State v. Jenkins’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

64 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 64 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “a proper Geisler analysis does not require [that we] simply ... tally and follow the decisions favoring one party's state constitutional claim; a deeper review of those decisions' underpinnings is required because we follow only 'persuasive' decisions. See Kerrigan v. Commissioner of Public Health , 289 Conn. 135 , 140-41, 957 A.2d 407 (2008) ('the state court cases that have determined that gay persons do not constitute a quasi-suspect class, like [certain] federal cases ... employed a flawed analysis, and, therefore, they do not constitute persuasive authority').”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. State v. Purcell · State v. Harris

2. “[W]here the legal conclusions of the court are challenged, we must determine whether they are legally and logically correct and whether they find support in the facts set out in the memorandum of decision.”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. State v. Ryder · 170 Conn. App. 501 - State v. Burgos

3. “[a] police officer is not entitled to seize and search every person whom he sees on the street or of whom he makes inquiries. Before he places a hand on the person of a citizen in search of anything, he must have constitutionally adequate, reasonable grounds for doing so. In the case of the self-protective search for weapons, he must be able to point to particular facts from which he reasonably inferred that the individual was armed and dangerous.... The authority to permit a reasonable search for weapons for the protection of the police officer is narrowly drawn applying only where he has reason to believe that he is dealing with an armed and dangerous individual .... The officer need not be absolutely certain that the individual is armed; the issue is whether a reasonably prudent man in the circumstances would be warranted in the belief that his safety or that of others was in danger.... And in determining whether the officer acted reasonably in such circumstances, due weight must be given, not to his inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or hunch, but to the specific reasonable inferences which he is entitled to draw from the facts in light of his experience.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 173 Conn. App. 827 - State v. Lewis