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2023 PA Super 120
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
MANUEL ALEJANDRO RONDON :
:
: No. 511 MDA 2022
APPEAL OF: STEPHEN HOBBS :
Appeal from the Order Entered March 8, 2022
In the Court of Common Pleas of Cumberland County Criminal Division at
No(s): CP-21-CR-0001073-2020
BEFORE: BOWES, J., STABILE, J., and SULLIVAN, J.
OPINION BY BOWES, J.: FILED JULY 11, 2023
Stephen Hobbs (“Surety”) appeals from the March 8, 2022 order
denying his petition to strike and/or set aside bail forfeiture and exonerate
surety, in relation to bail he posted on behalf of Manuel Alejandro Rondon
(“the defendant”). We affirm.
The trial court provided the following pertinent summary:
On June 18, 2020, Surety, in his capacity as a professional
bail bondsman, executed a bond on behalf of the defendant in the
amount of $75,000. On September 30, 2020, [the trial court]
issued a bench warrant and an order forfeiting bail as a result of
the defendant’s failure to appear at a pre-trial conference. Surety
was notified of the [same].
On October 5, 2005, the defendant appeared before the
Honorable Christylee Peck for a pre-trial conference. Defendant’s
counsel . . . also addressed the bench warrant. He explained to
the court that the defendant did not fail to appear as scheduled.
There was confusion caused by the Court Administrator
concerning the date for the pre-trial conference[, and that it] had
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been moved to October 5, 2020. He and the defendant had, in
fact, appeared that day as directed for the pre-trial conference.
The court accepted the explanation and vacated the bench
warrant.
Before the court reinstated bail, it directed counsel to
contact Surety about his position on standing-by the defendant’s
bail. Counsel contacted Surety to discuss the bail issue. Surety
agreed to continue on the reinstated bail and offered to
supplement the record with written consent. Counsel informed
the court and asked how it would like to take Surety’s consent.
The court, being satisfied with counsel’s reiteration, stated that
the Surety need not file anything because the court would put the
Surety’s consent on the record. It reinstated bail with Surety
continuing as the attached bondsman.
More than [nine] months later, on July 12, 2021, the
defendant failed to appear for trial. [The trial court] again issued
a bench warrant and forfeited bail. The Clerk of Courts notified
Surety of the bench warrant and forfeiture order on July 30, 2021.
On October 13, 2021, Attorney Wachinski entered his appearance
on behalf of Surety. Nearly two weeks later, he filed a petition to
set aside bail and exonerate surety.
[The trial court] held a hearing on the petition on March 1,
2022, at which time [it] heard from [defendant’s counsel] and
Surety.[1] [The court] denied exoneration because [it] found that
1) Surety continued as bondsman without reaffirming consent
because the erroneously issued bench warrant and forfeiture order
did not trigger [42 Pa.C.S. §] 5747.1, and 2) even if it were
triggered, Surety consented on the record to continue as
bondsman on the defendant’s reinstated bail.
Trial Court Opinion, 6/30/22, at 1-3 (cleaned up).
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1 The trial court noted that Surety failed to secure the inclusion of the
transcript of the March 1, 2022 hearing within the certified record. Given our
standard of review, the absence of this transcript does not hinder our
disposition of this appeal.
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This timely filed notice of appeal followed. Both Surety and the trial
court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.2 Surety presents a single issue for our
consideration: “Whether the trial court erred in its interpretation of 42 Pa.C.S.
§ 5747.1(b)(2), specifically the final sentence stating: ‘The bail bondsman
shall not be continued by the court on a reinstated bail unless a written
consent is signed by the bail bondsman agreeing to such an extension of
suretyship.’” Surety’s brief at 2 (cleaned up).
As Surety asks this Court to interpret § 5747.1, “our standard of review
is de novo, and our scope of review is plenary.” Commonwealth v. Watts,
283 A.3d 1252, 1255 (Pa.Super. 2022) (citation omitted). In conducting our
review, we keep the following principles in mind:
In all matters involving statutory interpretation, we apply the
Statutory Construction Act, 1 Pa.C.S. § 1501 et seq., which
provides that the object of interpretation and construction of
statutes is to ascertain and effectuate the intention of the General
Assembly.
Generally, a statute’s plain language provides the best indication
of legislative intent. We will only look beyond the plain language
of the statute when words are unclear or ambiguous, or the plain
meaning would lead to “a result that is absurd, impossible of
execution or unreasonable.” 1 Pa.C.S. § 1922(1). Therefore,
when ascertaining the meaning of a statute, if the language is
clear, we give the words their plain and ordinary meaning.
Id. at 1255-56 (cleaned up).
Section 5747.1 provides in pertinent part as follows:
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2 Neither the defendant nor the Commonwealth filed a brief in this matter.
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(a) General rule.--If a defendant in a criminal prosecution fails
to appear for any scheduled court proceeding, the defendant’s bail
may be revoked and notice of revocation shall serve as notice of
intent to forfeit the bail of the defendant. The notice or order of
revocation shall be served by the office of the clerk to the
defendant, surety or bail bondsman and insurer who has issued
the qualifying power of attorney for the bail bondsman by certified
mail, return receipt requested.
(b) Payment.--The following shall apply:
(1) Ninety days from the date of the service of the
notice of revocation or order of revocation, the
revocation shall become a judgment of forfeiture,
payment of which shall be immediately required by
the defendant or surety. Failure of a bail bondsman
to make a timely payment of a forfeiture judgment
shall result in the district attorney or county solicitor
commencing proceedings to suspend or nonrenew the
license of the bail bondsman otherwise consistent with
section 5746 (relating to suspension or revocation of
authority to conduct business in a county).
(2) Payment of forfeited undertaking shall be made
directly to the office of the clerk not later than the
close of business on the 91st day following the service
of the notice of revocation. If the defendant has been
recovered and placed into custody through the efforts
of the bail bondsman or proof has been provided to
the court that the defendant was discovered by the
bail bondsman to be in custody in another jurisdiction
prior to the 91st day, no payment of the forfeited
undertaking shall be required. If the defendant is
placed into custody or discovered to be in custody, the
court shall set aside the bail revocation and may
release the defendant with the reinstitution of bail
pursuant to the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal
Procedure. The bail bondsman shall not be continued
by the court as surety on reinstated bail unless a
written consent is signed by the bail bondsman
agreeing to such extension of suretyship.
42 Pa.C.S. § 5747.1.
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Specifically, Surety argues that the plain language of § 5747.1(b)(2)
provides that “a bail bondsman cannot be continued as a surety on a
reinstated bail absent written consent signed by the bail bondsman.” Surety’s
brief at 14. Since there was no signed written consent in this case, Surety
contends that the trial court erred in denying his petition to set aside the bail
forfeiture and exonerate surety. See id.
As indicated supra, the trial court determined that the requirements set
forth in § 5747.1(b)(2) for written consent were not triggered by the events
occurring in September and October of 2020, since the bench warrant and
forfeiture order had been erroneously issued at that time as a “result of
considerable confusion caused by [the] office of Court Administration.” Trial
Court Opinion, 6/30/22, at 4. Surety claims this rationale fails because the
court that issued both the September bench warrant/forfeiture order and
October bail-reinstatement order followed the procedures set forth in
§5747.1(b), except for obtaining Surety’s written consent. See Surety’s brief
at 14. Moreover, Surety argues that § 5747.1(b) was triggered by the
September bench warrant/forfeiture order, and that the October order
reinstating bail because the September order had been entered in error could
not undo that. See id. at 17.
This Court had occasion to consider whether the relevant language of
§ 5747.1(b) was triggered in a nearly-identical scenario in Commonwealth
v. Speedwell, 253 A.3d 282 (Pa.Super. 2021) (non-precedential decision).
Although not binding, we find our analysis in that case to be highly persuasive.
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Therein, defendant Speedwell had been granted a continuance request
for his arraignment. However, the court reporter typed the incorrect date into
the corresponding order. Based upon Speedwell’s failure to appear for his
arraignment on the date stated in the filed order, the trial court entered a
bench warrant and forfeited his bail. The next day, the trial court learned that
the relied-upon order had the incorrect date and, therefore, vacated the bench
warrant and reinstated Speedwell’s bail. The trial court did not obtain the
bondsman’s consent regarding the reinstatement. Subsequently, Speedwell
failed to appear for a pre-trial conference. Thus, his bail was forfeited and a
bench warrant issued. The bondsman and surety company petitioned to
vacate the bail forfeiture and exonerate surety based on the lack of written
consent by the bail bondsman to reinstate the bail.
The trial court in Speedwell denied the petition because the bail was
initially forfeited due to court error, and therefore the court “was not obligated
to secure the written consent of [the bondsman] to continue to hold him as
surety on the reinstated bail.” Id. at *4 (citation omitted). The trial court
reasoned that “the requirement to obtain a bondsman’s consent to continue
the suretyship was not triggered [because t]he initial order forfeiting
Defendant Speedwell’s bail lacked statutory authority for forfeiture in the first
instance given that the defendant was in compliance with bail conditions and
not lawfully subject to forfeiture.” Id. (cleaned up).
This Court agreed with the trial court’s analysis, expounding as follows:
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The plain language of [§] 5747.1(a) indicates that the statute
applies where “a defendant in a criminal prosecution fails to
appear for any scheduled court proceeding.” 42 Pa.C.S.
§ 5747.1(a). Here, the trial court found Defendant Speedwell did
not fail to appear at his arraignment.
Simply put, the plain language of the statute does not contemplate
that the trial court must secure the written consent of the bail
bondsman in order to continue suretyship where the initial
forfeiture of bail was due to a court error. As the trial court
astutely acknowledged, “To conclude otherwise would create an
absurd result where a defendant who did not violate the conditions
of his bail is nonetheless subject to the reaffirmed consent of the
bondsman by no error of his own.” Trial Court Opinion, filed
11/5/20, at 1. Accordingly, we find no merit to [the bondsman’s]
contention that the trial court violated [§] 5747.1 in reinstating
Defendant Speedwell’s bail and continuing [the] surety without
written consent on January 29, 2020.
Id. (cleaned up).
Here, as in Speedwell, the trial court relied on an incorrect order in
initially issuing a bench warrant and forfeiting bail. As explained by the trial
court,
multiple notices were generated at the docket regarding the pre-trial conference for the 2020 October Trial Term. At one point it
was set for September 29, 2020. At another point it was set for
October 1, 2020. Ultimately, the defendant was deemed to have
failed to appear for a pre-trial conference on September 30, 2020,
for which we do not have any docketed notice. It is common
practice for the Court Administrator to informally move scheduled
pre-trial conferences without notice given on the docket or to th[e
trial c]ourt. That resulted in the initial bench warrant and
forfeiture order. It was clearly issued in error.
Trial Court Opinion, 6/30/22, at 2 n.3.
Also as in Speedwell, the trial court vacated the bench warrant and
reinstated the defendant’s bail upon learning of the court error. Thus, similar
to Speedwell, the initial forfeiture was not due to an error on the defendant’s
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part. We agree wholly with this Court’s prior conclusion that “the plain
language of the statute does not contemplate that the trial court must secure
the written consent of the bail bondsman in order to continue suretyship where
the initial forfeiture of bail was due to a court error.” Speedwell, supra (non-
precedential decision at 8) (citation omitted). Indeed, we reiterate our prior
assent to the conclusion that to find such a situation triggered the need for
written consent “would create an absurd result where a defendant who did not
violate the conditions of his bail is nonetheless subject to the reaffirmed
consent of the bondsman by no error of his own.” Id. (cleaned up).
Based upon the foregoing, we hold that the trial court did not err in
finding that the written consent required by § 5747.1(b) was not triggered by
the September order, which was entered as a result of court error. Since the
trial court was not required to obtain the written consent of Surety before
reinstating the defendant’s bail in October 2020, we affirm the order denying
Surety’s petition to strike and/or set aside bail forfeiture and exonerate surety.
Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 07/11/2023
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