J-E01002-23
2023 PA Super 117
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
VINCENT SMITH :
:
Appellant : No. 1256 WDA 2021
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered June 30, 2021
In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County Criminal Division at
No(s): CP-02-CR-0008964-2018
BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., BENDER, P.J.E., LAZARUS, J., OLSON, J., STABILE,
J., DUBOW, J., NICHOLS, J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and McCAFFERY, J.
OPINION BY McCAFFERY, J.: FILED: JUNE 30, 2023
Vincent Smith (Appellant) appeals from the judgment of sentence
entered in the Allegheny County Court of Common Pleas, following his open
guilty pleas to two counts of voluntary manslaughter and four counts of arson
endangering persons.1 The four counts of arson endangering persons relate
to the presence of four police officers when Appellant started the fire. As an
issue of first impression, Appellant argues the trial court’s imposition of
multiple sentences for these counts was illegal, as the arson endangering
persons statute — Subsection 3301(a)(1)(i) of the Crimes Code — provides
for a single sentence regardless of the number of victims. We hold: (1) the
unit of prosecution for this offense is not merely the starting of a fire, but the
intentional starting of a fire that recklessly places another in danger of death
1 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 2503(b), 3301(a)(1)(i).
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or bodily injury; (2) Subsection 3301(a)(1)(i) was written with regard to an
individual person being placed in danger of death or serious bodily injury;2
and (3) a defendant may be convicted of and sentenced on separate counts
when there is one arson but more than one victim. We thus affirm.
I. Facts & Procedural History
At the plea hearing, Appellant generally agreed with the facts set forth
in the affidavit of probable cause,3 which stated the following: On February
26, 2018, four police officers went to the rowhome at 103 Penfield Place,
Pittsburgh, attempting to locate a missing person, John Van Dyke. See
Affidavit of Probable Cause, 2/28/18, at 3. The officers forcibly entered the
home and repeatedly announced their presence. Id. Once inside they heard
someone on the second floor say, “Steve’s not here[,]” and the officers again
announced their presence and purpose. Id. The officers then
observed [Appellant] striking matches and tossing them on the
floor. The matches started an instant fire[, which] began traveling
down the stairs toward the officers. The officers immediately
exited the residence and took positions . . . outside[. Appellant]
was eventually rescued by firemen and . . . treated for smoke
inhalation. . . .
Trial Ct. Op., 4/6/22, at 2.
2 See Commonwealth v. Frisbie, 485 A.2d 1098, 1100 (Pa. 1984).
3 See N.T. Plea H’rg, 4/5/21, at 16-17.
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The bodies of John Van Dyke and Steven Pariser were recovered from
the residence. Both “had obvious trauma to the back of their heads and their
deaths were ruled as homicides.” Trial Ct. Op. at 2. Appellant told detectives:
[H]e was attacked by the men and he fought back. He . . .
admitted that he [threw] them down a flight of steps[.] He
covered them with blankets and bags. He further told the
detectives that he wanted to kill himself so he took some pills and
spread lighter fluid all over the residence.[4]
Id.
Appellant was charged with homicide, various counts of arson, and
related offenses. On April 5, 2021, he entered open guilty pleas, all graded
as felonies of the first degree, to: (1) two counts of voluntary manslaughter,
representing the two victims killed; and (2) four counts of arson endangering
persons, for the four police officers present when Appellant started the fire.
On June 30, 2021, the trial court imposed the following sentences, all
to run consecutively: (1) for the two voluntary manslaughter counts, two
terms of five to 10 years’ imprisonment; and (2) for the four arson
endangering persons count, four terms of four to eight years. Therefore, the
aggregate sentence was 26 to 52 years’ imprisonment.5
Appellant filed a timely counseled post-sentence motion, challenging the
discretionary aspects of his sentence and the voluntariness of his guilty plea.
4 Appellant had killed the two victims approximately five days before the fire.
See N.T. Post-Sentence Mot. H’rg, 8/23/21, at 12.
5 At the time of sentencing, Appellant was 61 years old.
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The trial court conducted a hearing on August 23, 2021. Based on Appellant’s
arguments, the court considered an additional question, whether the
commission of arson endangering persons was “a one-act event,” regardless
of the number of potential victims — in other words, whether an individual
could be sentenced on multiple counts of this offense, based on a single act
of arson that placed more than one person at risk. See N.T., 8/23/21, at 26-
27. The court directed the parties to file supplemental briefs addressing this
issue, and they complied.
The trial court then conducted a second post-sentence hearing on
September 20, 2021. Both parties addressed: (1) the recent decision in
Commonwealth v. Satterfield, 255 A.3d 438 (Pa. 2021) (discussed infra),
which held the “unit of prosecution” of leaving the scene of an accident
involving death or personal injury6 was the defendant’s single act of leaving,
regardless of the number of victims, and thus only one conviction of this
offense and one sentence were proper; and (2) Commonwealth v. Frisbie,
485 A.2d 1098 (Pa. 1984) (discussed infra), which permitted separate
sentences for recklessly endangering another person7 (REAP), where there
was one act by the defendant that endangered multiple victims. N.T. Post[-]
sentencing Mot., 9/20/21, at 4-10, 12-17. The trial court ruled it was proper
6 75 Pa.C.S. § 3742.
7 18 Pa.C.S. § 2705.
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to impose separate sentences on Appellant’s arson endangering persons
convictions, and thus denied his request for relief. Id. at 24.
Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal and complied with the trial
court’s order to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement of errors complained of on
appeal.
II. Question Presented, Standards of Review &
Arson Endangering Persons Statute
Appellant presents the following issue for our review:
Did the trial court err in imposing multiple sentences for
[Appellant’s] convictions for arson pertaining to multiple
endangered persons where the statute providing for the offense,
properly construed according to the rules of statutory
interpretation, provide for a single sentence regardless of the
number of victims?
Appellant’s Brief at 8.
We note Appellant’s claim implicates the legality of his sentence, which
presents a pure question of law; thus our scope of review is plenary, and our
standard of review, de novo. See Satterfield, 255 A.3d at 442 (citation
omitted). Resolution of Appellant’s issue also involves interpretation of a
statute, namely 18 Pa.C.S. § 3301(a)(1)(i), which likewise “presents a pure
question of law; again, our scope of review is plenary, and our standard of
review, de novo.” See id.
At this juncture, we set forth the pertinent statutory definition of arson
endangering persons:
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§ 3301. Arson and related offenses.
(a) Arson endangering persons.
(1) A person commits a felony of the first degree if he
intentionally starts a fire . . . and if:
(i) he thereby recklessly places another person in
danger of death or bodily injury, including but not limited
to a firefighter, police officer or other person actively
engaged in fighting the fire . . . .
18 Pa.C.S. § 3301(a)(1)(i) (some emphasis added).
III. Parties’ Arguments
Appellant argues the trial court erred in imposing multiple sentences for
his arson endangering persons convictions, as the unit of prosecution is one
arson, and not the endangerment to others.8 In support, he first contends
the arson endangering persons statute is ambiguous. Appellant’s Brief at 16-
17. He proposes two possible interpretations of the statute: (1) first, that the
statute primarily prosecutes arson, not endangerment of persons; and (2) on
the other hand, that it prosecutes “arsons as ersatz crimes against persons.”
Id.
In support of his contention that the former interpretation should
control, Appellant presents the following arguments.9 First, where there are
8 We note Appellant does not challenge his multiple convictions of arson
endangering persons, and instead only the consecutive sentences.
9 Appellant does not present any discussion of his latter interpretation of the
statute.
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“two reasonable interpretations of a statute’s unit of prosecution[, the courts]
should adopt the more lenient one.” Appellant’s Brief at 19, citing
Commonwealth v. Davidson, 938 A.2d 198, 221 (Pa. 2007) (“[The United
States] Supreme Court has explained that ‘[w]hen Congress leaves to the
Judiciary the task of imputing to Congress an undeclared will, the ambiguity
should be resolved in favor of lenity.’”) (citation omitted). Second, the titles
of both Section 3301 (“Arson and related offenses”) and Subsection 3301(a)
(“Arson endangering persons”) suggest their primary focus, or key element,
is arson — and not endangerment. Appellant’s Brief at 17. Meanwhile,
“[c]rimes primarily focused on injury or danger to persons are defined
elsewhere” in the Crimes Code. Id. at 18, citing “18 Pa.C.S. §§ 2501 et seq.”
Finally, although the arson endangering persons statute contains an element
of endangerment to “another” person, in the singular, “our legislature has
provided that singular words . . . subsume their plural coordinate terms[.]”
Appellant’s Brief at 16-17, citing 1 Pa.C.S. § 1902 (“The singular shall include
the plural, and the plural, the singular.”).
Furthermore, Appellant asserts the trial court failed to conduct any
“textual or other statutory analysis[,] but instead rejected [his] claim . . . on
the ground” that the arson endangering persons statute is unlike the statute
addressed in Satterfield — leaving the scene of an accident involving death
or personal injury. Appellant’s Brief at 19. While Appellant agrees the
Satterfield statute is distinguishable, he maintains that “it does not follow
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that Section 3301’s unit of prosecution is [an] endangerment.” Id. at 20.
Appellant contends that in Satterfield, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
concluded that a vehicle “accident was [the] key element, and [it was]
immaterial that additional elements gave rise to [higher] penalties.” Id.
Finally, Appellant challenges the trial court’s reasoning, that it would be
absurd for a person to be charged with only one arson causing murder, under
18 Pa.C.S. § 3301(a)(2),10 if more than one person died from an act of arson.
Appellant’s Brief at 21, citing Trial Ct. Op. at 7. Appellant reasons that in that
scenario, a defendant could be charged with one count of arson endangering
persons and multiple counts of murder. Appellant’s Brief at 22. Appellant
concludes this Court should vacate three of his arson endangering persons
sentences.
The Commonwealth responds that the present sentencing issue is
governed by Frisbie, 485 A.2d 1098, which Appellant does not address on
appeal. In Frisbie, the defendant drove his car through a crowd injuring nine
pedestrians. Commonwealth’s Brief at 10. On appeal, the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court upheld the imposition of separate sentences for nine counts of
REAP, reasoning that the REAP statute’s inclusion of the phrase, “another
10 See 18 Pa.C.S. § 3301(a)(2) (“A person who commits arson endangering
persons is guilty of murder of the second degree if the fire . . . causes the
death of any person . . . .”).
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person,” indicated “a separate offense is committed for each individual person
placed in danger.” Id. at 11, citing Frisbie, 485 A.2d at 1100.
The Commonwealth further contends that Appellant’s reliance on the
title of Section 3301 is misplaced, as our Supreme Court has held the
“headings prefixed to titles, . . . sections and other divisions of a statute shall
not be considered to control.” Commonwealth’s Brief at 14, citing
Commonwealth v. Magwood, 469 A.2d 115, 119 (Pa. 1983). We agree
with the trial court’s analysis and the Commonwealth’s discussion and
therefore conclude Appellant is not entitled to relief.
IV. Pertinent Authority
To resolve Appellant’s issue, we must determine what our General
Assembly fixed as the unit of prosecution for a violation of Section
3301(a)(1)(i), arson endangering persons. In Satterfield, the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court explained:
The unit of prosecution is the actus reus that the General
Assembly intended to punish. Put otherwise, the unit of
prosecution is the minimum conduct that must be proven to obtain
a conviction for the statute in question. Only a single conviction
and resulting punishment may be imposed for a single unit of
prosecution. As this Court has indicated, “[t]o determine the
correct unit of prosecution, the inquiry should focus on whether
separate and distinct prohibited acts . . . have been committed.”
Satterfield, 255 A.3d at 445-46 (citation omitted).
This review involves statutory interpretation. The Satterfield Court
further stated:
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The best expression of legislative intent appears in the plain
language of a statute. Words of a statute “shall be construed
according to rules of grammar and according to their common and
approved usage.” 1 Pa.C.S. § 1903(a). “[W]hen the words of a
statute are clear and unambiguous, there is no need to look
beyond the plain meaning of the statute under the pretext of
pursuing its spirit.”
Satterfield, 255 A.3d at 446 (some citations omitted).
We consider our Supreme Court’s 1983 decision in Frisbie. In that
case, the defendant, while fleeing from police officers, “drove his car through
a crowded intersection and seriously injured nine pedestrians.” Frisbie, 485
A.2d at 1099. He was convicted of, inter alia, nine counts of REAP and
received nine consecutive sentences for each count.
Id.
On appeal, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court considered whether the
multiple sentences for REAP, arising from the defendant’s single act that
affected multiple victims, violated the double jeopardy clause of the Fifth
Amendment of the United States Constitution. Frisbie, 485 A.2d at 1099.
The Court reviewed the language of the REAP statute:
A person commits a misdemeanor of the second degree if he
recklessly engages in conduct which places or may place another
person in danger of death or serious bodily injury.
Id. at 1100, quoting 18 Pa.C.S. § 2705 (emphasis in Frisbie). The Frisbie
Court emphasized the phrase, “another person,” and concluded that under the
“fair import” of its terms, Section 2705 “was written with regard to an
individual person being placed in danger of death or serious bodily injury[.]”
Frisbie,
485 A.2d at 1100 (emphasis in original). Thus, the Court found, “a
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separate offense is committed for each individual person placed in such
danger.” Id.
In further support, the Court considered:
Where the legislature has intended to preclude multiple
punishments for multiple injuries resulting from a single act, it has
expressly done so. For example, in § 2707 of the Crimes Code,
the legislature made it a crime to “throw . . . a rock, stone, brick,
. . . or any deadly or dangerous missile . . . into a vehicle . . . that
is occupied by one or more persons . . . .” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2707
(emphasis added). Similarly, § 2710 of the Crimes Code makes
it a crime to commit an offense under any other provision of Article
B (offenses involving danger to the person) “with malicious
intention toward the race, color, religion or national origin of
another individual or group of individuals.” 18 Pa.C.S.A.
§ 2710 (emphasis added).
Had the legislature intended to preclude multiple
punishments under § 2705, that section would read: “a person
commits a misdemeanor of the second degree if he recklessly
engages in conduct which places or may place another person
or persons in danger of death or serious bodily injury.”
Frisbie, 485 A.2d at 1100 (some citations omitted & paragraph break added).
The Court thus upheld the imposition of multiple sentences upon the
defendant.
Id. at 1101.
Next, we review the 2021 decision in Satterfield. The defendant, under
the influence of alcohol, crashed his tractor-trailer into numerous vehicles,
which were stopped. Satterfield, 255 A.3d at 439. The defendant then fled
from his vehicle. Id. “As a result of the crash, three people died and many
others were injured.” Id. The defendant entered open guilty pleas to, inter
alia, three counts of Pennsylvania’s so-called “hit-and-run” statute, or leaving
the scene of an accident involving death or personal injury. Id. at 440. Each
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count related to one of the three victims killed. Id. at 440-41. The trial court
imposed three consecutive sentences on these counts. Id. at 441.
On appeal, our Supreme Court considered the defendant’s claim that
the imposition of separate sentences was illegal because he committed only a
single violation of Section 3742. Satterfield, 255 A.3d at 445. That statute
states, in pertinent part:
(a) General rule.—The driver of any vehicle involved in an
accident resulting in injury or death of any person shall
immediately stop the vehicle at the scene of the accident or as
close thereto as possible . . . and in every event shall remain at
the scene of the accident until he has fulfilled the requirement of
section 3744 (relating to duty to give information and render aid).
...
Satterfield, 255 A.3d at 446, quoting 75 Pa.C.S. § 3742(a).
The Satterfield Court reasoned that “Section 3742(a) plainly instructs
that a driver involved in an accident must ‘. . . remain at the scene of the
accident until he has fulfilled the requirements of 3744 (relating to duty to
give information and render aid).’” Satterfield, 255 A.3d at 447 (citation
omitted). In other words, “[a] driver who leaves the scene of the accident
prematurely[ ] violates the statute.[ ]” Id. at 447-48. “Based upon this
statutory language, it is solely involvement in an accident that triggers the
obligation to stop and remain at the scene.” Id. at 448. Accordingly, the
Court held “the unit of prosecution is the act of leaving the scene of an accident
without first rendering aid and providing the information required by Section
3744.[ ]” Id. at 447 (emphasis omitted). In other words, the unit of
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prosecution “does not depend upon the results of the accident, including the
number of victims or the severity of their injuries.” Id. at 448.
Because the unit of prosecution is the act of leaving the scene of an
accident without rendering aid and providing information, the Satterfield
Court concluded the defendant violated the statute only once — as “[t]here
was only one accident scene at which [he] had a legal duty to remain[.]”
Satterfield, 255 A.3d at 449-50. The Court thus vacated two of the
defendant’s three leaving the scene of an accident sentences, on the ground
they were illegal. Id. at 451.
V. Analysis
In its opinion, the trial court applied the “guidance” set forth in
Satterfield in order to determine a criminal statute’s unit of prosecution. Trial
Ct. Op. at 5. The court reviewed the language of Subsection 3301(a)(1)(i),
which provides:
(1) A person commits a felony of the first degree if he
intentionally starts a fire or causes an explosion, or if he aids,
counsels, pays or agrees to pay another to cause a fire or
explosion, whether on his own property or on that of another, and
if:
(i) he thereby recklessly places another person in danger
of death or bodily injury, including but not limited to a
firefighter, police officer or other person actively engaged in
fighting the fire[.]
Id. at 6, quoting 18 Pa.C.S. § 3301(a)(1)(i) (emphasis added).
The trial court concluded this statute “is specifically focused on the
individual risk of death or serious bodily injury caused to” another person.
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Trial Ct. Op. at 6. It found the unit of prosecution is not merely an arson, but
instead “the commission of an arson that specifically recklessly places
another person in danger of death or bodily injury.” Id. (emphasis added).
It reasoned “the statute specifically requires proof of both an arson and that
an enumerated person be placed in danger of death or bodily injury from the
arson.” Id. at 7 (some emphasis omitted & emphasis added). Thus, the court
concluded, the proper interpretation of this statute permits separate
sentences for each victim endangered by a defendant’s conduct. Id.
We agree with the trial court’s reasoning and, contrary to Appellant’s
argument, we conclude Section 3301(a)(1)(i) is unambiguous. First, applying
our statutory interpretation principles and the discussion in Satterfield, we
likewise conclude the General Assembly intended the unit of prosecution to be
the defendant’s commission of an arson coupled with their “recklessly
plac[ing] another person in danger of death or bodily injury[.]” See 18
Pa.C.S. § 3301(a)(1)(i); Satterfield, 255 A.3d at 447. The plain meaning of
the word, “and,” at the end of Subsection (1) requires the Commonwealth to
prove not only that a defendant “intentionally start[ed] a fire,” but also that
they “recklessly place[d] another person in danger of death or bodily injury[.]”
See 18 Pa.C.S. § 3301(a)(1)(i); Commonwealth v. Coleman, 285 A.3d 599,
605 (Pa. 2022) (“[W]ords and phrases shall be construed according to rules
of grammar and according to their common and approved usage[.]”) (citation
omitted).
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As to whether the statute contemplates placing a single person in
danger, or more than one person, we find Frisbie instructive.11 The REAP
statute at issue in that case and the pertinent arson endangering persons
subsection bear similarities. A person commits REAP when they “recklessly
engage[ ] in conduct which places or may place another person in danger of
death or serious bodily injury.” 18 Pa.C.S. § 2705 (emphasis added). The
Frisbie Court emphasized the phrase, “another person” and, as discussed
above, construed this language to mean “that § 2705 was written with regard
to an individual person being placed in danger of death of serious bodily
injury, and that a separate offense is committed for reach individual person
placed in such danger.” Frisbie, 485 A.2d at 1100. Similarly, the definition
of arson endangering persons is the intentional starting of a fire “and” the
“recklessly plac[ing] another person in danger of death or bodily injury[.]”
See 18 Pa.C.S. § 3301(a)(1)(i) (emphasis added). Applying the rationale of
Frisbie, we conclude the phrase, “another person,” “was written with regard
to an individual person being placed in danger of death of serious bodily
injury,” and thus separate offenses are committed for each person placed in
such danger. Thus, separate sentences may be imposed. See 18 Pa.C.S.
§ 3301(a)(1)(i); Frisbie,
485 A.2d at 1100.
11Although Appellant addressed Frisbie in the trial court proceedings, he
wholly ignores it on appeal. See Commonwealth’s Brief at 10.
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To this end, we also disagree with Appellant’s reliance on 1 Pa.C.S. §
1902, which states:
§ 1902. Number; gender; tense.
The singular shall include the plural, and the plural, the singular.
Words used in the masculine gender shall include the feminine and
neuter. Words used in the past or present tense shall include the
future.
1 Pa.C.S. § 1902. Appellant does not address the discussion in Frisbie, that
“[w]here the legislature has intended to preclude multiple punishments for
multiple injuries resulting from a single act, it has expressly done so.” See
Frisbie, 485 A.2d at 1100, citing 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2707 (it is a crime to throw
a rock or any deadly or dangerous missile into a vehicle “that is occupied by
one or more persons”), 2710 (a person commits ethnic intimidation if they
commit an offense “with malicious intention toward the race, color, religion or
national origin of another individual or group of individuals”).
VI. Conclusion
In sum, we conclude that under the plain language and meaning of
Subsection 3301(a)(1)(i), within the arson endangering persons statute, the
unit of prosecution is the intentional starting of a fire which recklessly places
another person in danger of death or bodily injury. See 18 Pa.C.S. §
3301(a)(1)(i). Accordingly, a defendant may be convicted of and sentenced
separately on multiple counts if one act of arson causes more than one person
to be in danger of death or bodily injury. Applying this holding to the case
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sub judice, we affirm the separate sentences imposed on each of Appellant’s
four arson endangering persons convictions, and hold they are not illegal.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
President Judge Panella, President Judge Emeritus Bender, Judge Olson,
Judge Stabile, Judge Dubow, Judge Nichols and Judge McLaughlin join this
opinion.
Judge Lazarus files a dissenting opinion.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 6/30/23
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