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← 298 NJSUPER 176 - State v. Bauman

State v. Bauman’s Empirical Analysis

1997

Citation profile

15
cited by 15 later decisions
1
states following
May 2016
most recently cited

15 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 15 later decisions — most recently May 2016

15 state decisions

80199720002010decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Relies on North Carolina v. Pearce · Bordenkircher v. Hayes · Bibby v. United States · Blackledge v. Perry · Oyler v. Boles

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 15 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “In our system, so long as the prosecutor has probable cause to believe that the accused committed an offense defined by statute, the decision whether or not to prosecute, and what charge to file or bring before a grand jury, generally rests entirely in his discretion. Within the limits set by the legislature's constitutionally valid definition of chargeable offenses, "the conscious exercise of some selectivity in enforcement is not in itself a federal constitutional violation" so long as "the selection was [not] deliberately based upon an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion, or other arbitrary classification." [ Bordenkircher, supra, 434 U.S. at 364 , 98 S.Ct. at 668 , 54 L.Ed. 2d at 611 ; Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 456 , 82 S.Ct. 501 , 7 L.Ed. 2d 446 (1962); see also State v. Bauman, 298 N.J.Super. 176, 201 , 689 A. 2d 173 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 150 N.J. 25 , 695 A. 2d 668 (1997) (rejecting defendant's contention that additional charges in a superseding indictment violated his right to due process the new indictment was sought after defendant failed to enter into a plea bargain).]”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
  2. “There is good reason to be cautious before adopting an inflexible presumption of prosecutorial vindictiveness in a pretrial setting. In the course of preparing a case for trial, the prosecutor may uncover additional information that suggests a basis for further prosecution or he simply may come to realize that information possessed by the State has a broader significance. At this stage of the proceedings, the prosecutor's assessment of the proper extent of prosecution may not have crystallized. In contrast, once a trial begins-and certainly by the time a conviction has been obtained-it is much more likely that the State had discovered and assessed all of the information against an accused and has made a determination, on the basis of that information, of the extent to which he should be prosecuted. Thus, a change in the charging decision made after an initial trial is completed is much more likely to be improperly motivated than is a pretrial decision.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
  3. “[p]rosecutorial misconduct is not ground for reversal of a criminal conviction unless the conduct was so egregious that it deprived defendant of a fair trial.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.