State v. Weber’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

32 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 32 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. ““[W]e view tire State’s reliance on trial counsel’s stipulation to be misguided. Initially, counsel had objected to the inclusion of the two Michigan convictions in Weber’s criminal history score. After the State provided the defense with certified copies of the Michigan journal entries, defense counsel advised the sentencing judge that the defense was withdrawing its objection to criminal history. Accordingly, we agree with tire State that Weber should be bound by his counsel’s stipulation of fact in tire district court widr respect to his criminal history, i.e., the factual stipulation that Weber was convicted in Michigan of the crime of assault with intent to commit sexual-contact in the second degree. But that factual stipulation does not answer the question before us, which is: what is the legal effect of that prior conviction on the imposition of an enhanced sentence. . . . “Inexplicably, defense trial counsel also conceded that the life without parole sentence . . . was mandated for Weber, which would suggest that defense counsel was stipulating to the legal effect of the admitted fact of the Michigan assault conviction. But we do not permit parties to stipulate ‘ “as to the legal conclusions from admitted facts.”’ [Citation omitted.] The legal question of whether Weber’s admitted criminal history was sufficient... to define him as an aggravated habitual sex offender subject to enhanced sentencing, ‘ “must rest upon the court, uninfluenced by stipulations of the partie”

   3 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. State v. Thomas · 51 Kan. App. 2d 212 - State v. Ruiz

2. “factual stipulation does not answer the question before us, which is: what is the legal effect of that prior conviction on the imposition of an enhanced sentence.”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. State v. Thomas · State v. Schulze

3. ““The legal question of whether [the defendant’s] admitted criminal history was sufficient to meet the requirements of K.S.A. 2009 Supp. 21-4642(c)(l)(B), so as to define him as an aggravated habitual sex offender subject to enhanced sentencing, “ ‘must rest upon the court, uninfluenced by stipulations of the parties.’ ” [Citations omitted.] Therefore, despite the concession of [defense] counsel, ‘we nevertheless must address the accuracy of the purported legal basis of [die defendant’s] concession.’ [Citation omitted]; see also Ritchie Raving, Inc. v. City of Deerfield, 275 Kan. 631, 641 , 67 P.3d 843 (2003) (‘Stipulations as to what the law is are not effective and not controlling on this court.’). “Perhaps more to the point here, ‘Kansas law is clear that a defendant can’t agree to an illegal sentence.’ [Citations omitted.] Accordingly, the State’s alleged procedural bar emanating from a defense stipulation ... is simply unavailing.” Weber, 297 Kan. at 814-15 .”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. State v. Dickey