298 Pa. Super. 32 - Commonwealth v. DeCaro’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

34 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 34 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. ““In Moore , the question posed was: ‘whether or not the Common Pleas Court in a trial de novo following an appeal as of right from a Municipal Court summary conviction can impose a sentence greater than that originally imposed in the Municipal Court without placing upon the record facts justifying such increase in sentence.’ (Emphasis added) Id., 226 Pa.Superior Ct. at 60, 312 A.2d at 422 . To start with, the Court in Moore found the Kentucky system, as discussed in Colten [v. Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104 , 92 S.Ct. 1953 , 32 L.Ed.2d 584 (1972) ], to be indistinguisha ble from the Philadelphia system. Consistent therewith, the Court went on to hold that, unless the appellant appealing a summary judgment to a higher court alleges error in regard to the prior summary offense and in the sentence imposed by the municipal court, the reasoning supporting Colten rather than that supporting North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 , 89 S.Ct. 2072 , 23 L.Ed.2d 656 (1971) was applicable and governing. In other words, the Moore Court was stating that the trial judge’s reasoning for increasing a sentence after retrial was not required to ‘ “be based upon objective information concerning identifiable conduct on the part of the defendant occurring after the time of the original sentencing proceeding[,]” ’ Commonwealth v. Moore, supra, 226 Pa.Super. at 64 , 312 A.2d 423 , unless, as just stated, the appellant alleged error attendant to the summary proceedings and the sentence imposed by the municip”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the concurrence
   e.g. 301 Pa. Super. 543 - Commonwealth v. Visconto

2. “The testimony at the suppression hearing shows that the police took with them one Sadusky, a defendant on another charge who knew appellant and who had agreed to have appellant open her door to him for the benefit of the police. The front door was reinforced by an iron gate opening outwards. When appellant opened the door to Sadusky, at least one police officer yelled out “police” and “we have a warrant”. A police officer standing with Sadusky grabbed the iron gate to prevent it from being slammed shut, and the other two police officers ran in, while appellant stood there, doing and saying nothing. The police had seen another person in the house, and rushed through the house to prevent disposal of any controlled substance, showing the warrant to appellant later. The judge, on the basis of Commonwealth v. Regan, 254 Pa.Super.Ct. 555 , 386 A.2d 89 (1978), found that Sadusky was being used as a ruse to get the door open and that there was no violation. We see no error in the conclusion drawn by the judge from the facts. The crucial issues are authority, purpose and entry, Commonwealth v. McCarthy, 257 Pa.Super.Ct. 42 , 390 A.2d 236 (1978). The police announced their authority and purpose and though they rushed in quickly there was no forced entry. There was no violation of appellant’s rights in the execution of the warrant.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 411 Pa. Super. 96 - Commonwealth v. Ceriani

3. “[WJhenever a judge imposes a more severe sentence upon a defendant after a new trial, the reasons for his doing so must affirmatively appear. Those reasons must be based upon objective information concerning identifiable conduct on the part of the defendant occurring after the time of the original sentencing proceeding. And the factual data upon which the increased sentence is based must be made part of the record, so that the constitutional legitimacy of the increased sentence may be fully reviewed on appeal. North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. [711], at 726, 89 S.Ct. [2072] at 2081, 23 L.Ed.2d [656] at 670 [1969]. The reason for this is primarily to protect the defendant from any vindictiveness on the part of the judge at the second trial”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 339 Pa. Super. 394 - Commonwealth v. Broadie