State v. Carson’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

50 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 50 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. ““[A] deadly weapon is used to procure the subjugation or submission of a rape victim within the meaning of G.S. 14-21 (a)(2) when (1) it is exhibited to her and the defendant verbally, by brandishment or otherwise, threatens to use it; (2) the victim knows, or reasonably believes, that the weapon remains in the possession of her attacker or readily accessible to him; and (3) she submits or terminates her resistance because of her fear that if she does not he will kill or injure her with the weapon. In other words, the deadly weapon is used, not only when the attacker overcomes the rape victim’s resistance or obtains her submission by its actual functional use as a weapon, but also by his threatened use of it when the victim knows, or reasonably believes, that the weapon is readily accessible to her attacker or that he commands its immediate use.””

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. State v. Joyner

2. “[w]e are advertent to the provisions of Article 14 of Chapter 15A of the General Statutes which require that an order for nontestimonial evidence shall contain a statement that the person is entitled to counsel at the procedure and to appointment of counsel if he cannot afford to retain one. In our opinion, the provisions of this article of the General Statutes are not here applicable since defendant was legally arrested on a misdemeanor charge, and under these circumstances, he could be photographed without the aid of the nontestimonial order.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. State v. Welch

3. “It is within the trial judge’s discretion to admit evidence on rebuttal which would have been otherwise admissible, and the appellate courts will not interfere absent a showing of gross abuse of discretion. . . . A trial judge has discretionary power to permit the introduction of additional evidence after a party has rested. State v. Coffey, 255 N.C. 293 , 121 S.E. 2d 736 (1961); State v. Perry, 231 N.C. 467 , 57 S.E. 2d 774 (1950).”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. State v. Torain