State v. Beale’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

17 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 17 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. ““The defendants ask us to distinguish between ‘knowing’ that goods are stolen and merely being put upon an inquiry which would have led to discovery * * *. The receivers of stolen goods almost never ‘know’ that they have been stolen, in the sense that they could testify to it in a court room. The business could not be so conducted, for those who sell the goods * * * must keep up a more respectable front than is generally possible for the thieves. Nor are we to suppose that the thieves will ordinarily admit their theft to the receivers: that would much impair their bargaining power. For this reason, some decisions even go so far as to hold that it is enough, if a reasonable man in the receiver’s position would have supposed that the goods were stolen. That we think is wrong; and the better law is otherwise, * * *. But that the jury must find that the receiver did more than infer the theft from the circumstances has never been demanded, so far as we know; and to demand more would emasculate the statute, for the evil against which it is directed is exactly that: i. e., making a market for stolen goods which the purchaser believes to have probably been stolen.” United States v. Werner, 160 F.2d 438, 441-442 (2d Cir. 1947).”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. State v. Sheffey

2. ““the minority jurisdictions which follow the ‘ordinary reasonable man’ test are failing to stress sufficiently the distinction between civil and criminal responsibility. In civil cases the failure of the defendant to act with the degree of care which a person of ordinary prudence would have used may be the test of his responsibility without any determination that the defendant, himself, was a person of ordinary prudence or that he had wrongful intent. On the other hand, the very essence of this criminal offense is the intentional wrongdoing of the defendant. “The distinction is more than one of semantics. It is made necessary by the fact that while a defendant may have received information which would have convinced a person of ordinary intelligence and average capacity to comprehend and evaluate facts, a defendant may be a person of less than average intelligence, comprehension and reasoning power. The true test is, did the defendant know the goods were stolen.” (Emphasis in original) Id. at 924-25 .”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. State v. Barker

3. ““The . . . test . . . , did the defendant know the goods were stolen "... is not to say that the defendant must have direct knowledge or positive proof that the goods were stolen, such as he would have gained by actually witnessing the theft or hearing the admission of the thief. It is enough if he was made aware of • circumstances which caused him to believe that they were stolen.” (p. 925)”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. State v. Melanson