¶1Kathryn S. Render, St. Louis, MO, argued, for appellant.
¶2Millie E. Aulbur, Jefferson City, MO, argued (Jeremiah W. (Jay) Nixon and Millie E. Aulbur, on brief), for appellee.
¶3Before MAGILL and LOKEN, Circuit Judges, and EISELE,* Senior District Judge.
¶6In February 1989, Kenneth Charles Pilk-erton pleaded guilty in Missouri state court to three counts of first degree robbery and one count of armed criminal action. He received four concurrent life sentences which he did not appeal. In February 1992, he filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in state court, arguing that the life sentence for armed criminal action was imposed in violation of his due process rights. This petition was summarily denied by the Circuit Court *1010for Cole County and, on appeal, by the Missouri Court of Appeals and the Missouri Supreme Court.
¶7Pilkerton then petitioned for federal habe-as corpus relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, raising the same sentencing claim. The district court1 denied the petition, concluding that Pilkerton’s claim is procedurally barred and, alternatively, that it “involves an interpretation of state law” rather than a valid due process claim for federal habeas corpus relief. Pilkerton appeals, arguing that his claim is not procedurally defaulted and does not turn solely on issues of state law. We decline to reach the potentially difficult procedural bar question2 because it is clear that the district court correctly denied Pilkerton’s federal habeas claim on the merits.
¶8Pilkerton attacks the life sentence he received under Mo.Rev.Stat. § 571.015.1, which provides that a defendant convicted of armed criminal action “shall be punished by imprisonment ... for a term of not less than three years.” He relies upon Hemphill v. State, 566 S.W.2d 200, 205 (Mo. banc 1978), and State v. Stephens, 507 S.W.2d 18, 22 (Mo. banc 1974), in which the Missouri Supreme Court held that a second-degree murder statute that did not prescribe a maximum prison sentence, when read in conjunction with § 5j6490, authorized a life sentence. Noting that § 546.490 was repealed in 1979, long before his offense of conviction, Pilkerton argues that his due process rights were violated because he was necessarily sentenced under this repealed statute.
¶9Though creative, this contention is fatally flawed. Pilkerton was indicted and sentenced under § 571.015. Following the repeal of § 546.490, the Missouri courts have consistently held that “[t]he absence of a stated maximum penalty [in § 571.015] merely indicates a legislative intent that a defendant convicted of [armed criminal action] may be sentenced to any term of years above the minimum, including life imprisonment.” Thurston v. State, 791 S.W.2d 893, 895 (Mo. App.1990), followed in State v. Stoer, 862 S.W.2d 348, 353 (Mo.App.1993), and State v. LaRue, 811 S.W.2d 40, 46 (Mo.App.1991); see also Mannon v. State, 788 S.W.2d 315, 322 (Mo.App.1990) (second-degree murder statute). Thus, even if Pilkerton has a federal due process right not to be sentenced under a repealed Missouri statute — a question we need not decide3 — that did not happen in this case. As in United States v. Addonizio, 442 U.S. 178, 186, 99 S.Ct. 2235, 2241, 60 L.Ed.2d 805 (1979), there is no basis for habeas corpus relief because “the sentence imposed was within the statutory limits; and the proceeding was not infected with any error of fact or law of the ‘fundamental’ character than renders the entire proceeding irregular and invalid.”
¶10The judgment of the district court is affirmed.