30 F. 238 -

238

FEDEBAL lUCPORTER.

was intended. Such a special provision, however, would hardly be expected; and in my judgment it is. not necessary, because fairly contained by necessary implication in the license to make and sell. As respects the construction of the extent of the license in particular cases, see ing v. Turner, 8 Blatchf. 321; LlghJJner v. B08Um t!c A. R; 00.,1 Low. 338.. A further ground for holding that the complainant's license extended to a sale after dissolution is found in the articles ofcopartnership, which contain a provision that either partner upon dissolution may acquire the firm property upon an offer and acceptance of some sum to be named. This necessarily implies that any such stoves remaining on hand at the time of dissolution are a sUbject of sale to or by either partner alike, and hence it imports a license to Lent to acquire the property individually, for the purposes of general sale, and is therefore practically equivalent to a license to Lent or his assigns. Wade v. Metcalf, 16 Fed. Rep. 130. This part of the 1Il0tion must therefore be As reSpects the patterns, etc., inasmuch as these would be of no use, or of trifling value, except for the further manufacture of stoves, the right to sell them, with the right to manufacture stoves, would depend upon the equitable right of Mr. Lent to a partnership in the complainant's patents. But as I am not ablest present to examine that bmnch of the motion, and there is urgent need for an immediate decision as respects the stoves, I decide only to relieve the defendant from the stipulation made by him in tbis cause on the fourth of 'March, 1887, so far as respects the stoves, and to continue the stipulation in full force and effect for 30 days from this date, as respects the other articles except stoves; . and that the motion as respects the patterns, etc., retain its place on the motion calendar for further hearing.

,

RAILWAY ' , :REGISTER MANUF'G ,

'

Co.

fl. BROADWAY

&:

SEVENTH

'

Av. R. Co.

(Otrcuit Court, 8. D. NMi' York.

March 11,188'7.)

PATBNTll I'OB Itn'BNTIONS-RBGISTBB I'OB CAB FABEB-INFRINGBHBNT·

.A. patent, No. 260,526, dated July 4, 1882. to John B. Benton for aD Improvement in car-fare registers, and1l0nslsting of a.combination which includes.a tell-tale hand to indicatl) any failure to reset the trip-hand of the register at zero at the commencement of a trip, is not infringed by a device Incapable of being fixed at the point where registration is begun away from the proper place, so as to Indicate that fact, or act as a tell-tale at all.

Ed'liJard N. DiaerBcm, Jr., for plaintiff. John F. DiJkm and John Dane, .Jr., for defendltnt.
WUEEI&R, J. A permanentinjunctionhas been gmnted In thisC8l18e against further infringement of the plaintiff's .patent No. 260,526, dated luly 4, 1882, and granted to John B. Benton. for an improvement in

In Equity· .

KITTLE V. HALL.

239

rare-registers. The patented invention is a combination which includes a hand to indicllteany failure to reset the trip-hand of the regofa trip. 26 Feci. Rep. 522. The. ister at zero at the tell-tale hand of the patent is moved with the trip-hand in resetting, and, if they are reset at zero, moves with it in registering fares until they are again reset. If they are not reset at zero, the tell-tale hand remains at the place at which they are reset when the trip-hand moves forward in registering fares, and indicates that registration was begun at a wrong place. rl'he tell-tale hand of the infringement moves the trip-hand ward in resetting, and is left by it when registration beginsj and, if is begun at any place other than zero, it indicates that fact. Since the injunction, the defendant has commenced using another resetting device, which the plaintiff claims is an equillalent of the tell-tale hand in the combination, and a colorable attempt to evade the. injunction. The plaintiffhllB moved for an attachment on account of thiause of that device. . This device resets the trip-hand by moving it forward, and has!a stop by which it cannot move the trip-hand beyond zero. If it is stopped short of zero, and registration is begun, it can be moved up to zero when the trip-hand has proceeded in registration to that point or beyondj and, if it is stopped at zero, it. can be moved back from that point llot .l;l.ny time, and forward to it again, without interfering with the trip-hlUld ilil registration.. It is therefore a stop on moving the trip-hand forward beyond zero, but is not ,capable of fixed where registration is b,egun away from the proper place so as to indicate that fact, or act as.ll. tale at all. Therefore it is not the equivalent of the tell-tale in combination, and its use.is not a violation of the injunction. The motion is denied.

KITTLE ·v.. .

HALL

and others. .

(OiIrcuit Oourt, 8. D. New York. 'March 9,1887.)
PATENTS FOB INvENTIONS-INvALID CLAIM-DISCLAIMEB-!:NFBmGEMENT-DAMAGES.

A patentee who has retained, during the life of his patent, an invalid claim, may recover upon the valid claims, though he filed no disclaimer after the decision holding the claim invalid. it appearing that the patent was then about to expire and that it was too late to file a disclaimer.

In Equity. The court heretofore decided (Kittle v. HaU, 29 Fed. Rep. 508) that the complainant, although the third claim of his patent was invalid as having been irregularly inserted, was, nevertheless, the patent being about to expire, entitled to a decree for an accounting as to the valid claims. No disclaimer was filed, and the defendants now move to dismiss the bill for that reason. James P. Fbster, for complainant. Ja'TM8 A. Whitney, for defendants.