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298 S.C. 6

377 S.E.2d 584

Toth v. Square D Company

Supreme Court of South Carolina

Decided March 13, 1989

Supreme Court of South Carolina · decided 1989-03-13

Key passage — most relied on by later courts

“Small involved an action for breach of contract. It is elementary that a cause of action for breach of contract is not a new one. Respondent argues that Small “substantially altered the doctrine of employment at-will to create contractual obligations ... where none had existed before.” We do not agree that a new contractual obligation has been created. The companies themselves previously created the contractual obligations through promises made in employee handbooks.... Employers cannot now be allowed to re tract their promises and ignore handbooks they have drafted.”

quoted by 1 later decision, including Osborne Ex Rel. Osborne v. Adams

“Prospective application is required when liability is created where formerly none existed.”

quoted by 1 later decision, including Fabian v. Lindsay

Relies on Small v. Springs Industries, Inc. · Ludwick v. This Minute of Carolina, Inc. · Elam v. Elam

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1989-03-13

How this case has been cited

Cited by 33 later decisions — most recently November 2022 · most notably Steinke v. South Carolina Department of Labor, Licensing & Regulation (1999), Osborne Ex Rel. Osborne v. Adams (2001)

27 state decisions

13019891990200020102020decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

View the full empirical analysis of this case →

Per Curiam:

¶1Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 46, we agreed to answer the following question certified by order of the Honorable Karen LeCraft Henderson, United States District Court for the District of South Carolina:

Is the holding in Small v. Springs Industries, Inc., 292 S. C. 481, 357 S. E. (2d) 452 (1987), to be given retroactive effect so as to permit a plaintiff whose employment was terminated before June 8, 1987,1 the date the Smallopinion was filed, to bring an action for breach of contract based on the provisions of an employee handbook?

¶2*8FACTUAL BACKGROUND

¶3Plaintiffs are employees “laid off” by defendant employer in January of 1986 and January of 1987. Plaintiffs filed suit in July and August of 1987 alleging breach of contract as a result of alleged violations of provisions included in an employee handbook. Defendants moved for summary judgment asserting that Small v. Springs Industries, Inc., supracould not be applied retroactively. In Small, we held that employee handbook provisions could be introduced as evidence in a breach of contract action against an employer. We accepted certification of the question of the retroactive application of Smallin an order dated September 7, 1988.

¶4DISCUSSION

¶5“[T]he general rule regarding retroactive application of judicial decisions is that decisions creating new substantive rights have prospective effect only, whereas decisions creating new remedies to vindicate existing rights are applied retrospectively.” McCaskey v. Shaw, 295 S. C. 372, 368 S. E. (2d) 672, 673 (Ct. App. 1988) citing Bartlett v. Nationwide Mutual Fire Ins. Co., 290 S. C. 154, 157, 348 S. E. (2d) 530, 532 (Ct. App. 1986). “Prospective application is required when liability is created where formerly none existed.” Hupman v. Erskine College, 281 S. C. 43, 44, 314 S. E. (2d) 314, 315 (1984).

¶6To limit Smallto prospective application, we must agree that it created a new cause of action, with liability where none previously existed. An inspection of previous cases involving prospective application is helpful. In Ludwick v. This Minute of Carolina, 287 S. C. 219, 337 S. E. (2d) 213 (1985), an employment law case, we first recognized the tort of retaliatory discharge, thereby creating a new cause of action and a new substantive right. Clearly, prospective only application was mandated, and this Court included a statement so directing in the body of the opinion itself. In McCaskey v. Shaw, supra,the Court of Appeals gave prospective only application to this Court’s recognition of a tort for the negligent infliction of emotional distress.2 As in *9Ludwick, this created a new tort and therefore a new cause of action.

¶7Other cases which have held prospective application to be appropriate include those in which immunities have been dissolved. These include: Hyder v. Jones, 271 S. C. 85, 245 S. E. (2d) 123 (1978) (statute abrogating parental immunity not retroactively applied); Walton v. Stewart, 277 S. C. 436, 289 S. E. (2d) 403 (1982) (abrogation of interfamily immunity3 not retroactively applied); Douglass v. Florence General Hospital, 273 S. C. 716, 259 S. E. (2d) 117 (1979) (judicial4 and statutory modification5 of charitable immunity for hospitals not retroactively applied). These cases effected more than remedial or procedural changes. They created liability where none had previously existed. Further, both Hyderand Douglassinvolved statutes; the presumption for statutes is that they are to be prospectively applied. Hyder, supra.

¶8The above-cited cases are examples of situations where retroactive relief would have been unfair and inappropriate. Smalldiffers markedly from these situations. In Smallwe recognized no new right or cause of action; we abolished no previous immunities. Smallinvolved an action for breach of contract. It is elementary that a cause of action for breach of contract is not a new one. Respondent argues that Small“substantially altered the doctrine of employment at-will to create contractual obligations ... where none had existed before.” (Resp. brief p. 3). We do not agree that a new contractual obligation has been created. The companies themselves previously created the contractual obligations through promises made in employee handbooks. Smallallowed the introduction of these handbooks as evidence of a contract. Employers cannot now be allowed to retract their promises and ignore handbooks they have drafted.

¶9The use of employee handbook provisions in the construction of an employment relationship is not a novel idea. In fact, introduction of such provisions has previously been allowed in a pro-employer setting. This Court previously *10upheld the dismissal of an employee because a handbook provision allowed “any employee [to be] dismissed or suspended by the city manager.” Dew v. The City of Florence, 279 S. C. 155, 303 S. E. (2d) 664 (1983). Our Court of Appeals has also upheld consideration of handbook provisions in the construction of an employment relationship. Hogsed v. Lancaster Area School Board of Trustees, 283 S. C. 42, 320 S. E. (2d) 724 (Ct. App. 1984) (summary judgment inappropriate where evidence did not clearly establish employer’s compliance with transfer provision included in handbook). In light of these past decisions upholding consideration of handbook provisions to construe employment contracts, respondents’ claim that the Smalldecision was totally unforeshadowed is untenable.

¶10Finally, we point out that this Court has already given retroactive effect to the Smalldecision through our holding in Francisco v. Black River Electric Cooperative, Mem. Op. 87-MO-325 (S. C. filed July 27, 1987). In Francisco, the plaintiff filed suit alleging breach of contract based on violations of employee handbook provisions. The Smallcase had not yet been decided. The trial judge sustained the defendant-employer’s demurrer to the breach of contract cause of action. Smallwas subsequently filed, and Francisco appealed, arguing that he was entitled to proceed because he had stated a cause of action as recognized by Small. We agreed and reversed the trial judge’s decision. Although we recognize that Francisco is a memorandum opinion without precedential value,6 it nonetheless indicates that we have already implicitly allowed retroactive application of Small. By our holding today, we explicitly hold that Smallis to be retroactively applied to causes of action arising prior to the date it was filed.

¶11Certified question answered.

Gregory, C. J., and Finney, J., dissenting in separate opinions.

¶12 Judge Henderson’s Order erroneously lists the filing date as May 26, 1987. Small v. Springs Industries, Inc., 292 S. C. 481, 357 S. E. (2d) 452 (1987) was actually filed on June 8, 1987.

¶13Kinard v. Augusta Sash and Door Company, 286 S. C. 579, 336 S. E. (2d) 465 (1985) (recognizing tort of negligent infliction of emotional distress).

¶14Elam v. Elam, 275 S. C. 132, 268 S. E. (2d) 109 (1980).

¶15Brown v. Anderson County Hospital Association, 268 S. C. 479, 234 S. E. (2d) 873 (1977).

¶16 S. C. Code Ann. § 44-7-50 (1976).

¶17 See Supreme Court Rule 23.

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