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← 296 F.2d 244 - Freeling v. Sebring

Freeling v. Sebring’s Empirical Analysis

296 F.2d 244 · 1961

Citation profile

56
cited by 56 later decisions
2
states following
July 1993
most recently cited

21 federal appellate · 6 district · 2 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 56 later decisions — most recently July 1993 · most notably Gunter v. Hutcheson (1982), Federal Deposit Insurance v. Ashley (1978)

21 federal appellate · 6 district · 2 state decisions

3401961197019801990decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Relies on Sprowls v. Johnson

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 56 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. ““Under the statute [ 12 U.S.C. § 1819 ] federal courts have jurisdiction over any action involving the FDIC, unless the FDIC is acting in its capacity as Receiver and the suit involves only the rights or obligations of depositors, creditors, or stockholders of a State bank under State law. Defendant has moved to dismiss this action on the asserted grounds that FDIC is essentially suing in this action as Receiver seeking to collect assets of First State Bank, since whatever rights FDIC, as corporation, has against defendant arise initially out of FDIC’s Receiver status. It is defendant’s contention that FDIC’s sale of First State Bank’s assets to itself — an act which defendant characterizes as a means of facilitating the assumption of deposit liabilities by a successor bank— was all part of the liquidation function of the Receiver, and cannot serve as a ground for federal jurisdiction under 12 U.S.C. § 1819 . We disagree. We note at the outset that 12 U.S.C. § 1823 (d) specifically authorizes the FDIC, as Receiver, to sell bank assets to FDIC, as corporation, and that FDIC, as corporation, is empowered to ‘purchase and liquidate or sell any part of the assets of an insured bank.’ The only limitation placed upon such sale by the FDIC, as Receiver, to FDIC, as corporation, is that court approval of the sale is required. Though the complaint itself does not allege such court approval, plaintiff’s memorandum asserts that court approval was received, and defendant does not appear ”
    3 later decisions quote this exact passage
  2. “Congress has thus authorized the FDIC to act simultaneously in the dual capacity as federal insurer and as a state receiver and has discerningly provided for federal jurisdiction of claims against it as federal insurer, while denying federal jurisdiction over claims arising out of its activities as a state agent.”
    3 later decisions quote this exact passage
  3. “such appointment is tendered by the authority having supervision of such (state) bank and is authorized or permitted by State law,”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.