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297 So. 2d 135

Docket No. 73-1036.

Gue v. State

Susan M. GUE, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

District Court of Appeal of Florida

Decided July 3, 1974.

District Court of Appeal of Florida · decided 1974-07-03

Key passage — most relied on by later courts

“"We find nothing in this record to constitute an exception to the speedy trial rule. While it is true, as the trial judge pointed out, that at arraignment the defendant might have called to the state's attention that the case was set for trial beyond the 180 days, we find nothing in the rule which places the burden of compliance elsewhere than on the state. There being no waiver or other circumstances justifying extension, denial of the motion to discharge was error."”

quoted by 1 later decision, including 349 So. 2d 837 - State v. Ansley

Relies on 276 So. 2d 470 - State Ex Rel. Gutierrez v. Baker · State Ex Rel. Green v. Patterson, Pinellas County

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1974-07-03

How this case has been cited

Cited by 5 later decisions — most recently May 2005

5 state decisions

201974198019902000decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

View the full empirical analysis of this case →

¶1Robert E. Jagger, Public Defender, and Paul C. Scherer, Asst. Public Defender, Clearwater, for appellant.

¶2Robert L. Shevin, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, and Robert J. Landry, Asst. Atty. Gen., Tampa, for appellee.

¶3PER CURIAM.

¶4Appellant was charged originally with possession of marijuana in an amount constituting a misdemeanor. The state nolle prossed this charge and filed a felony charge for possession of narcotics paraphernalia, but failed to bring appellant to trial within 180 days of the date when appellant was "taken into custody as a result of the conduct or criminal episode giving rise to the crime charged." CrPR 3.191(a)(1), 33 F.S.A. We find nothing in this record to constitute an exception to the speedy trial rule. While it is true, as the trial judge pointed out, that at arraignment the defendant might have called to the state's attention that the case was set for trial beyond the 180 days, we find nothing in the rule which places the burden of compliance elsewhere than on the state. There being no waiver or other circumstances justifying extension, denial of the motion to discharge was error. See State ex rel. Gutierrez v. Baker, Fla. 1973, 276 So.2d 470; cf. State ex rel. Green v. Patterson, Fla.App.2d 1973, 279 So.2d 362, in *136 which the delay was attributable to the accused, a circumstance not shown on this record.

¶5Reversed.

¶6MANN, C.J., and McNULTY and GRIMES, JJ., concur.

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