In Re Morphis’s Empirical Analysis
1983
Citation profile
2 district · 1 state decisions
How this case has been cited
Cited by 32 later decisions — most recently February 2016 · most notably Caster v. United States (In Re Caster) (1987), Cameron Brown Co. v. Bruce (In Re Bruce) (1984)
2 district · 1 state decisions
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Applies 11 U.S.C. § 1322
Relies on Di Pierro v. Taddeo · United Companies Financial Corp. v. Brantley · In Re Simpkins · In Re Neal · In Re Paige
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 32 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“... “The last sentence in this Congressional report infers that the exception provided by § 1322(b)(2) for a claim secured by the debtor’s principal residence is the type of claim that may be treated with under § 1322(b)(5) — a long-term mortgage debt and not a short-term finance company 2nd or 3rd mortgage. In construing the exception provided in § 1322(b)(2) the Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Florida reached a similar conclusion. ‘Although the legislative history is silent, the plain intent of the exception is to provide stability in the residential long-term home financing industry and market. It is to specifically protect institutional lenders engaged only in providing long-term home mortgage financing and not lenders primarily engaged in consumer or other areas of financing but who take security interests in a residence or homestead to secure non-home financing debts.' United Companies Financial Corporation v. Brantley, 6 B.R. 178, 189 (Bankr.N.D. Fla.1980). Contra, In re Simpkins, 16 B.R. 956, 972 (Bankr.E.D.Tenn.1982). Although the statute is not limited to lenders engaged only in home financing, it is intended to specifically apply to actual, long-term home financing loans, regardless of the lender. In applying the exception in § 1322(b)(2), the distinction is not based on the type of lenders but rather on the type of loan. This court believes that this exception is inapplicable to relatively short-term, non-home related loans secured only by a security”
1 later decision quote this exact passage“(b) Subject to subsections (a) and (c) of this section, the plan may— ... (2) modify the rights of holders of secured claims, other than a claim secured only by a security interest in real property that is the debtor’s principal residence, or of holders of unsecured claims; ...”
1 later decision quote this exact passage““(b) The plan may— ... (2) modify the rights of holders of secured claims, other than a claim secured by a long-term residential mortgage ...””
1 later decision quote this exact passage
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.