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3 Day 411

Thaddeus v. Adams

Supreme Court of Connecticut

Decided June 15, 1809

Supreme Court of Connecticut · decided 1809-06-15

<p>If in an action of slander, the defendant art-raits the speaking of the words,but jgromd°*⅛⅛ they were true, he does . thereby admit probable cause, so [⅛,° '"from*10 showing the want of it in an action for a vexatious suit.</p> <p>A person may be liable for prosecuting, after he is of full age, a suit commenced by him maliciously, and without probable cause, while an infant.</p> <p>In an action for a vexatious suit, the plaintiff having stated, that in the original suit* he recovered his costs, alleged, that he rain most unjustly imfirisoned on said suit, for the space of twenty four hours, and in defending the same expended large sums oj mo-7ieyf to tvitt the sum of 200 dollars in employing counsel to defend; also the sum of -200 dollars in paying witnesses, and maintaining thorn when attending on the trial; also the sum of 100 dollars in making various journeys to procure testimony, and in attending on the trial; without showing that such damages exceeded the costs recovered: Held* this was a sufficient allegation of damages.</p> <p>An allegation that words charged as slanderous were known to the party and to the public in general, to be true, is a sufficient allegation of their truth.</p> <p>SUPREME COURT OF ERRORS. 413 lime slie carried on the same as aforesaid, that if the then defendant had spoken the words as alleged in her declaration, they were true; and said charges imputed thereby were long before known to her, and to the public in general, to be true.” The declaration further alleged, “ That the plaintiff was most unjustly imprisoned on said suit for the space of twenty-four hours; and, in defending the same, expended large sums of money, to wit, the sum of two hundred dollars in employing counsel to defend; also the sum of two hundred dollars in paying witnesses, and maintaining them when attending on the trial; also the sum of one hundred dollars in making various journeys to procure testimony, and in attending on the trial, to the damage of the plaintiff,” &c. To this declaration there was a demurrer. The superior court adjudged the declaration insufficient. The plaintiff brought a writ of error to this court, at the term in June, 1808; when the cause'" was argued by Gould, for the plaintiff, and by Daggett and Hatch, for the defendants. The court being divided in opinion, continued it to advise, and ordered a further argument at this term, Sherioood and Hatch, in support of the judgment below. The acl';»n in this case, is founded upon the statute for preventing and punishing vexatious lawsuits.(a) But that statute creates or defines no new injury. Of course, the questions which arise upon this record are to be determined upon common law principles. June, 1809. STERI.IS& V. Adams.</p>

Decided 1809-06-15

By the Court.

¶1Tins declaration contains all the averments necessary to support an action for a vexatious suit. It is expressly averred, that the former action was altogether groundless, and known to be so to the plaintiff, and yet, with an intent to vex, the action was commenced, and prosecuted, until great expenses, sufficiently specified, were occasioned. These aver-ments leave no room for probable cause; and the plaintiff, under this declaration, might have proved, that _the defendant had declared, that she knew she had no cause of action, but had commenced it with an intent to vex the plaintiff, without any expectation of a recovery. More complete vexation and malice cannot be imagined; and if, this action will not lie, it is impossible to state one that will.

¶2It has been laid down as a general proposition, that ■where in the original action the defendant was obliged to set up some collateral matter, by way of justification, which does not appear on the declaration, probable cause is admitted. This proposition is unsupported by precedent or reason. When a justification goes on the ground of a denial of the cause of action, it no more admits a probable cause than the plea of not guilty. The present plaintiff, in the action of slander, justified on the ground, that the words charged to have been spoken by him were true. This was an absolute denial of the cause of action; for it is essential to slander, that the *433words spoken should be false; if they are true, the plaintiff has no cause of action.

¶3It is not necessary to decide whether a minor would be liable, in any case for a vexatious suit; for though it appears, that the plaintiff in the original action was a minor, when the suit was commenced, it also appears, that she was of full age before the return-day, and that she afterwards knowingly prosecuted the suit, with the same intent to vex.

¶4, We are, therefore, of opinion, that there is error apparent in the record before us; and that the judgment be reversed.

¶5Judgment reversed,

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