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← 298 F. Supp. 708 - Lawrence v. Blackwell

298 F. Supp. 708 - Lawrence v. Blackwell’s Empirical Analysis

1969

Citation profile

44
cited by 44 later decisions
1
cited 1 times by the Supreme Court
4
states following
October 1992
most recently cited

19 federal appellate · 7 district · 5 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 44 later decisions (1 by the Supreme Court) — most recently October 1992 · most notably Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court of Kentucky (1973), United States of America Ex Rel. Frank Esola, 53517 v. Ronald M. Groomes, Superintendent (1975)

19 federal appellate · 7 district · 5 state decisions

3801969197019801990decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Applies 18 U.S.C. § 4001 · 18 U.S.C. § 4042 (Prison Camera Reform Act of 2021) · 28 U.S.C. § 2201 · 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Civil Rights Act of 1871 / Section 1983 (Ku Klux Klan Act)) · 5 U.S.C. § 702

Relies on Klopfer v. State of North Carolina · United States v. Ewell · Smith v. Hooey · Time, Inc. v. Bon Air Hotel, Inc. · Illinois Power Co. v. Local Union No. 51, International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 44 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. ““[I]n the federal system, motions to dismiss the indictment for unnecessary delay in trial are addressed to the trial court. (Rule 48(b) F.R.Cr. Proc. and cases cited). Considerations of federalism and peculiar state statutes on the question of speedy trial make this rule particularly appropriate in cases, such as this one, where a state charge is pending. A state trial judge, not a federal district court, should initially decide the question of denial of the right to speedy trial. A second consideration in our decision was the common practice of federal courts, in the pre-Smith v. Hooey ( 393 U.S. 374 , 89 S.Ct. 575 , 21 L.Ed.2d 607 ) era, to permit prisoners to raise the speedy trial question at the state court level when they were actually tried” ( 298 F.Supp. 716 ).”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  2. ““While the state detainers [is] placed on these plaintiffs restrict their privileges, the courts cannot declare those restrictions per se capricious. The prison authorities have made the judgments, based on experience and expertise that prisoners with detainers warrant more restrictive treatment. Even if we might disagree, the court cannot quarrel with their judgment, for the administration of the prisons is within the purview of the Executive, not the Judicial, branch.””
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  3. “While detainers reduce the incentive for the prisoner to attempt to improve himself, they also affect the institution’s readiness to allow an inmate full participation in the program. . . . Today the prisoners with detainers are evaluated individually but there remains a tendency to consider them escape risks and to assign them accordingly. In many instances this evaluation and decision may be correct, for the detainer can aggravate the escape potentiality of a prisoner.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.