298 Ga. App. 338 - Hayes v. State’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

33 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 33 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “[t]he template for deciding all constitutional speedy trial claims under the Sixth Amendment and the Georgia Con stitution is laid out in the 1972 case of Barker v. Wingo[, 407 U. S. 514, 530 (IV) (92 SC 2182, 33 LE2d 101) (1972)] and the 1992 decision in Doggett v. United States, [ 506 U. S. 647 , 651 (II) (112 SC 2686, 120 LE2d 520) (1992)]. ... The analysis has two stages. First the court must determine whether the interval from the accused’s arrest, indictment, or other formal accusation to the trial is sufficiently long to be considered “presumptively prejudicial.” If not, the speedy trial claim fails at the threshold. If, however, the delay has passed the point of presumptive prejudice, the court must proceed to the second step of the Barker-Doggett analysis, which requires the application of a delicate, context-sensitive, four-factor balancing test to determine whether the accused has been deprived of the right to a speedy trial.”

   4 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. Whatley v. State · 301 Ga. App. 187 - Ditman v. State

2. “[o]ur toleration of (governmental) negligence varies inversely with its protractedness, and its consequent threat to the fairness of the accused’s trial. Condoning prolonged and unjustifiable delays in prosecution would both penalize many defendants for the state’s fault and simply encourage the government to gamble with the interests of criminal suspects assigned a low prosecutorial priority. The Government, indeed, can hardly complain too loudly, for persistent neglect in concluding a criminal prosecution indicates an uncommonly feeble interest in bringing an accused to justice; the more weight the Government attaches to securing a conviction, the harder it will try to get it. 12”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 301 Ga. App. 155 - Davis v. State

3. “[g]iven that the Barker-Doggett analysis is a balancing test, . . . requiring the trial court to analyze each case based upon its own unique facts, it necessarily forbids the application of any “bright-line” rules. Thus, the fact that the delay in this case was less than five years does not automatically foreclose a presumption of actual prejudice. Rather, in determining whether a pre-trial delay gives rise to a presumption of actual prejudice, the trial court must examine the delay relative to all other factors, including the complexity of the case and the evidence existing on the date the State initiated the prosecution.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the concurrence
   e.g. 301 Ga. App. 315 - State v. Moses