Fross v. Wotton’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

2 federal appellate · 2 district · 77 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 85 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. ““ * * * We understand the true rule to be that amply secured debts are not to be taken into consideration for the purpose of determining whether the financial condition of the grantor renders the conveyance presumptively fraudulent as to existing creditors, but that when actual fraud is charged the sufficiency of the security at the time of the conveyance is important only as evidencing the existence or nonexistence of a fraudulent intent. This is in accordance with the long-established rule in this state that where there is actual fraud it is immaterial that the debtor does not entirely strip himself of his assets and there is other property from which the creditor may be satisfied. In Fiist National Bank [of Los Angeles] v. Maxwell, 123 Cal. 360 , 55 P. 980 , 69 Am.St.Rep. 64 , it was found that, in addition to the property covered by the deed of trust which it was sought to have set aside, the debtor owned real estate aggregating several thousand dollars over encumbrances and unencumbered personalty worth between five and six thousand dollars. The court said in 123 Cal. 360 , at page 372, 55 P. 980, 983 , 69 Am.St. Rep. 64: ‘This is not a finding that the trust deed was not made to delay and defraud creditors, though competent as evidence tending in some measure towards that conclusion, though far from being in itself conclusive. In 2 Bige-low Frauds, p. 393, it is said, “Indeed, it matters not, where personal intent to defraud is shown, that the fraudulent conveyance, if ”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. H. A. Thompson & Sons, Inc. v. Hahn

2. ““§ 21. Acts of bankruptcy “(a) Acts of bankruptcy by a person shall consist of his having (1) concealed, removed, or permitted to be concealed or removed any part of his property, with intent to hinder, delay, or defraud his creditors or any of them, or made or suffered a transfer of any of his property, fraudulent under the provisions of section 107 or 110 of this title; or (2) made or suffered a preferential transfer, as defined in subdivision a of section 96 of this title; or (3) suffered or permitted, while insolvent, any creditor to obtain a lien upon any of his property through legal proceedings or distraint and not having vacated or discharged such lien within thirty days from the date thereof or at least five days before the date set for any sale or other disposition of such property; or (4) made a general assignment for the benefit of his creditors; or (5) while insolvent or unable to pay his debts as they mature, procured, permitted, or suffered voluntarily or involuntarily the appointment of a receiver or trustee to take charge of his property; or (6) admitted in writing his inability to pay his debts and his willingness to be adjudged a bankrupt. * Sjt * * * * “(c) It shall be a complete defense to any proceedings under the first act of bankruptcy to allege and prove that the party proceeded against was not insolvent as defined in this title at the time of the filing of the petition against him. If solvency at such date is proved by the alleged bankrupt, the proce”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. H. A. Thompson & Sons, Inc. v. Hahn

3. ““We are here met by the argument that it is a violation of the constitutional privilege to draw an inference from the refusal to testify when put upon the ground of the privilege against self-incrimination. However, we do not think the inference here drawn constitutes a denial or invasion of that privilege. ... “The privilege is not for the benefit of the guilty nor to enable the claimant to prevail in civil suits by means of it. The privilege, is to be protected from compulsory disclosure of criminal liability or facts connecting the claimant with the crime. (See In re Berman, 105 Cal. App. 37 [ 287 Pac. 126 ]). To hold that no inference could be drawn from the refusal of these witnesses to explain their dealings, in the face of so many suspicious circumstances, would be an unjustifiable extension of the privilege for a purpose it was never intended to fulfill.””

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 43 Wash. 2d 449 - Ikeda v. Curtis