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← 30 Cal. 4th 1302 - People v. Johnson

30 Cal. 4th 1302 - People v. Johnson’s Empirical Analysis

2004

Citation profile

147
cited by 147 later decisions
6
cited 6 times by the Supreme Court
4
states following
September 2022
most recently cited

24 federal appellate · 93 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 147 later decisions (6 by the Supreme Court) — most recently September 2022 · most notably Johnson v. California (2005), 38 Cal. 4th 491 - People v. Avila (2006)

24 federal appellate · 93 state decisions

1100200420102020decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Applies 42 U.S.C. § 2000E (§ 701 of the Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964)

Relies on McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green · Miller-El v. Cockrell Director Texas Department of Criminal Justice Institutional Division · Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine · Batson v. Kentucky · Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc.

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 147 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “show that it is more likely than not the other party's peremptory challenges, if unexplained, were based on impermissible group bias”
    6 later decisions quote this exact passage
  2. ““Upon presentation of this and similar evidence—in the absence, of course, of the jury—the court must determine whether a reasonable inference arises that peremptory challenges are being used on the ground of group bias alone. We recognize that such a ruling ‘requires trial judges to make difficult and often close judgments. They are in a good position to make such determinations, however, on the basis of their knowledge of local conditions and of local prosecutors.’ [Citation.] They are also well situated to bring to bear on this question their powers of observation, their understanding of trial techniques, and their broad judicial experience. We are confident of their ability to distinguish a true case of group discrimination by peremptory challenges from a spurious claim interposed simply for purposes of harassment or delay. “If the court finds that a prima facie case has been made, the burden shifts to the other party to show if he can that the peremptory challenges in question were not predicated on group bias alone. The showing need not rise to the level of a challenge for cause. But to sustain his burden of justification, the allegedly offending party must satisfy the court that he exercised such peremptori.es on grounds that were reasonably relevant to the particular case on trial or its parties or witnesses—i.e., for reasons of specific bias as defined herein. He, too, may support his showing by reference to the totality of the circumstances; for example, it will be ”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage
  3. “Defendant asks us to examine the responses of jurors other than Juror T. [,the African-American juror struck,] in determining whether the trial court erred in finding that defendant failed to establish a prima facie case of group bias. In earlier cases we explained that, although such an examination is appropriate at the trial court level when the issue is properly brought to that court’s attention, such an examination for the first time on appeal is unreliable. Defendant urges reconsideration of these cases in light of the high court’s decision in Johnson, in which the court did not comment upon whether comparative analysis should be undertaken for the first time on appeal, and another decision issued the same day, Miller-El [II], in which the court employed comparative juror analysis in circumstances in which it was undisputed that a prima facie case had been made. Assuming without deciding that a comparative juror analysis should be undertaken under the circumstances presented [in which the trial court found that the defendant failed to make a prima facie ease], we conclude [that] defendant’s proffered analysis fails to establish a prima facie ease of group bias.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.