State v. Ultreras’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

2 federal appellate · 48 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 50 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “offered evidence sufficient for a person of 'ordinary prudence and caution to conscientiously entertain a reasonable belief' of [defendant's] guilt despite his claim of justified use-of-force immunity”

   3 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 56 Kan. App. 2d 140 - State v. Collins · State v. Collins

2. “"The initial appeal of this argument evaporates in light of the fact that the phrase 'causing bodily harm to another person with a deadly weapon' is synonymous with the phrase 'causing bodily harm to another person ... in any manner whereby great bodily harm, disfigurement or death can be inflicted.' The equivalency of the two phrases is revealed in the manner in which this court has defined 'deadly weapon.' For example, in State v. Hanks , 236 Kan. 524 , 537, 694 P.2d 407 (1985), superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in State v. Borthwick , 255 Kan. 899 , 916, 880 P.2d 1261 (1994), this court, in the context of an aggravated battery case, defined a deadly weapon as 'an instrument which, from the manner in which it is used, is calculated or likely to produce death or serious bodily injury.' In other words, a deadly weapon is an instrument that can inflict death or great bodily harm, which includes disfigurement. Thus, the phrase 'with a deadly weapon' describes a factual circumstance that proves bodily harm was caused in a 'manner whereby great bodily harm, disfigurement or death can be inflicted' and, as such, is an option within a means rather than an alternative means. [Citation omitted.]" 296 Kan. at 853 -54 , 295 P.3d 1020 .”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 55 Kan. App. 2d 595 - State v. Green · State v. Phillips

3. ““(a) A person who uses force which, subject to the provisions of K.S.A. 2014 Supp. 21-5226, and amendments thereto, is justified pursuant to K.S.A. 2014 Supp. 21-5222, 21-5223 or 21-5225, and amendments thereto, is immune from criminal prosecution and civil action for the use of such force, unless the person against whom force was used is a law enforcement officer who was acting in the performance of such officer’s official duties and the officer identified the officer’s self in accordance with any applicable law or the person using force knew or reasonably should have known that the person was a law enforcement officer. As used in this subsection, ‘criminal prosecution’ includes arrest, detention in custody and charging or prosecution of the defendant. “(b) A law enforcement agency may use standard procedures for investigating the use of force as described in subsection (a), but tire agency shall not arrest tire person for using force unless it determines that there is probable cause for the arrest. “(c) A prosecutor may commence a criminal prosecution upon a determination of probable cause.” K.S.A. 2014 Supp. 21-5231.”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. State v. Evans · Bretherick v. State