J-S38010-22
2023 PA Super 114
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
SHAHEED TARIQ GINDRAW :
:
Appellant : No. 1222 EDA 2022
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered April 18, 2022
In the Court of Common Pleas of Bucks County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-09-CR-0001141-2020
BEFORE: KUNSELMAN, J., MURRAY, J., and SULLIVAN, J.
OPINION BY SULLIVAN, J.: FILED JUNE 23, 2023
Shaheed Tariq Gindraw (“Gindraw”) appeals from the judgment of
sentence imposed following his non-jury conviction for driving under the
influence of alcohol.1 Gindraw challenges the denial of his motion to suppress.
We affirm.
The suppression court summarized the factual history relevant to this
appeal as follows:
On November 27, 2019, at approximately 12:22 a.m.,
Pennsylvania State Trooper Richard Sentak2 (“Trooper Sentak”)
was on patrol, traveling south on State Route 413 . . . in Bucks
County . . .. State Route 413 is a two-lane roadway, with one
lane of traffic traveling in each direction. Trooper Sentak was
working the midnight shift . . . along with his assigned partner,
Trooper Steven Gentile (“Trooper Gentile”) [who was driving the
patrol vehicle]. . .
2[Trooper Sentak] has been assigned to the patrol unit
for the entirety of his seven years as a state trooper.
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1 See 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3802(a)(1).
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While completing training at the police academy,
Trooper Sentak received instruction on standardized
field sobriety tests and advanced roadside impairment
detection. Trooper Sentak estimated that he has
made over 150 DUI arrests and has been a part of
another 150 to 200 DUI investigations during his
tenure as a State Trooper. [See N.T. 11/29/21, at 8-
9.]
At approximately 12:22 a.m., Trooper Sentak and Trooper
Gentile (collectively the “Troopers”) observed a vehicle on the
shoulder of Route 413 with its hazard lights activated. There were
very few streetlights on the road and the areas in which they were
traveling was dark. The engine of the vehicle was running, while
it was legally parked on the shoulder of the roadway.
Shortly after observing the above-mentioned vehicle,
Trooper Sentak activated the patrol vehicle’s emergency lights.
Trooper Sentak activated his lights when approaching the vehicle
for the purposes of providing greater visibility to both the Troopers
and the vehicle they were pulling behind, along with greater
protection for the Troopers and the occupant of the stopped
vehicle. The patrol vehicle’s lights also signal to other vehicles in
the surrounding area to either slow down or move over. This in
turn creates a safer environment for both law enforcement and
the individual while on the side of a road. Based on Trooper
Sentak’s training and experience, he knew that when a vehicle is
disabled, it is common for the vehicle’s operator to use the
vehicle’s hazard lights to be more visible to other motorists
traveling on the roadway.
After Trooper Gentile pulled the patrol vehicle behind the
vehicle which had its hazard lights activated, Trooper Sentak
exited the patrol vehicle and approached the driver’s side to make
contact with the operator of the vehicle, later identified as
[Gindraw]. Trooper Sentak’s flashlight was out and on as he
approached the operator.
Moments later, Trooper Gentile approached the passenger’s
side of the vehicle, with his flashlight out and on as well. Trooper
Sentak spoke to [Gindraw] for “a minute or two” to see if
everything was “all right” with his vehicle. Trooper Sentak also
engaged in other generic questioning to determine whether
[Gindraw] was in need of any assistance. [Gindraw] stated that
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he had “just dropped his friend off and he pulled over to put [] his
home address into his cell phone.”
In speaking to [Gindraw], Trooper Sentak observed that
[Gindraw’s] eyes were glassy and bloodshot. [Trooper Sentak]
also noted a “very strong odor of alcohol emanating from the
vehicle.” Once [Gindraw] emerged from his vehicle, the Trooper
also noticed the odor of alcohol emanating from [Gindraw’s]
person. Based on Trooper Sentak’s training and experience, such
circumstances are “generally an indication that someone’s been
possibly drinking that night,” and can indicate that someone may
be under the influence of alcohol. In response to the Trooper’s
question if [Gindraw] had been drinking, [Gindraw] stated: “yes,
he had a couple of shots.” Trooper Sentak thereafter asked
[Gindraw] to exit his vehicle so that he could conduct several
standard field sobriety tests. Trooper Sentak recalled conducting
several standard field sobriety tests. . ..
Decision and Order, 2/11/22, at 2-3 ¶¶ 1-21 (record citations and some
footnotes omitted, and formatting changed).
The troopers arrested Gindraw and charged him with driving under the
influence. Gindraw filed a suppression motion challenging the admission of all
evidence resulting from the illegal seizure of him and his vehicle. See
Omnibus Pretrial Motion, 11/29/21. Gindraw’s motion asserted that the
activation of the police lights and the approach of the troopers with illuminated
flashlights on each side of the car constituted an investigative detention
because a reasonable person would not have felt free to leave, the troopers
lacked reasonable suspicion at the time they initiated the investigation, and
all evidence resulting from the stop should be suppressed as the fruit of the
poisonous tree. See id. at 1-7.
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The suppression court held a hearing at which Trooper Sentak was the
only witness. The suppression court found that Trooper Sentak properly
conducted an investigative detention of Gindraw under the public servant
provision of the community caretaking doctrine. The court held that:
Gindraw’s use of his hazard lights provided specific and objective facts for the
trooper to believe he might have a problem with his car; Trooper Sentak’s
brief conversation with Gindraw did not derive from an unlawful purpose to
detect or investigate a crime or acquire criminal evidence; and the trooper
reasonably and appropriately tailored his actions to rendering assistance. See
id. at 7-12, distinguishing Commonwealth v. Livingstone, 174 A.3d 609,
627 (Pa. 2017). After denying Gindraw’s motion to suppress, the court
convicted Gindraw at a non-jury trial of driving under the influence and on
April 18, 2022, imposed its sentence. Gindraw timely appealed, and he and
the trial court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.
Gindraw raises the following issue for our review:
Did the trial court err in denying [Gindraw’s] motion to suppress
where [Gindraw] was subjected to a detention not supported by
reasonable suspicion or justified by the public servant exception?
Gindraw’s Brief at 7.
When reviewing an order denying a motion to suppress evidence,
Our standard of review . . . is limited to determining whether the
findings of fact are supported by the record and whether the legal
conclusions drawn from those facts are in error. In making this
determination, this [C]ourt may only consider the evidence of the
Commonwealth’s witnesses, and so much of the witnesses for the
defendant, as fairly read in the context of the record as a whole,
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which remains uncontradicted. If the evidence supports the
findings of the trial court, we are bound by such findings and may
reverse only if the legal conclusions drawn therefrom are
erroneous.
Commonwealth v. Freeman, 128 A.3d 1231, 1240 (Pa. Super. 2015)
(internal citations omitted).
Here, Gindraw, the Commonwealth, and the suppression court agree
that the stop in this case constituted an investigative detention and the legality
of that detention and resulting DUI investigation depends on whether the
Commonwealth satisfied Livingstone’s test for the application of the public
servant community caretaking doctrine exception to the warrant requirement.
We agree that pursuant to Livingstone, Trooper Sentak’s interaction with
Gindraw was an investigative detention. See Livingstone, 174 A.3d at 625.
We thus examine Gindraw’s challenge to the application of the public
servant/public safety exception.
Concerning the public servant exception, the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court has explained that:
[i]n order to protect individuals against unreasonable searches
and seizures, a right guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment, law
enforcement generally must obtain a warrant prior to conducting
a search. . . . [S]ome warrantless searches have been held not
to violate state or federal constitutional privacy rights, even
absent probable cause, for officer safety. . . .
…
The community caretaking doctrine [an exception to the warrant
requirement] . . . encompass[es] three specific exceptions: the
emergency aid exception, the automobile/inventory exception,
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and the public servant exception, also sometimes referred to as
the public safety exception.
Livingstone, 174 A.3d at 625-629.
Having comprehensively reviewed police officers’ multiple criminal and
non-criminal responsibilities and other states’ analyses of the public safety
doctrine, the Livingstone court set forth a three-element test for determining
when the doctrine may properly be invoked under Pennsylvania law:
[I]n order for the public servant exception of the community
caretaking doctrine to apply, police officers must be able to point
to specific, objective, and articulable facts that would reasonably
suggest to an experienced officer that a citizen is in need of
assistance.
…
Second . . . the police caretaking action must be independent from
the detection, investigation, and acquisition of criminal evidence.
…
We are not suggesting, however, that an officer’s
contemporaneous subjective concerns regarding criminal activity
will preclude a finding that a seizure is valid under the community
caretaking function.
…
As an officer goes about his . . . duties, an officer cannot always
ascertain which hat the officer will wear – his law enforcement hat
or his community caretaker hat. For example, an officer may
come upon what appears to be a stalled vehicle and decide
to investigate if assistance is needed; however, the
investigation may show that a crime is being committed
within the vehicle. Therefore, from the point of view of the
officer, he . . . must be prepared for either eventuality as
the vehicle is approached. Accordingly, the officer may
have law enforcement concerns, even when the officer has
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an objectively reasonable basis for performing a
community caretaking function.
To conclude otherwise would ignore the multifaceted
nature of police work and force police officers to let down
their guard and unnecessarily expose themselves to
dangerous conditions.
…
[Third] . . . in order for the public servant exception to apply the
level of intrusion must be commensurate with the perceived need
for assistance.
Livingstone, 174 A.3d at 634-37 (parenthesis and internal citations omitted;
emphasis added).
Gindraw asserts that the trial court erred in its weighing of the
Livingstone factors. He asserts the trooper lacked specific, objective, and
articulable facts to suggest Gindraw needed assistance because, contrary to
Trooper Sentak’s testimony that he suspected at the time of the stop that
Gindraw’s car might have a flat tire or an empty gas tank, Gindraw’s car had
neither problem. Gindraw also asserts the troopers acted to investigate, not
assist, as demonstrated by the fact they both used their flashlights to look
into his car, and that the level of intrusion far exceeded what was necessary
to mitigate the peril. See Gindraw’s Brief at 15-18.
The suppression court determined the facts sub judice supported the
application of the public servant exception. It credited Trooper Sentak’s
testimony that his training and experience taught him that hazard lights are
frequently used to signal a vehicle’s disability and increase its visibility. See
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Decision and Order, 2/11/22, at 8. In the court’s view, Gindraw’s use of his
hazard lights, the time of night, and the darkness of the location indicated a
possible problem with Gindraw’s car. See id. at 9-10; Trial Court Opinion,
6/22/22, at 6.
The suppression court further found Trooper Gindraw acted reasonably
to determine if Gindraw needed assistance, and the troopers’ act of stopping
their car behind Gindraw’s car and brief conversation with him constituted acts
completely independent from any unlawful purpose to detect, investigate, or
acquire criminal evidence. See Decision and Order, 2/11/22, at 10; Trial
Court Opinion, 6/22/22, at 7. Finally, the court concluded that the level of
intrusion was commensurate with the perceived need for assistance. See
Decision and Order, 2/11/22, at 11-12; Trial Court Opinion, 6/22/22, at 7.
In sum, the court determined that the evidence satisfied all three
elements of the Livingstone public servant exception to the warrant
requirement: specific, objective, and articulable facts that would reasonably
suggest to an experienced officer that a citizen is in need of assistance; the
independence of the police’s caretaking action from the detection,
investigation, and acquisition of criminal evidence; and the degree of
intrusiveness was commensurate with the perceived need for assistance.
Accordingly, the court determined that Trooper Sentak did not violate
Gindraw’s rights when his brief questioning of Gindraw to determine if he
needed assistance produced reasonable suspicion that Gindraw was driving
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under the influence, permitting the performance of field sobriety tests. See
id.
After a careful review of the record including the troopers’ dash-cam
video, we conclude that the record supports the suppression court’s findings
of fact and conclusions of law. First, the presence of Gindraw’s vehicle on the
side of the road after midnight in a dark area with its hazard lights flashing
provided the experienced trooper with specific, objective, and articulable facts
to suggest he might require assistance. See Livingstone, 174 A.3d at 632,
citing Ullom v. Miller, 705 S.E.2d 111, 123 (W.Va. 2010) (under community
caretaking doctrine, state trooper reasonably believed car occupant might be
in need of immediate help where she was parked at dusk with her parking
lights on in front of a gate blocking a dirt road).2
Second, the record supports the suppression court’s finding the
troopers’ interaction with Gindraw independent of any unlawful purpose to
detect, investigate, or acquire criminal evidence. The dash-cam video and
audio show that Trooper Sentak’s conversation with Gindraw lasted slightly
more than one minute. The trooper greeted Gindraw by saying, “What’s up,
man . . . how are you?” After a brief conversational exchange, the trooper
explained, “We just seen you sitting you here with your four-ways on, so we
____________________________________________
2 Compare Livingstone, 174 A.3d at 638 (three-Justice plurality states that
absence of a motorist’s use of hazard lights undermined the assertion the
motorist needed assistance).
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weren’t sure what was up,” and then after Gindraw volunteered an explanation
of where he had come from and where he was going, the trooper stated, “We
just seen you sitting here with four-ways on and we figured we’d check on you
to make sure you didn’t run out of gas or nothing.” See N.T., 11/29/21, at
24-25, Exhibit C-1. During the course of this conversation, the trooper
recognized indicia that Gindraw had been drinking. He told Gindraw that the
car reeked of alcohol and asked him to perform field sobriety tests. See id.;
see also Decision and Order, 2/11/22, at 3-4 (finding that in the course of a
“one to two minute” conversation involving “generic questioning to determine
whether [Gindraw] was in need of any assistance,” Trooper Sentak observed
that Gindraw’s eyes were bloodshot and detected a very strong odor of alcohol
emanated from his car). Additionally, some of that brief conversation
consisted of Gindraw’s narration of where he had been. The trooper’s
interaction with Gindraw epitomizes the scenario Livingstone and other
courts contemplated when they rejected the notion that an officer must have
completely ruled out any possibility of criminal activity before exercising the
community caretaker function. See Livingstone, 174 A.3d at 636.
Livingstone specifically rejected that rule that an investigation must be
“totally divorced” from the detection of criminal activity to be valid when it
stated that “a coinciding subjective law enforcement concern by the officer
will not negate the validity of that search under the public servant exception
to the community caretaking doctrine.” See id. at 637.
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Finally, Trooper Sentak’s interaction with Gindraw constituted a minimal
intrusion. See Livingstone, 174 A.3d at 630, citing State v. Anderson, 362
P.3d 1232, 1239-40 (Utah 2015) (concluding the seizure of a motorist stopped
at the side of a highway in below-zero temperatures with his vehicle’s hazard
lights on was “minimally invasive” because: (1) the vehicle was parked, not
driving; (2) there was no excessive display of authority or force, including an
absence of display or weapons or shouting of commands; and (3) the officer
approached the motorist only long enough to approach his vehicle and ask
whether he needed aid).
Here, Gindraw was parked on the side of the road; his car was stopped
and he had his hazard lights on. Additionally, the intrusion was minimal
because it was short and not conducted for the purpose of detecting crime.
The trooper’s use of flashlights to see inside and around the outside of
Gindraw’s car did not change the nature of the search. Given the time of night
and Gindraw’s use of his hazard lights, the troopers’ attempt to determine if
Gindraw or a possible passenger required assistance or whether there were
any safety concerns with his car was commensurate with the perceived need
for assistance.
Thus, the suppression court did not err in finding the public servant
exception applied: the trooper had specific, objective, and articulable facts
that suggested Gindraw was in need of assistance, the trooper’s caretaking
action was independent of the investigation of crime, and the level of intrusion
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was commensurate with the perceived need for assistance. Because the
suppression court’s findings of fact have record support and the court did not
commit an error of law, the court properly denied Gindraw’s suppression
motion. Accordingly, we affirm the order denying suppression of evidence of
evidence following Trooper Sentak’s investigative detention of Gindraw.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 6/23/2023
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