¶1(dissenting).
¶2The fact that appellant had been offered a blood test was first injected on the cross-examination of State’s Witness Burnip.
¶3This testimony was before the jury and if there was any error in regard to its admissibility, it was waived when no motion to exclude or withdraw the answer was made. Bates v. State, 99 Tex.Cr.R. 647, 271 S.W. 389; Johnson v. State, 90 Tex. Cr.R. 229, 234 S.W. 891; Murray v. State, 136 Tex.Cr.R. 38, 122 S.W.2d 1119; Lawson v. State, 148 Tex.Cr.R. 140, 185 S.W.2d 439; Stanford v. State, 145 Tex.Cr.R. 306, 167 S.W.2d 517; Adams v. State, 158 Tex. Cr.R. 306, 255 S.W.2d 513; Deams v. State, 159 Tex.Cr.R. 496, 265 S.W.2d 96. Many other decisions to like effect are collated under Criminal Law 1044, Texas Digest.
¶4The rule applies though the answer was not responsive. Parker v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 261 S.W. 782; Kennedy v. State, 150 Tex.Cr.R. 215, 200 S.W.2d 400; Martin v. State, 157 Tex.Cr.R. 210, 248 S.W.2d 126.
¶5The same rule applies to the testimony of Officer Burnip wherein he answered in the affirmative when asked by Counsel for the State if he offered appellant a blood alcohol test. No motion was made to withdraw the testimony, though the objection made after the question had been answered was sustained.
¶6The remaining interrogation set out in the majority opinion added nothing to the testimony that was twice before the jury, namely that a blood test had been offered. It could not, therefore, have been prejudicial and reversal should not be predicated thereon,