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297 Ark. 26

759 S.W.2d 535

Starr v. State

Supreme Court of Arkansas

Decided November 7, 1988

Supreme Court of Arkansas · decided 1988-11-07

Relies on United States v. Leon · State v. Anderson

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1988-11-07

How this case has been cited

Cited by 43 later decisions (2 by the Supreme Court) — most recently May 2016 · most notably Starr v. Al Lockhart (1994), Richardson v. Illinois (1989)

39 state decisions

1601988199020002010decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

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David Newbern, Justice,

¶1dissenting.

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the person or things to be seized.

¶2These, with certain of them emphasized, are the words of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution.

¶3The words of Ark. R. Crim. P. 7.2. follow:

Rule 7.2. Form of Warrant.
(a) Every arrest warrant shall:
(iii) be signed by the issuing official with the title of his office and
(v) have attached a copy of the information, if filed, or, if not filed, a copy of any affidavit supporting issuance

¶4In State v. Anderson, 286 Ark. 58, 688 S.W.2d 947 (1985), we refused to consider the “good faith rule” of United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984), as legitimating a search based on a warrant with no supporting affidavit, and we wrote: “The procedure of providing an affidavit when obtaining search warrants is so standard a practice that we cannot consider such a deficiency as falling within the purview of good faith error.” The Monroe County warrants which the state says formed the basis for Starr’s arrest in Phillips County were equally deficient. Officer Nolan of Monroe County testified he did not see any affidavit with the warrants for David Starr’s arrest. Rule 7.2(a)(v) requires that either an information or an affidavit be attached to an arrest warrant. The burglary and theft warrants were signed by Tammy Ellis who, Officer Nolan testified, was a court clerk. Under her signature, were the following words printed on the warrant form, “Municipal Judge, Clarendon, Monroe County, Arkansas.” The word “Judge” under her name was crossed out, and nothing was put in its place. Rule 7.2(a)(ii) requires a signature by the issuing official with the title of his office.

¶5To justify its application of the Leon case doctrine here, and thus avoid the exclusionary rule, the majority opinion makes two points. First, it says that the affidavit in support of a search warrant, which was the element'lacking in the Anderson case, is required by the Constitution. Clearly, there is, in the Fourth Amendment, the same requirement for an arrest warrant, and that requirement is reflected in our rules. I suggest the requirement for supporting documentation is just as “standard” in arrest warrant cases as in search warrant cases. Second, the majority opinion says that a police officer need not have an arrest warrant in hand when the arrest occurs. That is true, Ark. R. Crim. P. 4.3., but it does not justify an arrest where there is no supporting document attached to the warrant pursuant to which the arrest was made, and the state cannot even produce testimony after the fact that such a document existed. Nor does it justify the admission of evidence which results from such an arrest where the state cannot show compliance with the rules of criminal procedure.

¶6The requirement of Rule 7.2. that the warrant have the supporting documentation attached to it makes sense. Otherwise, by “community custom” a practice could develop which would permit an arrest on the basis of a piece of paper with no support whatever. The arresting officer could say, as here, that he made the arrest assuming the warrant was good, and thus he or she acted in good faith.

¶7Just as we did not get to it in the Anderson case, I do not find it necessary even to consider application of the Leon case doctrine here. However, if that were the issue, it would not seem to me to be too much to require an officer to examine or at least to inquire about an arrest warrant to learn whether it is signed by someone purporting to be an authorized official and is accompanied by a supporting document or documents before we hold that the officer has acted in good faith in executing the warrant. In its zeal to expand upon the Leon case, the majority applies it in a way not demonstrably intended by its authors, and in the process the Fourth Amendment requirement that there be more than a piece of paper styled “arrest warrant” is subverted.

¶8I respectfully dissent.

Purtle and Dudley, JJ., join this opinion.
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