State v. Pritchett’s Empirical Analysis
1961
Citation profile
28 state decisions
How this case has been cited
Cited by 30 later decisions — most recently May 1991 · most notably 53 Cal. 3d 753 - Mercer v. Department of Motor Vehicles (1991), Gallagher v. Commonwealth (1964)
28 state decisions — followed in 12 states
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Relies on Commonwealth v. Russ · State v. Webb · Rickards v. State · State v. Storrs · Stroud v. Board of Water Commissioners
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 30 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
““Although statutes which prescribe the offense of ‘driving’ while intoxicated and those which prescribe the offense of ‘operating’ a motor vehicle while intoxicated exist for the same purpose, that is, protecting the users of the highways against the hazards of vehicles controlled by persons under the influence of intoxicating liquors, a distinction between the. terms has nevertheless been recognized by some courts. ‘Operating’ has been construed to include acts not within the meaning of the term ‘driving.’ Merely starting the engine of an automobile has been held to constitute an • operation of such automobile within the meaning of a statute prohibiting the operation of a motor vehicle by a person under the influence of intoxicants. “Indeed, some courts have held that any manipulation of the mechanical or electrical agencies of a motor vehicle, which manipulation, alone or in sequence, would set in motion the motive power of the vehicle, is an ‘operation of the vehicle’ within the meaning of the statute prohibiting the operation of a motor vehicle by an intoxicated person, at least, if there is an intention to move the car. “The slightest operation of the machine by an intoxicated person constitutes a violation of the statute.””
1 later decision quote this exact passage“(1) If there was five-hundredths per cent or less by weight of alcohol in the defendant’s blood, it shall be presumed that the defendant was not under the influence of intoxicating liquor at the time of the alleged violation. (2) If there was in excess of five-hundredths per cent but less than ten-hundredths per cent by weight of alcohol in the defendant’s blood, such fact may be considered with other competent evidence in determining whether or not the defendant was at the time of the alleged violation under the influence of intoxicating liquor but shall not of itself give rise to any presumption. (3) If there was ten-hundredths per cent or more by weight of alcohol in the defendant’s blood, it shall be presumed that the defendant was under the influence of intoxicating liquor at the time of the alleged violation. The foregoing provisions of this section shall not be construed as limiting the introduction of any other competent evidence bearing upon the question of whether or not the defendant was under the influence of intoxicating liquor at the time of the alleged violation.”
1 later decision quote this exact passagee.g. State v. Cannon“Indiana imposes a criminal sanction for “driving” a vehicle while under the influence of liquor. Our statute does not contain the word “operating,” as do the statutes of some of the other states. Since these two key words have been interpreted in several jurisdictions and since Indiana’s statute was recently revised, we must presume the Legislature used the word “drive” intentionally. In those jurisdictions where the word “drive” is used, it has been interpreted as requiring the vehicle to be in motion, not merely standing still with the engine running. “Operate,” on the other hand, has been defined more broadly to include merely controlling the vehicle. In view of the above, we must conclude that the Indiana statute prohibits a defendant from “driving” a vehicle in the common meaning of the word, i. e., to cause the vehicle to be in motion. See Black’s Law Dictionary (4th Ed. revised 1968).”
1 later decision quote this exact passage
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.