact passage“Appellant has failed to present any concrete evidence that this case involved especial racial considerations which might best be dealt with through individual questioning. Additionally, he does not claim that the actual panel chosen was racially biased against him. Rather, although he admits that he was permitted by the court to probe any racial bias, he complains that the jurors were constrained by peer pressure implicit in collective voir dire to admit to such. ... Under these circumstances we cannot conclude that the trial of crimes involving defendants whose race differs from that of their alleged victims automatically triggers the need for individual voir dire or that such a ruling is more compelling in sexual prosecutions.”
1 later decision quote this exact passage“We find it difficult, if not impossible, to imagine a situation where one whose presence in an automobile is unlawful can have a legitimate expectation of privacy so as to entitle him to Fourth Amendment protection when that automobile is the object of a search. Although expressly not deciding whether appellant had standing to challenge the admissibility of physical evidence seized from a stolen truck, Judge Popovich, writing for the majority in Commonwealth v. Prengle, [293 Pa.Super. at 67], 437 A.2d 992 at 994 n. 3 (1981) noted “... because appellant’s presence in the truck was unlawful, any claim to a reasonable expectation of freedom from government intrusion into a stolen vehicle would be ludicrous.””
1 later decision quote this exact passage
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.