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3 F.3d 765

Docket Nos. 92-6973, 92-6999.

United States v. Christy

Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals

Argued March 31, 1993.

Decided Sept. 1, 1993.

Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals · decided 1993-09-01

2 counsel of record

Key passage — most relied on by later courts

“When a timely motion for reconsideration is filed in a criminal case, the ten-day appeal period does not begin to run until after the motion to reconsider has been decided by the district court.... Accordingly, [the defendant’s] notice of appeal is premature. While the disposition of a motion for reconsideration by the district court has been held to establish jurisdiction in the appeals court, ... [the defendant’s] notice of appeal will not be effective until the district court disposes of the motion to reconsider. We are, therefore, constrained to remand this case once more so that the district court may rule on the motion for reconsideration. The parties should inform this Court when the district court has ruled and provide a copy of the order disposing of the motion to reconsider.”

quoted by 1 later decision, including 384 F. Supp. 2d 909 - United States v. Benyo

“[I]f [the defendant] had moved for reconsideration before filing his notice of appeal, the district court would have been required to rule upon the motion. If the motion were denied, ... [the defendant] would then have had ten days in which to file a notice of appeal.”

quoted by 1 later decision, including 384 F. Supp. 2d 909 - United States v. Benyo

Applies 18 U.S.C. § 2516 (Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986) · 21 U.S.C. § 846 (§ 406 of the Controlled Substances Act)

Relies on Griggs v. Provident Consumer Discount Co. · Ball v. United States · Wright v. Wright

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Opinion by Kenneth Keller Hall · Decided 1993-09-01

How this case has been cited

Cited by 43 later decisions — most recently April 2025 · most notably United States v. Ameline (2005), Harvey v. Horan (2002)

9 federal appellate · 1 state decisions

2601993200020102020decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

View the full empirical analysis of this case →

¶1*766Frank Joseph Petrella, Atlanta, GA, argued, for defendant-appellant.

¶2Cynthia Ann Young, U.S. Dept, of Justice, Washington, DC, argued (Margaret Person Currin, U.S. Atty., J. Douglas McCollough, Asst. U.S. Atty., on brief), for plaintiff-appel-lee.

¶3Before ERVIN, Chief Judge, HALL, Circuit Judge, and FABER, District Judge for the Southern District of West Virginia, sitting by designation.

¶4OPINION

¶5K.K. HALL, Circuit Judge:

¶6Carl Robert Christy appeals the district court’s denial of his motion for a new trial based upon newly discovered evidence. We affirm.

¶7I.

¶8In July 1989, Christy was convicted in a jury trial of conspiring to possess with the intent to distribute more than five kilograms of cocaine, 21 U.S.C. § 846, and sentenced to 300 months of imprisonment to be followed by five years of supervised release. This Court affirmed Christy’s conviction in an unpublished per curiam opinion. See United States v. Christy, 911 F.2d 725 (4th Cir.1990).

¶9Following his conviction, Christy began conducting pro se legal research in an effort to overturn his conviction. In December 1991, Christy discovered that on October 21, 1986, Congress changed the group of individuals in the United States Department of Justice who were empowered to “authorize an application” seeking court-approved electronic surveillance. See 18 U.S.C. § 2516(1). Christy interprets the statute to say that an order authorizing electronic surveillance must be made by the Attorney General or an Assistant Attorney General in the Criminal Division. In Christy’s case the order was authorized by Charles Cooper, an Assistant Attorney General assigned to the Office of Legal Counsel, a separate division.

¶10On August 27,1992, Christy filed a motion for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence. The motion argued that the alleged error in the electronic surveillance order precluded the introduction of all of the evidence gained through electronic surveillance.

¶11On September 3, 1992, the district court denied Christy’s motion. The thrust of the district court’s ruling was that Christy had failed to produce “new evidence” because all of the “evidence” asserted in the motion was available at the time of Christy’s trial. Additionally, the court rejected Christy’s argument on its merits.

¶12*767On September 11, 1992, Christy filed a notice of appeal and, simultaneously, a motion for reconsideration.1 The district court dismissed the motion for reconsideration on September 17, 1992, on the ground that the filing of the notice of appeal divested it of jurisdiction. Christy appealed that decision as well. We consolidated the two appeals.

¶13II.

¶14Each party raises a threshold argument against our reaching the merits of Christy’s appeal. Christy argues that the district court erred when it concluded that the September 11, 1989, notice of appeal divested it of jurisdiction to rale upon his motion for reconsideration. Although Christy does not specify the effect of this alleged error, we assume that he seeks to have the case remanded so that the district court may rale upon the motion to reconsider. The government argues that, even though we have jurisdiction over the case, we should hold the appeal in abeyance until the district court rales upon the motion for reconsideration.

¶15A. Does this Court have jurisdiction to consider the appeal?

¶16Following the district court’s denial of Christy’s motion for a new trial based upon newly discovered evidence, he was left with two options. First, if he had moved for reconsideration before filing his notice of appeal, the district court would have been required to rale upon the motion. If the motion were denied, under Healy, Dieter, and Ibarra (see footnote 1, supra) Christy would then have had ten days in which to file a notice of appeal. Christy’s second option was to forgo a motion for reconsideration and proceed directly with his appeal.

¶17We conclude that Christy chose the second course of action, albeit unwittingly. When the September 11, 1989, notice of appeal was filed, there were no pending motions before the district court. Because the district court’s judgment was final, when the notice of appeal was filed it divested the district court of its jurisdiction over the case and conferred jurisdiction upon this Court.2See Griggs v. Provident Consumer Discount Co., 459 U.S. 56, 58, 103 S.Ct. 400, 402, 74 L.Ed.2d 225 (1982) (“[It is] generally understood that a federal district court and a *768federal court of appeals should not attempt to assert jurisdiction over a case simultaneously. The filing of a notice of appeal is an event of jurisdictional significance — it confers jurisdiction on the court of appeals and divests the district court of its control over those aspects of the case involved in the appeal.”) (citations omitted); United States v. Perate, 719 F.2d 706, 711 (4th Cir.1983) (filing of notice of appeal terminated the district court’s jurisdiction over the case); cf. United States v. Ball, 734 F.2d 965, 965 n. 1 (4th Cir.1984) (district court is without jurisdiction to consider motions submitted after the appeal was filed), vacated on other grounds, 470 U.S. 856, 105 S.Ct. 1668, 84 L.Ed.2d 740 (1985).

¶18B. Should the appeal be held in abeyance?

¶19Having determined that we have jurisdiction over the appeal, we now address the issue of whether prudential concerns require us to hold Christy’s appeal in “abeyance” until the district court rules upon the merits of his motion to reconsider.3 We note that the Fifth Circuit has adopted such a rule. See Greenwood, 974 F.2d at 1468-69 (court takes a pragmatic approach rejecting the “traditional notion of mutual exclusivity of jurisdiction”).4

¶20Perhaps judicial economy will be best served in some cases, by allowing the district court to pass upon a motion for reconsideration that has been filed subsequent to a notice of appeal. However, this does not require us to adopt a per se rule that an appeal must be held in abeyance until the district court issues an advisory opinion about what it would do with the case if it had the opportunity. If an appellant believes that his motion should be ruled upon by the district court rather than the appellate court, he may move this Court to remand the case under Fed.R.App.P. 27. If we agree that the district court is peculiarly situated to consider the alleged error, we can then grant the appellant’s motion to remand.

¶21Except for his desire to receive an additional bite at the apple, Christy offers no reason why this case must be reviewed (again) by a district rather than an appellate court.

¶22III.

¶23We now address the district court’s denial of Christy’s motion for a new trial based upon newly discovered evidence. The standard of review is whether the district court abused its discretion. United States v. Arrington, 757 F.2d 1484, 1486 (4th Cir.1985).

¶24Motions for a new trial based upon newly discovered evidence are reviewed pursuant to the five-prong test adopted in United States v. Chavis, 880 F.2d 788, 793 (4th Cir.1989):

(i) is the evidence, in fact, newly discovered; (ii) are facts alleged from which the court may infer due diligence on the part of the movant; (iii) is the evidence relied upon not merely cumulative or impeaching; (iv) is the evidence material to the issues involved; and (v) would the evidence probably result in acquittal at a new trial?

¶25The defendant must satisfy all five prongs of the test in order to receive a new trial. Id.

¶26The fundamental problem with Christy’s argument is that there is no new “evidence.” Christy’s motion was triggered *769by legal research that led him to conclude that Congress had “limited the individuals in the United States Department of Justice who were empowered to ‘authorize an application to a federal judge [for court-ordered surveillance].’ ” Christy’s motion is a legal argument — not a motion based on new evidence.

¶27Additionally, even if we were to characterize this legal argument as evidence, it is not new. Before his trial, Christy had a copy of the October 22, 1986, “Authorization for Interception Order Application” that was signed:

Charles J. Cooper,
Assistant Attorney General
Office of Legal Counsel

¶28Furthermore, the designation order and relevant Attorney General orders that Christy cites in support of his statutory construction argument were public records and were made available to Christy before the trial. Thus, there was no reason that this entire argument could not have been made at or before Christy’s trial. This Court has previously held that a new trial will not be granted when the “evidence” could have been discovered by “the diligence of the defendant or his counsel.” United States v. Bales, 813 F.2d 1289, 1295 (4th Cir.1987).

¶29Because Christy fails to meet either of the first two prongs of the Chavis test, we need not address the merits of his statutory construction argument. The judgment of the district court is affirmed.

¶30AFFIRMED.

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