3 Utah 2d 392 - Gittens v. Lundberg’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

25 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 25 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. ““Another remonstrance against the conduct of the trial, addressed to us by plaintiff, is the exclusion of testimony that defendant had stated shortly after the accident that the car was covered by insurance. Whether it was is immaterial. (Balle v. Smith, 81 Utah 179 , 17 P.2d 224 ). Generally speaking, reference ±o that subject for the purpose of getting it before the jury is prejudicial. An exception to this is where a reference to insurance is so interwoven in an admission against interest that it is impractical to exclude it without destroying or impairing the benefit of the admission, to which the plaintiff is entitled. (See Reid v. Owens, 98 Utah 50 , 93 P.2d 680, 685 , 126 A.L.R. 55 ; Am.Jur., Evidence, Sec. 388; Annotation 4 A.L.R.2d 767 , 781.) The defendant, a young man who was driving his father’s car, naturally felt some remorse in having struck and injured the plaintiff so he went to plaintiff’s 'home and talked to Mrs. Gittens expressing his regret at the misfortune and concern for the plaintiff’s welfare. In the course of the conversation he did state that he was in somewhat of a hurry to get home that night, and failed to place direct blame on the plaintiff for the accident. This was admitted. But in connection with the conversation he also incidentally stated that he thought the car was insured. The reference to insurance was not 'freighted with admission,’ (Reid v. Owens, supra) nor was it so interwoven with admissions against interest as to detract from thei”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 18 Ariz. App. 519 - Swick v. White

2. “[w]hile it is trae that if a witness willfully testifies falsely as to any material matter the jury is at liberty to disbelieve the whole of his testimony if they so desire, it does not necessarily follow that .they are obliged to do so.... It is the duty of this court to leave the question of credibility of witnesses to the jury or fact trier .... As has often been said, the jury is in a favored position to form impressions as to the trust to be reposed in witnesses. They have the advantage of fairly close personal contact; the opportunity to observe appearance and general demeanor; and the chance to feel the impact of personalities. All of which they may consider in connection with the reactions, manner of expression, and apparent frankness and candor or want of it in reacting to and answering questions on both direct and cross-examination in determining whether, and to what extent, witnesses are to be believed.... . It is • not a prerequisite to credibility that a witness be entirely accurate with respect to every detail of his testimony. If it were so, human frailties are such that it would be seldom that a witness who testified to any extent could be believed. ... An examination of the record here does not show that facts testified to would be impossible in the light of known physical facts, or so contradictory or uncertain as to justify a conclusion that ... the witnesses were entirely ‘unworthy of belief....”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 2017 UT App 78 - State v. Ray