¶1Dissenting. I dissent. If wilful misconduct is correctly defined in the opinion as implying “at least the intentional doing of something either *427with knowledge that serious injury is a probable (as distinguished from a possible) result, or the intentional doing of an act with a wanton and reckless disregard of its possible result”, then I think the minor was guilty of wilful misconduct when he drove his car at a speed of forty to forty-five miles per hour onto and across an obstructed or blind intersection knowing that another car was approaching the intersection on the cross-street at a rapid rate of speed. In doing so, he was surely driving his car with a wanton and reckless disregard of the possible if not a probable result of a collision with the car which he knew was on -the cross-street, or with some other car which might be on said cross-street and which was aproaching said crossing. I, therefore, submit that the opinion is erroneous in concluding that the minor was not guilty of wilful misconduct.
3 Cal. 2d 420
Meek v. Fowler
Decided April 30, 1935
California Supreme Court · decided 1935-04-30
Key passage — most relied on by later courts
“.. “ On the issue of wilful misconduct, the evidence is insufficient to support a determination favorable to plaintiff. The jury were instructed as follows on this issue: “ ‘The words “wilful misconduct” have a meaning in the law, additional to that which they have in common usage. If we were to use the words in their ordinary sense, they would mean simply the indulging in wrongful conduct by conscious choice. Such conduct might consist of doing something that ought not to be done or in failing to do something that ought to be done. But in order to be a basis for liability to a guest under our law, the misconduct must be something more than intentional and wrongful; it must be done under circumstances which show either knowledge that serious injury to the guest probably will result, or a wanton and reckless disregard of the possible results. “ ‘Wilful misconduct means something different.from and more than negligence, however gross the negligence may be. A guest may not recover against her host unless the conduct of the host amounted to wilful misconduct, and that means intentional, wrongful conduct, done either with knowledge that serious injury to the guest probably will result, or with a wanton and reckless disregard of the possible results. . . . “ ‘ [I] f you should find that defendant was negligent, and if you should find that she intentionally did something that was wrongful and which was a proximate cause of injury to plaintiff, still a case of willful misconduct is n”
quoted by 3 later decisions, including Olson v. Jones, 49 Cal. 2d 359 - Gillespie v. Rawlings
“The term 'serious and wilful misconduct' is described by the supreme court of Massachusetts as being something 'much more than mere negligence, or even gross or culpable negligence' and as involving 'conduct of a quasi criminal nature, the intentional doing of something either with the knowledge that it is likely to result in serious injury, or with a wanton and reckless disregard of its possible consequences.' ... To constitute 'wilful misconduct' there must be actual knowledge, or that which in the law is esteemed to be the equivalent of actual knowledge, of the peril to be apprehended from the failure to act, coupled with a conscious failure to act to the end of averting injury.”
quoted by 3 later decisions, including People v. Nowell, 30 Cal. 2d 193 - Cope v. Davison
Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know
Decided 1935-04-30
How this case has been cited
Cited by 90 later decisions — most recently October 2010 · most notably 45 Cal. 2d 421 - Emery v. Emery (1955), 19 Cal. 4th 714 - Calvillo-Silva v. Home Grocery (1998)
90 state decisions
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
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