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← 296 F.3d 560 - Hampton v. Wyant

Hampton v. Wyant’s Empirical Analysis

296 F.3d 560 · 2002

Citation profile

28
cited by 28 later decisions
1
cited 1 times by the Supreme Court
2
states following
November 2019
most recently cited

13 federal appellate · 1 district · 2 state decisions

Relationships

Relies on Terry v. Ohio · Mapp v. Ohio · Stone v. Powell · Brown v. Texas · Elder Holloway et al

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 28 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “[A] person imprisoned following a trial that relies, in part, on unlawfully seized evidence is not “in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (a). The seizure may have violated the Constitution, but the custody does not, because the exclusionary rule is a social device for deterring official wrongdoing, not a personal right of defendants.”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  2. “[WJhat a court has to do is look to the appropriate body of decisional law. Faced with a claim that the police lacked probable cause to make an arrest, a state court could not respond that in Illinois it is proper to arrest without probable cause. Failure to apply applicable law would show that the accused lacked a full opportunity to prevail on direct appeal. A court that has made up its mind not to enforce the fourth amendment rarely says so directly, though it may leave clues in its treatment of the merits. It is impossible to see how the problem could be identified without paying some attention to how the state court dealt with the merits. But as we said in Turentine [v. Miller, 80 F.3d 222 (7th Cir.1996) ] this must not be confused with a search for error. It takes an “egregious error” ( 80 F.3d at 226 ) to imply that the state judges have closed their ears and minds to argument-and it is the latter circumstance, not the error itself, that would justify relief under Stone .”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
  3. “That the [judge] did some research beyond the boundaries set by the briefs shows industry rather than the sort of indolence that might deprive the parties of a fair hearing.... [I]t is the sleepwalking judge, not the diligent one, who deprives the litigant of the personal right to careful, individual consideration. Any time a judge does independent research there is a risk of error, but judges with some initiative probably err at lower rates than judges who naively believe that the briefs cover everything worth considering. Courts frequently decide cases on lines of reasoning that can't be found in the briefs.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.