Volume 3 — Paige's Chancery Reports

Peter Cone Dyckman died in April, 1824, leaving the complainant his widow, and the defendant Eliza Letitia Cone Dyckman his only child, then an infant, under two years of age. Held: that Betty took an estate for life, by implication. The judges say, a strong probable implication is sufficient, it need not be a necessary implication.

While this cause was pending, and before the hearing, an injunction granted therein had been so far modified as to permit the defendants in this suit to proceed to trial and judgment at law without prejudice to the complainants’ equitable rights. The defendants proceeded to trial at law, and on that trial were nonsuited.

The bill in this cause was filed by Rem Remsen Teller and one hundred and forty others, claiming to be heirs, devisees or descendants of Annetje Jans, against A. S. W. Van Deusen and fifteen others, for the specific performance of an agreement to prosecute a claim of all the parties against the Trinity church, for the recovery of an undivided portion of the lands confirmed to the heirs of Annetje Jans in 1667, and of the rents and profits thereof; and also to restrain the…

Upon the bill of interpleader filed in this cause it was referred to a master to examine and report which of the several defendants was entitled to the fund in controversy, with liberty for the defendants respectively to file a statement in the nature of a bill of discovery against their co-defendants, and to compel an answer to the same.

This was a motion to dismiss the appeal entered in this cause for irregularity. The appeal was also heard on its merits, at the same time.

This was an application on the part of the complainant for an injunction, to restiain the defendants from entering upon or taking possession of that part of the site of their rail road which had been… Held: (Stark ads. M’Gowen, 1 Nott & Mc'Cord’s S. Car. R. 387,) that a state may take private property for public use without compensation. (Vattel, 1, 2, 103,4. Puff. 64, ch. 7.

This was an application to dissolve an injunction, which had been obtained upon a bill of discovery to aid a defence at iaw, and also for the costs of the defendant in answering the • bill.

This was an appeal from an interlocutory decision of tile vice chancellor of the eighth circuit. The complainant filed a bill as a judgment creditor, and obtained the usual injunction. A few days afterwards, and before either of the defendants had appeared, he discovered that certain allegations required by the 189th rule of the court had been omitted in the bill.

This was a demurrer to a bill of revivor and supplement, filed against the infant heirs of John Sellon, deceased, and against the other defendants in the original suit. The object of the original bill was to compel a specific performance of an agreement between the complainant and John Sellon relative to a small piece of land in the city of New-York.

This was an appeal from the decision of the vice chancellor of the eighth circuit upon the taxation of the relator’s costs in this case. The costs arose upon a proceeding by attachment against the defendant for not putting in an answer. The vice chancellor allowed retaining fees for solicitor and counsel on the attachment. Other items allowed on the taxation were also objected to, which are referred to in the decision of the chancellor.

This was an appeal from so much of an interlocutory order of the vice chancellor of the 8th circuit as directed the complainant to pay the costs of the application.

The bill in this case was filed by Gregory & Selman against the defendant Dodge, as the surviving partner of Dodge & Green, for an account and payment of what might be due to the complainants on account of a joint concern between themselves on the one part, and Dodge & Green on the other, for the purchase and sale of fish.

This was an application to compel the purchaser, under the decree in this cause, to complete his purchase. The purchas—, er resisted the application, on the ground that he had been ! deceived by the notice of sale as to the quantity of land contained in the lot sold. for the complainants. It has been repeatedly •decided that masters’ sales do not come within the statute of frauds.

This was an appeal from a decree of the vice chancellor of the 3d circuit. The bills in these suits were filed by the complainants respectively, as judgment creditors of the defendant Mott,, to reach his property and dioses in action which were not liable to execution at law, and particularly the amount of a judgment which he had recovered against the defendant Comstock, in an action of slander.

This was an appeal from the decision of the vice chancellor of the sixth circuit disallowing the defendant’s exceptions to the master’s report, on exceptions taken by the complainant to the answer. The bill was filed to restrain the defendant from proceeding by a sale, under the statute, to foreclose a mortgage given by the complainant, and which was alleged to be usurious.

The bill in this cause was filed to restrain the defendant, who is the widow of James M’Lean deceased, from proceeding at law to recover her dower in a house and lot in the city of New.York, and to compel her to execute a release of dower to the complainant. The cause was brought to hearing on bill and answer. And the principal facts as admitted by the defendant in her answer, are stated in the opinion of the court. for the complainant.

This was an appeal from the decision of the late vice chancellor of the first circuit, dismissing the complainants’ bill against the defendants, respectively, with costs.

<p>The complainant filed his bill in this case to obtain a divorce, on the ground of adultery, and to .obtain a decree declaring a child of the defendant illegitimate, bom after the commission of the offence charged in the bill. The bill was taken as confessed against the defendant, and was set down for hearing on the master’s report of the testimony, as to the facts and circumstances charged in the bill.</p>

This was an application to dissolve an injunction and to discharge a ne exeat, upon the bill and answer. for the complainant, objected that the application was irregular, as the ten days allowed for excepting, according to the 38th rule, had not expired. for the defendant, cited the case of Pell v. Gasman, decided in November, 1830, in which the chancellor said the defendant might, at the time of serving his answer, give notice of a motion to dissolve the injunction; but…

The bill in this cause was filed to correct an alleged mistake in a deed from the complainant to the defendant; and to restrain the latter from proceeding at law on the covenants of seisin.

The petition in this case stated among other things, that in 1822, R. Carter was found to be an habitual drunkard, and incapable of conducting his own affairs, and that B. Eldridge was appointed his committee. That Carter at that time owned a house and lot, on which the committee held a mortgage, executed a few months before, and that he was also possessed of a large personal estate.

This was an appeal from a decree of the vice chancellor of the fourth circuit, allowing a demurrer to the bill, for want of sufficient equity therein to sustain the suit. The defendant H. Rogers was the executrix of Eber Weed, her late husband; and by his will she was entitled to the use of his whole farm until his youngest child arrived at the age of 21, and to the use of one third thereof for life.

This was an application for an order requiting the defendant to deposit with the assistant register a pass book, claimed by the complainants as belonging to them and admitted by tire answer of the defendant to be in his possession, and. particularly referred to in such answer. The object of the application was to enable the complainants to use the same on the trial of an action at law which bad been commenced by them against the defendant.

The bill in this cause was filed against the personal representatives of W. Bostwick, deceased, and against his surviving partner, to recover the amount of certain notes executed by the partnership to the complainants; and also to recover an alleged balance due from the partnership to the complainants on account.

This was a creditor’s bill for the settlement and administration of the real and personal estate of Gilbert F. Lush, deceased ; and the usual decree was entered for an account of the estate and for the creditors to come in and prove their demands. Under this decree debts were proved before the master to an amount far exceeding the funds belonging to the estate.

<p>The bill in this case was filed by the complainants in behalf of themselves and the other creditors of G-. F. Lush, deceased, against his heirs and personal representatives for an account and distribution of his personal effects, and for a sale of his real estate for the payment of his debts. The estate was insolvent to a large amount, principally on account of debts due from the partnership between himself and Edwin Jessup and Henry Vandenburgh, trading under the name of “ Edwin Jessup.” Debts to a considerable amount were due from the decedent individually, one of which was for money received by him under the decree of one of the equity courts as the. guardian of infants in a partition suit. Some few debts were also due from him jointly with H. Vandenburgh. Lush died in December, 1828, leaving his two partners him surviving; and leaving in their hands partnership effects to the amount of twenty or thirty thousand dollars. Shortly after the. death of G. F. Lush, Jessup and Vandenburgh stopped payment; and Jessup, with the assent of Vandenburgh, assigned the greatest part of the partnership effects to D. & B. Wood, in trust, to pay certain creditors of the firm of Edwin Jessup. On the coming in of the answers of the defendants, a decree was entered in the usual form, referring it to a master to take an account of the personal estate, and of the sitúatian and value of the real estate, with the usual notice to the creditors of the decedent to come in and prove their debts before the master. Under this order the master received proof of debts due from the firm of Edwin Jessup to the complainants, and to several other persons not provided for in the assignment to D. & B. Wood. Also for two or three debts due from Lush and Vandenburgk, jointly, as well as of the separate debts of Lush, which were due from him individually. It also appeared by the proceedings in another suit that the present complainants, and others who had come in and proved their debts before the master, were proceeding as judgment creditors of the surviving partners of the firm of Edwin Jessup, to reach the residue of the partnership property not assigned to D. & B. Wood; apd that they were also seeking to set aside that assignment, on the ground that it had not been executed by both of the surviving partners, aud also by the administrator of the decedent. The Farmers and Mechanics’ Bank held several notes due from the partnership, endorsed or secured by the friends of the partners, which notes the bank claimed the right to prove, under the decree, for the benefit of those persons who stood in the situation of sureties. The complainants and other creditors resisted the proof of these demands, on the ground that they were secured to nearly their full amount by the assignment to D. & B. Wood, a part of which amount had actually been paid. It appeared by the testimony of D. Wood, before the master, that 42 per cent, of the principal of the notes had been paid out of the funds assigned, and that there would probably be enough of the fund to pay 85 per cent, of the principal and interest, including what had already been paid. The master deducted the amount which had actually been paid upon these debts out of the assigned fund, and permitted the bank to make proof for the residue, reserving the question as to what they were to receive on a final distribution for the decision of the court. Some of these notes had been endorsed by G. F. Lush in his individual capacity. A debt was allowed by the master in favor of B. Osborn & Co., although it appeared that another distinct debt to that firm was provided for by the assignment. The complainants excepted to so much of the report as admitted the debts of the Farmers and Mechanics’ Bank to proof, and also to the proof of the debt of B. Osborn & Co. The cause was heard upon the master’s report, upon the exceptions, and upon the equity reserved. In the mean time an order was made for the sale of the estate, and to bring the money into court to abide the decree which should be made therein.</p>

Pursuant to ihe decision of the court in this case, as reported in 2 Paige's Rep. 490, a decree was entered to carry into effect the provisions of the deed of trust, and referring it to a master to take an account between the trustee, Vincent Le Ray De Chaumont, and the trust estate.

This was an appeal from a decree of the surrogate of the county of Columbia, made in June, 1829. The appeal waa from so much of the decree as charged the appellant with the principal and interest due to the intestate upon two sealed notes, executed by Albert Feliz the brother-in-law of the administrator ; and also from that part of the decree which charged the administrator with the costs of taking the account before the surrogate.

This case came before the court on exceptions to a master’s report, on exceptions to the separate answer of the defendant H. H. Bogert. The principal object of the bill was to correct a mistake in a deed from J. Livingston to one of the members of the “ Genesee Company,” of a lot of land drawn to the share of such member.

This was an application on the part of the respondents to dismiss the appeal, which had been entered with the surrogate of the county of Oneida, on the ground that the appeal had not been entered within the time allowed by the statute; and also on the ground that no petition of appeal had been filed, or transcript returned, as required by the 118th rule of this court.

This was an application for leave to examine several witnesses on the part of the defendants, whose names had not been furnished to the solicitor of the adverse party, or to the examiner, before the commencement of the examination of witnesses, as required by the 83d rule.

This was an appeal from an interlocutory order of the vice chancellor of the fifth circuit. A rule to produce witnesses was entered by the defendant’s solicitor, and was served on the solicitor of the adverse party on the 26th of July, 1831. On the 29th of August, the complainant obtained an order extending the time to produce witnesses until the 24th of September.

This was a petition on the part of the trustees of a school district to compromise a claim against an idiot for pulling down a school house; for which claim they had brought a suit against him at law. Jacob Heller, the elder, died about 30 years since, seised of a farm in the town of Bethlehem. By'his will he gave to his son Baltus ah his real and personal estate in fee; provided Jacob Heller, the brother of Baltus, had no child who should arrive at the age of twenty-one.

The bill in this, cause was originally filed in 1823, by Davoue, an infant, by her next friend. She was married to Pendleton, and the suit was revived in their names. After the death of Pendleton a decree was made, settling the rights of the parties to the real estate in controversy, and referring it to the master to take an account of the rents and profits of the premises, received by the Robert Grade.

The complainant, in this cause sued the defendant in the circuit court of the United States for the southern district of New-York, and obtained a judgment against him in that court. After the return of his execution unsatisfied, he filed his bill in this court to obtain satisfaction of his judgment out of the equitable assets and other property of the defendant which he could not discover and reach by bis execution at law.

This case came before the court on exceptions to a master’s report, on exceptions to an answer for insufficiency. The complainants were judgment creditors of James Lynch, the former president of their corporation. They also claimed a specific lien on the interest of Lynch in the estate of his father, under a written agreement for a mortgage. The defendant Lynch had assigned his property to 8.

The bill in this cause was filed for the purpose of restraining the corporation of Albany and their dock master, from removing from the Albany basin an ark, or floating store house, which the complainants had erected and moored therein, contrary to an ordinance of the corporation.

Theodore F. Talbot purchased all the interest of D. V. Chamberlin in a certain piece of land in Monroe county, under a judgment and execution against Chamberlin who was in possession of the premises at the time of the sheriff’s sale. Talbot afterwards applied by petition to the vice chancellor of the eighth circuit, and obtained an order and injunction to restrain the defendants from the commission of waste, according to the provision of the revised statutes.

The bill in this cause was filed by certain stockholders of the New-York Coal Company against the directors of that corporation, charging them with improper conduct in the management of their trust. Held: that if directors diverted the funds of the corporation, chanceiy would have a right to interfere.

The facts of this case, so far as they are necessary to a correct understanding of the questions decided, are stated in the opinion of the court

This was an appeal from an interlocutory order of the vice chancellor of the fourth circuit, suppressing the deposition of Oliver Weston, a witness examined on the part of the complainants.

This was a bill for partition. The complainant claimed one half of the premises, as the brother and one of the heirs at ... law of Jenkin Jenkins, deceased. The premises in question were formerly the property of David Jenkins, the father of the complainant, and of the defendant Elizabeth Van Schaack.

The bill in this cause alleged that Ephraim Brasher died some years since, and by his will bequeathed the whole of - his estate to his widow, now the wife of J. Bingham, the defendant. That Brasher had no children; but that Grace Berrian, who was his relative, now the wife of L. Bleeker the complainant, resided in his family.

The wife of Lytle, the lunatic, petitioned for the removal of the trustee ; charging fraud and mismanagement in the execution of the trust.

On a former day the complainant, upon due notice to the defendant, who did not appear to oppose the application, ob- tained an order directing the defendant Edgarton to deliver to ° the master certain articles alleged to he in his possession within three days after service of the order. The defendant having neglected to comply with the order,

In July, 1816, W. Bostwick was the owner of a lot of land in the village of Auburn, containing about four acres, lying on the west side of South and Hotel streets. He also owned a small triangular piece of land on the east side of Hotel street, at the junction of that and South street. This piece of land lay directly opposite or in front of the north part of the four acre lot, and was between five and six rods in length, north and south.

In February, 1830, the complainant leased to the defendant a house and lot, at the corner of Rivington street and the Bowery, in the city of New-York, for the term of eight years from the first of May thereafter.

This was an application on the part of the complainant to authorize a substituted service of the subpoena to appear and answer. The defendant filed a bill against his wife, the present complainant, before the vice chancellor of the, eighth circuit, charging her with adultery, and praying for a divorce. She appeared and put in her answer in that suit, denying the allegations in the bill, and obtained an order for the allowance of alimony.

This was an application on the part of the husband of Jane E. Lansing, in behalf of his wife and two other infants, for an order authorizing a sale of the infants interest in a lot of land in the city of Troy.

This was a bill for a separation, filed by the wife against her husband. On a former day, upon the application of the wife, the court ordered the husband to advance to her next friend $50, towards the expenses of the suit, to be refunded, as the court should direct, if, upon the hearing, it should appear the suit was brought without any justifiable cause.

The bill in this cause was filed by the administratrix of J. Bolton, deceased, to obtain the distributive share of the decedent in the estate of A. McLachlan, his half brother. The bill charged that McLachlan died in January, 1819, leaving a large personal estate, and that the defendant D. Gardner, who married his sister, administered thereon; that in February, 1821, Bolton received a letter from the defendant S. 8.

This was an application to set aside the further answer of the defendant, and to take it off the files of the court for irregularity, on the ground that it was not signed either by the defendant or by his solicitor or counsel. By the papers read in opposition to the application, it appeared that the answer as filed was properly signed, but that through inadvertence, the signatures were omitted in the copy served on the complainant’s solicitor.

This was a bill for the specific performance of a contract for the purchase of several lots of land. One of the objections made on the part of the purchaser to a specific performance was, that since the making of the contract, he had discovered that he was himself the legal owner of a part of the land.

After the proofs in the original cause were closed, the complainant applied to the chancellor and obtained an ex parte order for leave to file a supplemental bill. On the filing of such bill, and without serving any subpoena to answer the same, the complainant’s solicitor entered a common order that the defendants answer the supplemental bill within forty days.

Tins was an application for an injunction. The complainants’ bill stated, in substance, that previous to October, 1813, a Baptist church or society was organized in Hartford, in fellowship with, and under the government of the regular Baptist Association of that part of the state of New-York.

This was an application, under the provisions of the revised statutes, to rectify certain irregularities in the sale of real estate. (Vide % Paige’s R. 817, 8.

Tiie complainant was a judgment creditor of the defendants, and applied for an injunction under the statute, (2 R. S'. 174, § 38,) to restrain them from disposing of their property, &c. The bill stated the issuing of a writ of fieri facias on the judgment, returnable at a certain day therein mentioned that the same was delivered to the sheriff on the first of May, instant; and that he made a return thereon that the defendants had no goods or chattels, &c. The chancellor…

<p>The objection to the jurisdiction of the court, that the complainant has an adequate remedy at law, should be made by plea or demurrer, or should be distinctly stated in the answer of the defendant</p> <p>Where the vendor of a lot of land secretly intended to sell only a part of the lot, but succeeded in making the vendee understand that he was buying the whole lot, and only a part of the lot was included in the deed of conveyance, for which the vendee paid the vendor the whole consideration intended by him to he given for the whole lot, the court decreed that the vendor execute to the vendee a conveyance for the whole.</p> <p>The wife of the vendor having united with him in the deed, but not being privy to the fraud attempted to be practiced upon the purchaser, the court refused to compel her to join in the conveyance.</p> <p>As a general rule, a grant of land bounded on tide water extends only to high-water mark,</p> <p>The right to erect a wharf and to receive tolls for the use thereof is a franchise, and cannot be exercised by an individual citizen, except under a grant for that purpose from the sovereign power; or by prescription, which is supposed to have been founded on a grant, hut the evidence of which has been lost by the lapse of time.</p> <p>Where the right to erect a wharf and to take tolls or wharfage is granted as appurtenant to a lot bounded upon tide waters, it seems the right of wharfage, &c. will pass under the term appurtenances, in a subsequent conveyance of the lot</p>

This cause came before the court upon the demurrer of the defendant De Peyster to the complainants’ bill. In January, .1828, a decree was obtained in this court, in favor of the present complainants and D. F. Clarkson, against De Peyster, for about $11,000, besides costs. This decree was afterwards affirmed oh appeal; and the costs in the original suit and in the court for the correction of errors were taxed at about $1300.

The bill in this cause was filed by the complainants to obtain a portion of the proceeds of the sale of the ship Adonis. The cause was heard upon bill and answer, as to the defendants who had any real interest in the controversy.

The decision in this case was made upon a demurrer of the defendant F. De Peyster, to the complainant’s bill. The facts of the case are sufficiently stated in the opinion of the court.

This was a bill filed against a surviving partner, and the administrators of a deceased partner, to recover a debt due from the firm; it being alleged that the surviving partner was insolvent. The defence set up by the administrators, by way of plea, was that their intestate was discharged from his debts, in the spring of 1816, under the act of April, 1813, usually called the two thirds act.

<p>A vice chancellor is authorized to tax the costs in a suit or proceeding before any other vice chancellor. '</p> <p>Questions as to the regularity of the proceedings to get the costs taxed should be brought before the vice chancellor in whose circuit the suit is pending, - and not before the chancellor.</p> <p>The rule of the court allowing an application to the chancellor for a retaxation of costs in a suit pending before a vice chancellor, applies only to those cases where the amount of the taxable costs is in controversy; and not to a motion for a retaxation, upon the ground of irregularity in the proceedings of the adverse party.</p> <p>In a proceeding by petition for an attachment against a person who is not a party to the suit, the solicitor for such person is entitled to a retaining fee, if the petition is dismissed with costs. But a retaining fee cannot be taxed in his favor, against the adverse party, upon a mere collateral proceeding on such petition; as upon a reference for scandal or impertinence.</p> <p>Where a party is entitled to an order of course, he cannot charge the adverse party with the extra expense of a special application to the court for such order.</p> <p>Upon an order for the payment of costs, prospective costs can only be taxed for a copy of the order and of the taxed bill, to be served on the adverse party with the demand of payment.</p> <p>If costs are not paid within the time limited by the order, the party entitled to the costs may make-an ex parte application for an order to commit the delinquent to prison ; and all the costs subsequent to the demand can then he allowed, and will be inserted in the mittimus.</p>

The bill in this cause was filed to compel the defendants to permit a transfer to be made to the complainant, who was the cashier of the New-York Chemical Manufacturing Company, of twenty shares of the capital stock of the Phenix Fire Insurance Company, standing upon the books of the defendants in the namerof James Donaldson; and also for the payment of the dividends which had accrued on such stock.

This was an appeal from a decree of the vice chancellor of the fifth circuit.

The complainants being judgment creditors of the defendant, filed a bill in this court to reach his property, which could not be levied on by execution at law. The defendant having put in his answer, by his solicitor, Lynch, denying the existence of property, the complainants suffered the bill to be dismissed, with costs. The costs of the defendant were afterwards taxed at $53,30..

The object of the bill filed in this cause was to review the decision and decree of Chancellor Kent, made in a suit in which Harvey Elliott, deceased, was plaintiff, and Aaron Pell and wife, Minot Mitchell, Betsey Hinman, now the wife of Elisha Webb, and others were defendants; and which decree was afterwards affirmed upon a re-hearing before Chancellor Sanford.

This was an appeal from the decree of the late vice chancellar of the first circuit. The decree was founded upon a bill of interpleader, filedhy the master of the brig General Paez, to compel the defendants to litigate and settle their conflicting claims to fifty Spanish doubloons, shipped on board his vessel at Curacoa.

This was an appeal from the decision of the vice chancellor of the first circuit, overruling the demurrer of the defendants. The complainants, as executors of Fitch Rogers deceased, instituted suits against the defendant N. Rogers, in the superior court of the city of New-Yorlt, to recover a debt due to the decedent, and recovered a judgment thereon.

From the decision of this court dissolving the injunction in this cause, (ante, p. 213,) the complainants appealed to the court for the correction of errors. The defendants, pending the appeal, were proceeding to carry into effect the ordinance of the corporation, by removing from the basin the ark, or floating store house, referred to in the bill. To effect this object it would be necessary to destroy the store house by taking it to pieces.

This was an appeal from a decision of the vice chancellor of the first circuit, refusing to stay the proceedings in a suit commenced by a wife against her husband. The petition on which the application was founded, alleged that the next friend of the complainant was wholly irresponsible and without property; and that he was, as- the petitioner was informed and believed, an apprentice and under age.

In September, 1786, N. Seely, who was then the owner of lot No. 8, in the Queensbury patent, containing 250 acres of land, mortgaged the same to the Old Loan Officers of the county of Washington, to secure the payment of =£32. One hundred acres of this lot was purchased by Reuben Morgan, in May, 1797, and a conveyance was taken to himself -in fee ; and the residue of the lot passed into the hands of other purchasers.

This was an appeal from the decision of a vice chancellor on a question of interest arising upon the sale of mortgaged premises under a decree of the court. The premises consisted of two lots, and the same were ordered to be sold in parcels. On the day of sale, one of the lots was put up and sold for $8,700.

This was an appeal from a decision pf -the vice chancellor of the first circuit, refusing to dissolve An injunction, on bill and answer. Quintín Millen, who died in 1818, by his will directed, in the first place, that all his just debts, and his funeral expenses, should be paid as soon as convenient after his death.

This was an application to set aside an order taking the bill as confessed. The default of the defendant was occasioned by the supposition on the part of his solicitor that he had made an agreement with the solicitor of the adverse party, by paroi, to extend the time for answering.

The bill in this cause was filed on the 9th of January, 1830, by the complainants, in behalf of themselves and all the other creditors of The Commercial Insurance Company of New-York, against the defendants, as stockholders of that company at the time of its dissolution. The company was incorporated in April, 1805, to continue until the second Tuesday of January, 1820.

M. Trotter, by his will, devised and bequeathed his estate, both real and personal, to his executors named in his will, of whom the petitioner, was one ; to hold the same upon certain trusts in the will mentioned.

This was an appeal from a decision of the vice chancellor, of the eighth circuit, dissolving an injunction.

The bill in this case was filed by the wife against her and C. Strong, to restrain the latter from collecting a bond and mortgage assigned to him by the husband, but to be the séparate property of the wife. The defendants demurred to the bill for want of equity. They also alleged, ore terms, as a cause of demurrer, that the suit was brought by the wife in her own name, when she ought to have sued by her next friend.

This was an appeal from a decision of the late equity court for the eighth circuit, dismissing the complainants’ bill without costs. The defendant Bostwick was an agent' of the managers of the literature lottery, and kept an office at Batavia ; and the defendant Graves was either the agent or partner of Bostwick in the sale of lottery tickets at that place.

Orson Martin resided at Poultney, in the state of Vermerit, and was at the time of his death engaged in running a line of stages, and transporting the mail, from the city of Albany into the state óf Vermont. The stage stopped over night at Poultney, about five or six miles from the line of this state, where the team which ran from thence to Hebron, in the county of Washington, was kept over night.

This was a bill for the specific performance of an agreement to convey a lot of land. Samuel Bear was the owner of part of the village plot of Schauyas; and for the-purpose of inducing mechanics to settle there, and thus, to increase the value of his other lots, he agreed to give village lots to several persons, if they would settle thereon as mechanics. Among others, * he gave lot No. 37 to D. Nihart, a carpenter and joiner, who built thereon.

This was an appeal by the defendant, E. Woodworth, from the decree of the vice chancellor of the eighth circuit, founded upon the complainant’s bill only. S. Woodworth, the father of the defendant, died in 1823, seised of 100 acres of land in the county of Cayuga, leaving the defendant and five other children his heirs at law, one of whom was an idiot.

In this case the answer of the defendants was excepted to for insufficiency; and a part of the exceptions, upon a reference to a master, were allowed. The defendants thereupon put in a further answer, which was referred upon the old exceptions, but to a different master. This answer being also reported insufficient, a third answer was put in; which was also referred upon some of the old exceptions to a third master.

This was an appeal by L. Root, one of the defendants, from a decree of the vice chancellor of the eighth circuit; by which decree Root was charged with the amount of a certain judgment recovered by the complainants against the defendant Congdon, on which judgment a fi. fa. had been issued and returned unsatisfied. The facts of the case, so far as is necessary to understand the questions of law decided, appear in the opinion of the court.

This was an appeal from a decree of the vice chancellor of the third circuit, by the defendants, Murray and Woolley,, the executors of J. Carson, deceased, who had made probate of the will. Held: that after a question has been put and answered without objection, it is too late to object to its repetition, and much more to the admissibility of the previous evidence.

This was an appeal from a decretal order of the vice chancellor of the first circuit. The original bill was filed against the defendants Willis and Robinson, as judgment debtors, against whom an execution at law had been returned unsatisfied ; and against the defendant Yardley, and two others, who were charged with having obtained a fraudulent assignment of the property of Willis and Robinson.

The complainants in the last of these causes executed a mortgage to M. Trotter. They afterwards sold the mortgaged premises to Winne and Fonda, and took back a mortgage, for the payment of the purchase money on that sale, conditioned also to pay off the previous mortgage to Trotter. Winne and Fonda afterwards sold the premises to the ancestor of the infant defendants in these causes, subject to the payment of both mortgages.

This was a proceeding in which W. V. L. Peterson, one of the solicitors of this court, was removed from his office of . . solicitor. The causes of his removal are stated m the opinion of the chancellor. The court had previously directed a copy of an order to show cause, and copies of the papers containing the charges against the solicitor, to be served on him personally.

This was a bill filed by the vendor of real estate, against the widow and administratrix of the purchaser, and against his infant heirs, to enforce an equitable lien for the purchase money. JL. Doty, who had purchased an eighteen months lease of the property, under an ordinance for flagging one of the streets of the village where the property was situated, was also made a party defendant.

This was an application on the part of the defendants, D. & B. R. Wood, for the dissolution of an injunction, on bill and answer. The bill alleged that several judgments had been recovered against the defendants C. Jessup and H. Vandenburgh, as surviving partners of G-. F. Lush deceased, on which judgments executions had been issued and returned unsatisfied.

This was an application on the part of the defendant S, Harris, for the dissolution of an injunction.

This was an appeal by the defendant from a decision of the vice chancellor of the seventh circuit, overruling the demurrer to the complainants’ bill. The facts sufficiently appear from the opinion of the court. for the complainants. The decision of the vice chancellor in overruling the demurrer was correct. The bill is for discovery to aid the defence of a suit at law.

' This case came before the court on pleadings and proofs; The facts of the case, so far as they are material to the decision, are detailed in the opinion of the court.

The complainant in this cause having appealed from an interlocutory decree of the vice chancellor of the fifth circuit, her solicitor applied for an order directing the clerk of that circuit to transfer the pleadings and other papers in the cause to the office of the register of this court at Albany.

This was an appeal from a decree of the vice chancellor of the first circuit. Held: after the death of the grantor, and when a different disposition had been made of the property, that the deed could not be enforced by the creditors. That decision was made upon the authority of Walwyn v. Coutts, (3 Simon’s Rep. 14. 3 Meriv.

To all that part of the bill which related to errors in the books of the company, by supposed improper credits to Smith, or by the neglect to make proper charges against him, or to the neglect to give all proper credits to the complainant, and to that part which sought to charge Smith with the losses upon monies loaned or endorsements made for the accommodation of other persons, or which related to the bank stock subscribed for or purchased by Smith with the funds of the…

The bill in this cause was filed by certain landowners in the city of New-York, whose land had been taken by virtue of an ordinance of the corporation for widening Fifth street, between Broadway and the Washington square, to restrain the defendants from proceeding with the improvement, after the report of the commissioners of estimate and assessment had been confirmed by the supreme court.

This was an appeal from a decree of the late equity court of the second circuit. The respondents are the separate owners of several mills, and milling establishments, situate upon a stream of water called the Quassaick creek; it being the outlet of the Great Pond in the county of Orange.

This cause came before the chancellor on appeal by the defendants from the decision of the vice -chancellor of the first circuit, overruling their exceptions to the master’s report on exceptions to their several answers. The bill was filed by judgment creditors of the defendant Levy, after the return of their execution at law against him unsatisfied.

This was an appeal from a decree of the vice chancellor of the fourth circuit. Held: because she was surety, .that • even as against other subsequent annuitant creditors of the husband, bis estate should be first applied to discharge hers ; that is to say: she was allowed the same preference as the grantee of the first annuity; she came into his shoes because she was surety; and even during her husband’s life. ■ This…

The original complainants in this cause, Wilkinson & Blood, filed their bill for the partition of certain lands held by them as tenants in common with the defendants and with each other.