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← 30 F.3d 723 - Jibson v. Michigan Education Ass'n-NEA

Jibson v. Michigan Education Ass'n-NEA’s Empirical Analysis

30 F.3d 723 · 1994

Citation profile

21
cited by 21 later decisions
4
cited 4 times by the Supreme Court
1
states following
September 2020
most recently cited

10 federal appellate · 1 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 21 later decisions (4 by the Supreme Court) — most recently September 2020

10 federal appellate · 1 state decisions

901994200020102020decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Applies 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Civil Rights Act of 1871 / Section 1983 (Ku Klux Klan Act))

Relies on Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corporation · Abood v. Detroit Board of Education · Sisson v. Ruby · Chicago Teachers Union, Local No. 1 v. Hudson · City of El Centro v. United States

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 21 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “clear distinction between the adequacy of a union's notice, addressed by the Supreme Court in Hudson, and the propriety of a union's chargeability determinations, considered separately by the Supreme Court in Lehnert [v. Ferris Faculty Association, 500 U.S. 507 , 111 S.Ct. 1950 , 114 L.Ed.2d 572 (1991) ].”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  2. “[P]laintiffs' challenge mistakenly equates the adequacy of the notice with the accuracy of the fee assessment, and thus squarely contradicts Hudson's holding and rationale. Contrary to the plaintiffs’ position, Hudson did not contemplate that federal courts would be required, on the basis of the notice, to pass on the legality and accuracy of every element of the fee calculation before any fees could be collected. Were we to accept plaintiffs' invitation and provide a hearing and judicial determination of the correctness of the fee, we would in effect render redundant and irrelevant the requirements that an impartial decisionmaker hear the dispute and that an escrow account be provided for the amounts reasonably in dispute while the challenge is pending. The proper procedure employs each of the three prerequisites identified by the Supreme Court: the fair share notice provides the basis for a challenge to the fair share fee assessment; the impartial decisionmaker determines the correctness of the fee amount; and the escrow protects the challenger’s funds pending, such a decision. The Supreme Court's prerequisites presuppose that a fee has already been collected and that the challenge will be decided after the fee has been collected. The federal court does not, at this stage, review the fee calculation. Indeed, the Supreme Court noted, "[i]n other First Amendment contexts, of course, we have required swift judicial review of the challenged government action. In this context, w”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.