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← 298 F.2d 121 - Woodard v. General Motors Corp.

Woodard v. General Motors Corp.’s Empirical Analysis

298 F.2d 121 · 1962

Citation profile

97
cited by 97 later decisions
3
states following
September 2016
most recently cited

63 federal appellate · 3 district · 4 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 97 later decisions — most recently September 2016 · most notably Don Marquis v. Chrysler Corporation, Don Marquis v. Chrysler Corporation and Chrysler Motors Corporation, Don Marquis v. Chrysler Corporation, Chrysler Motors Corporation and Chrysler Realty Corporation (1978), Northview Motors, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp. (2000)

63 federal appellate · 3 district · 4 state decisions

330196219701980199020002010decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Relies on Clay v. Sun Ins. Office Ltd. · United States v. International Union United Automobile, Aircraft & Agricultural Implement Workers · United States v. Witkovich · Kuhl Motor Co. v. Ford Motor Co.

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 97 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “The principal effect of the bill as amended by the committee is to give the dealer a right of action against the manufacturer, where the manufacturer fails to act in a fair and equitable manner so as to guarantee the dealer freedom from coercion, intimidation, or threats of coercion or intimidation. The term `fair and equitable' as used in the bill is qualified by the term `so as to guarantee the one party freedom from coercion, intimidation, or threats of coercion or intimidation from the other party.' In each case arising under this bill, good faith must be determined in the context of coercion or intimidation or threats of coercion or intimidation. Each party to an automobile franchise would have a special obligation to guarantee the other party freedom from coercion or intimidation of any kind.”
    3 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  2. ““An automobile manufacturer is not precluded by the Act from including in its contracts with dealers, as the appellee has done here, requirements that dealers shall provide product representation commensurate with the good will attached to its trade name and facilitate the proper sale and servicing of its motor vehicles. The manufacturer is entitled to bargain for the protection of its good name, to provide for the trade acceptance of its wares, and to have a reasonable expectation that those who are marketing its cars have the facilities for coping with the sales efforts of those who are dealing in the products of competitors. Cf. Best Motor and Implement Co. v. International Harvester Co. supra [5 Cir., 252 F.2d 278 ]. As is said in the House Report, the Act ‘does not prohibit the manufacturer from terminating or refusing to renew the franchise of a dealer who is not providing the manufacturer with adequate representation. Nor does the bill curtail the manufacturer’s right to cancel or not to renew an inefficient or undesirable dealer’s franchise.’ H.R.Rep. No. 2850, 84th Cong. 2d Sess. 9. We do not think that the good faith requirement, whether viewed in or outside of the context of coercion, prevents a manufacturer from terminating a contract with a dealer where the dealer has, over a long period of time, violated a valid and material clause of the contract and has failed to comply with the continuing insistence of the manufacturer upon performance. And it is shown, we th”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  3. “An automobile manufacturer is not precluded by the Act from including in its contracts with dealers, as the appellee has done here, requirements that dealers shall provide product representation commensurate with the good will attached to its trade name and facilitate the proper sale and servicing of its motor vehicles. The manufacturer is entitled to bargain for the protection of its good name, to provide for the trade acceptance of its wares, and to have a reasonable expectation that those who are marketing its cars have the facilities for coping with the sales efforts of those who are dealing in the products of competitors. [Citing case.] As is said in the House Report, the Act `does not prohibit the manufacturer from terminating or refusing to renew the franchise of a dealer who is not providing the manufacturer with adequate representation. Nor does the bill curtail the manufacturer's right to cancel or not to renew an inefficient or undesirable dealer's franchise.' H.R.Rep. No. 2850, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. 9. * * *”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.