Volume 30 — Grattan's Virginia Reports

This case was heard in Staunton, but was decided in Richmond. It was an action of debt brought in the county court of Shenandoah in September, 1871, but afterwards transferred to the circuit court of that county, in the name oí the Commonwealth of Virginia, suing at the costs, &c„ of Ridgely, Hampton & Co., against JohnJ. Grandstaff, late sheriff of Shenandoah county, *and the surviving sureties in his official bond. The declaration contained .five counts.

This was an action on the case in the circuit court of the city of Lynchburg, brought in July, 1873, by W. W. Hardwicke against George H. Burch. Burch had been for some time, and continued to be, mayo-r of the city, and Hardwicke was chief of police of the city. In May, 1873, Burch, acting under the authority claimed by him as mayor of the city, removed Hardwicke from his office of chief of police.

This was a suit' in equity in the circuit court of Mecklenburg county, brought in March, 1865, by R. T. Owen to enforce a judgment which he had recovered against Luther Pixley, by subjecting certain real estate which Pixley and wife had conveyed in trust to -secure a debt due to W. T. White.

*Mrs. Ann P. Hall, of Chesterfield, upon her marriage with Edward Hatch-er, in February, 1870, conveyed, with his assent, all her estate to a trustee, for her separate and exclusive use, with full power to dispose of it, either in her lifetime or by will. She died in August, 1871; and after her death a paper was propounded as her will to the circuit court of Chesterfield for probate.

In August, _ 1877, John R. Cogbill and Marcus A. Cogbill. of Chesterfield county, in behalf of themselves and all other creditors of like class, filed their bill in the circuit court of the city of… Held: as treasurer. $10,000 of registered stock of the United States, deposited by the Universal Life Insurance Company, in accordance with the laws of Virginia. The two cases were consolidated, and the Universal Life Insurance Company demurred. and answered.

William 15. Gates, of Chesterfield county, died in 1868, leaving a widow and five infant children surviving him. Of these children three were by a former wife.

This was a suit in equity in the circuit court of Buckingham county, brought in September, 1869, by Walker J. Patteson, and others, devisees and legatees of James M. Patteson, against the executors, devisees and legatees of Thomas M. Bondurant, deceased, and Willie Ann Patteson, in her own right and as executrix of James M. Patteson, deceased, to subject the estate of said Thomas *M. Bondurant, and especially a tract of land called Oak-lawn, to pay the amount of a bond of…

This was a suit in equity in the circuit court of Northampton county, brought in October, 1870, by William J. Robins, against Henry H. Ayres and Willis Thompson, to i enforce the payment of a balance .of purchase money of land sold by said Robins and his brother, Joseph W. Robins, who had since died, to said Ayres and Thompson. There was a decree in favor of the plaintiff; and thereupon the defendants obtained an appeal. The case is fully stated by Judge Burks in his opinion.

This was a suit in equity in the circuit court of Nottoway county, brought ill July, 1873, by John E. Jones, styling himself surviving commissioner of the circuit court of Nottoway county, in the chancery cause of Williams against Williams & als., sometimes styled Williams’ guardian against Street and wife, &c., E. P. Lyon and C. P. Lyon, his wife, formerly C. P. Williams, and a number of other parties, children of Eliza J. Williams, deceased, against Thomas W. Williams,…

This was an application to this court by James Clarke for a writ of habeas corpus. The case is stated by Judge Christian in his opinion.

This was a bill of interpleader in the circuit court of Norfolk county, brought in 1873 by Mary Ann L,.

This was a bill filed in the circuit court of Culpeper county in November, 1872, by Elias Compton, to enjoin the sale of a tract of land by John C. Major, trustee in *a deed of trust, executed by Compton and wife, to secure a debt due to Eangdon C. Major, the balance of purchase money on land sold by Langdon C. Major to Compton.

This was a suit in equity in the circuit court of Fauquier county, brought in Feburary, 1869, by Caroline R. Dulaney, the widow, and two of the children of Bladen Dulaney, against Richard H. Carter, the executor, asking for an account of Carter’s administration, and that they might have liberty to surcharge his accounts, &c. The only question in this court was as to the right of Carter to a credit for $5,900. which he had invested in Confederate bonds.

This was a suit in equity in the circuit court of the town of Danville, by the Bank of Greensboro’ against A. B. Chambers, and Fannie E. Chambers, his wife, and Thomas J. Patrick, to subject a house and lot in Danville to satisfy a debt of said Fannie E. Chambers. Before the marriage of A. B. Chambers and his said wife, he and Patrick had been engaged in the manufacture of tobacco in the town of Danville.

This was an action of covenant in the circuit court of the city of Richmond, brought in April, 1873, by the ^Richmond and Petersburg Railroad Company, against Robert B. Kasey and five others, to recover from the defendants an amount of money which the plaintiffs alleged Kasey, as their ticket and freight agent, had received and had not accounted for. The action was founded on the bond of Kasey, as such agent, the other defendants being his sureties in the bond.

<p>Marriage Settlement Deed — Bill for Reformation. — Power of Married Woman to Alienate — Construction of Decree.* — A bill filed for the reformation of a deed of marriage settlement prayed that the deed might be so corrected as to secure the property to the married woman, free from the marital rights of her husband, “as if she were a feme sole, and with power to dispose of the same by a writing in the nature of a deed or will;” and all parties interested, Dy their answers, concurred in the prayer of the bill; and the decree directed that the property should be, and was, secured to the said married woman, “as fully and completely as if she were a feme sole, free from the debts of her husband, and in no manner liable for his debts or contracts” — Held : That the court might 100k to the bill and answers for the purpose of ascertaining the proper construction of the decree; and tnat the decree when so construed operated to confer upon the married woman power to dispose by her sole act of the real estate settled upon her.</p>

In April, 1868, Jesse Prunty brought an action of assumpsit in the circuit court of Pittsylvania against Mitchell & Cobbs, partners. At the June term of the court they appeared by their attorneys and filed the plea *of non-assumpsit, on which issue was made up. At a special term held in July, 1870, the case was tried, and there was a verdict and judgment in favor of the plaintiff for $1,092.94, with interest from the 13th of June, 1867.

Ludlam, Heineken & Co., and Taliaferro & Musgrove, judgment creditors of William Crumpton, filed their bill in the circuit court of the city of Lynchburg to subject certain real estate to the payment of their judgments against said Crumpton. The first judgment was obtained November 17th, 1866, and docketed in the hustings court of Lynch-burg January 7th, 1877, and the second was obtained and docketed in said hustings court October 15th, 1866.

<p>1. Effect of Foreign Judgment — Constitutional Law.* — That the judgment of one state may have in another the effect provided for by the constitution of the United States, Article IV, section 1, and the act of congress of -May 26, 1790, the court in which the judgment was rendered must have had jurisdiction of the case when it pronounced the judgment.</p> <p>2. Same — Same.—Whether or not a defendant resides in the state in which the action is brought, he must be summoned, or appear in person or by attorney, in the suit, in order to give the court jurisdiction of the case, so as to give its judgment the effect in another state provided for by the constitution and act of congress.</p> <p>8# Same — Rights of Defendant. — It is perfectly competent for a defendant, in an action in one state, on a judgment rendered in another, to plead and show in his defence that he was not summoned, and did not appear, in person or by attorney, in the suit in such other court; and that, too, even though it be expressly stated in the record of the suit in that court that he was actually summoned and did so appear.</p> <p>4. Pleading. — This defence ought to be made by special plea.</p> <p>5. Partnerships — Dissolution—Right to Retain Connsel. — One member of a dissolved partnership has no authority, unless specially given, to retain an attorney to defend the other members of the late firm in an action brought against them. Such authority does not result from the partnership itself.</p> <p>6. - Same — Same—Effect of Foreign Judgment — Rights of Partner Not a Party to Action. — A judgment rendered in another state against all the members of a partnership, after the dissolution of' the partnership, does not personally bind a member of said partnership not served with process and not appearing in the case, although the other members were served, or appeared and caused an appearance to be" entered for all.</p> <p>7. Same — Same—Same—Constitutional Law. —A judgment in New York under me Code of procedure of that state against the members of a dissolved partnership, *one of whom was not served with process and did not appear in person or by attorney in the suit, is not such a judgment as is contemplated by the constitution and act of congress, as to such person.</p>

<p>Witnesses — Deatli oí Otlier Party.* — In an action of debt by W for the use of G, against the executor of M, upon two bonds purporting to be executed by M and R, the administrator pleads non est factum, and payment. The only proof of the execution of the bonds by M, is proof of an acknowledgment by M to an agent of G, made after the assignment to G, and the proof as to the payments are of payments made by R to G in the lifetime o 1 M — Held: G is not a competent witness under the statute to testify in his own behalf.</p>

This was an action of debt in the county court of Richmond county, and afterwards transferred to the circuit court of the county, brought by William Cammack against T. W. Soran, a non-resident of the state, to recover the sum of $1,114.89 with interest.

This was a suit in equity in the circuit court of Danville, brought in October, 1873, by March, Price & Co. against A. B. Chambers and John G. Raney, to subject to the satisfaction of a judgment they had recovered against Chambers a lot in the town of Danville which had been once owned by Chambers, but which Raney claimed as his property. The circuit court dismissed the bill, and the plaintiff applied to this court for an appeal; which was allowed.

This case was argued at Richmond, but was decided at Wytheville. It was a suit in equity in the corporation court of Lynch-burg, brought in February, 1877, by C. Fannie Latham, by her next friend, against her husband, Robert F. Latham, for a divorce.

This case was heard at Richmond, but was decided at Wytheville. It was a creditor’s bill in the circuit court of Pittsylvania comity, brought in 1870 by James McAden and others against W. W. Keen and Robert A. Walters and others, purchasers of real estate from Keen, to subject the said real estate to satisfy the judgments * of the plaintiffs. There were two amendments of the bill bringing in other parties.

John Helm, of the county of Floyd, died intestate in August, 1874, leaving a widow, but no children; and his mother, brothers and sisters, and the children of some who were dead, were his heirs and distributees. He left several small tracts of' land, of the value of between $2,500 and $3,000, and personal property appraised at $1,533. Joseph Helm, his brother, qualified as administrator on his estate.

This case was heard at Richmond, but was decided at Wytheville. It was a petition presented to this court by Samuel M.'Page, asking the court for a writ of mandamus to William J. Clopton, judge of the hustings court of the city of Manchester, to sign three bills of exceptions to the judgment of the judge imposing a fine upon the petitioner for a contempt of court.

*On the 30th day of March, 1857, Amos Worrell and Darthula. his wife, then of the county of Carroll, between'whom there was then pending a suit for a divorce from bed and board, brought by him, compromised the matter, and in pursuance of the compromise he settled on her a portion of his estate, to be “secure from his control and disposition and free from all liability for his debts and obligations.” Accordingly, by deed dated on that day and duly recorded, they conveyed to…

This was an appeal from the decree of the circuit court of Bland county dismissing a bill filed by Abraham Wampler against his son, Ephraim Wampler, to set aside a deed which the plaintiff and his wife has executed, conveying a tract of land to the said Ephraim Wampler. The defendant demurred to the bill.

This was an appeal from a decree of the circuit court of Tazewell county, rendered on the 18th of November, 1875, in a cause in which Nancy Harman and her two children, who were infants, were plaintiffs, and J. Mosby Davis, administrator of E. H. Harman, deceased, and his sureties were defendants.

These were applications by the Virginia and Tennessee Railroad Company to the county court of Washington County, to be exonerated from assessments of taxes for county, township, school and road purposes, upon their real estate in the county, consisting of that part of their road lying in said county. It appears that the several township assessors had placed the said land on their books, at a valuation fixed by them, and the tax-tickets had been issued.

*This is a sequel to the case of Suavely v. Harkrader & als., reported in 29 Gratt. 112.

This was a writ of error and supersedeas to a judgment rendered by the circuit court of Grayson County, upon an appeal from a decision of the board of supervisors of Grayson County, upon a claim against the county, presented to the said board of supervisors by James W. Preston. The board of supervisors rejected the claim, and upon appeal the circuit court affirmed the judgment. The facts of the case are very fully stated in the opinion of the court, delivered by Moncure, P.

In May, 1872, the executrix of John Sexton instituted a suit in equity in the county court of Wythe county against Benjamin Be-ville, James A. Beville, Jane E. Moore and William T. Beville, in his own right and as trustee for Susan Beville and others.

In January, 1874, Valentine Thrash brought his suit in equity in the circuit court of Roanoke county, to enforce the lien of a judgment which he had recovered at the November term, 1873, of that court, against Tazewell Pnce.

In January, 1872, Samuel W. Cecil, suing for the benefit of James S. Witten, instituted a suit in equity in the county court of Russell county, to subject the land of John G. Duff to satisfy a judgment for $199.80, with interest from the 20th of April, 1860, and $6.96 costs, which said Cecil had recovered against said Duff in the county court of Tazewell county in August. 1860.

This was a writ of error and supersedeas to judgments of the circuit court of Russell county, rendered against Robert E. Withers. The case is fully stated by Judge Christian ill his opinion.

Tn November, 1872, David C. Kent, administrator of Gordon Cloyd, deceased, brought his suit in equity in the county court of Pulaski county, which was removed to the circuit court of the county, against Isaiah H. Welch, administrator de bonis non, with the will annexed, of James R. Kent, deceased, and the devisees and legatees of said James R. Kent, to subject the estate of said James R. Kent to satisfy a judgment which he had recovered against said Welch, administrator, as…

<p>I. In contemplation of the marriage of B and L, B by deed in which L joined, conveyed her property consisting of personalty and a life estate in land, to M, in trust for her separate use, with full power in her to dispose of the rents and profits as if she had never márried, and to transfer in such proportion and form as she shall.from time to time direct, notwithstanding her coverture, by any writings under hand and seal attested by three or more credible witnesses, or by her will, executed and attested in the same mode. By a paper executed as prescribed in the deed, B directed her trustee to purchase two lots to be paid for out of her trust fund, and this was done and they were conveyed to the trustee on the same trusts. These deeds were duly recorded. The trustee dying, C and W were appointed trustees. Afterwards B, by deed executed by herself alone, and acknowledged by her in the clerk’s office without privy examination, upon full consideration, conveyed the lots to W, and he died, and they were sold to different purchasers. B,Ddied intestate in 1862; and in March, 1875, her heirs filed their bill against the purchasers to recover the lots — Held:</p> <p>1. Wife’s Separate Estate — Alienation.*— The deed of marriage settlement directing how the trust fund may be disposed of by B, and the lots having been purchased under her directions, as prescribed in that deed, were a part of the trust estate, and being real estate could only be conveyed in the mode directed in the deed; and therefore the deed from B to W did not pass the title to the lots to W.</p> <p>2. $a.me — Purchasers Affected with Notice. — The purchasers holding under W, are affected with the notice of the trusts, and will be treated as trustees for Mrs. B and her heirs.</p> <p>3. Same — Defective Conveyance — Equity. —It is not a case in which equity will aid a defective conveyance in favor of a bona fide purchaser.</p> <p>4. Statute of Liuiitatiou. — Mrs. B being under coverture until her death in 1862, and the statutes of limitations having been suspended until December 31st, 1869, the statute of limitations does not bar the claim of the heirs of 8; and under the circumstances the delay in bringing the suit does not bar the claim.</p> <p>5. Return of Purchase Money. — Though there is a covenant of general warranty in the deed from B to W, yet there is nothing to show that she intended to bind her estate by that covenant, and no personal decree could have been made against her, and it does not appear that the heirs of B have received property in which the purchase money of the lots was invested, the purchasers are not entitled to have the purchase money returned out of the estate of B, or to subject the lots for it.</p>

This case was decided in October, 1877, but there was a motion for a rehearing of the decree, which was overruled at this term of the court. It was a case of caveat in the circuit court of Augusta county, in which A. D. Trotter and others were the caveators, and Isaac Newton and Major D. Vines were the caveatees. The case was submitted to the decision of the judge, and he rendered a judgment for the caveatees.

This was an action of trespass on the case in the circuit court of Shenandoah county, brought in December, 1874, by the administratrix of Nathan G. Sherman/ deceased, against the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Company, to recover damages for the killing of the said *Sherman upon the road of the said company.

<p>Statement of Case. — In 1856 M sold and con•veyed her share of a tract of land to her brothers, J and II, reserving a vendor’s lien in the deed for $1,204.93. In 1860 J and II sold and conveyed with general warranty the whole tract to A for $23,500, of which one-third was paid in cash, and bonds of $2,000 given to H for the balance, payable in each year from 1861 to 1867, and $1,666.66 in 1868, reserving in the deed a vendor’s lien as security. In 1860 II assigned the four bonds falling due in 1865-66-67 and 68 to K, and K assigned to G in April, 1861, the bond due in 1866, and in November, 1865, she assigned to G the bond due in 1867. In the latter part of 1860, or the first of 1861, K assigned to S the bond due in 1865. A died in 1867, having paid off the first *our bonds and made payments to G on the sixth, and after his death A’s executors paid to K the last bond. The deed from M to J and II was recorded, but was destroyed by the federal forces in 1864. After the war, C, as assignee of M, filed a bill to enforce the vendor’s lien in the deed from M for the $1,204.93, and obtained a decree. Pending C’s suit, G filed his bill to enforce the vendor’s Hen in the deed to A, for a balance due on the two bonds assigned to him. A’s executors and devisees insisted thát they should have credit on the bonds assigned to G and S for the amount of C’s decree, they • insisting that the purchase money paid by A in his lifetime and the executors since, was paid without any knowledge of C’s Hen on the land, that deed having been destroyed. J and II were insolvent — Held:</p> <p>1. Subrogation. — A-S®i»uees.*—A was entitled to a credit on account of the purchase money due by him as vendee of said land for the said sum of $1,204.93, with interest, and he was so entitled as against the assignees of said bonds, at least if the assignments were made without his consent.</p> <p>2. Assignment — liability, to Set-Off. — That the liability of such assigned bonds to such right of set-off is not in the order in which said bonds are payable, *but in the .nverse order of their assignment; and if some of said bonds were assigned and some were not, the unassigned bonds were liable to said right of set-off before the assigned bonds, even though the unassigned bonds were payable before the assigned bonds.</p> <p>3. Vendor’s lien — Destruction of Record. —That the said land" remained liable in the hands of A, the vendee, to -the said vendor’s Hen for the said sum of $1,204.93 and interest, notwithstanding the destruction of the record of the deed, and that the said A and his executors may have paid the full amount of the purchase money and interest without actual knowledge of the existence of such lien at the time of such payment, the due recordation of the said deed in which said lien was reserved being constructive notice to him and them of the existence of such lien, and as effectual for this purpose as actual notice of its existence, or as if the deed had not been destroyed.</p> <p>4. Assignment — Notice.—If A received notice of the assignment of the said bonds to K, before his payment of the bonds of 1861-62-63 and 64, then such payment to the extent of the said sum of $1,204.93, with interest, was a payment in his own wrong. But if he made such payment without such notice, then he or his estate is entitled to a credit for the said sum of $1,204.93 on the said assigned bond.</p> <p>5. Constructive Notice — Exoneration.— Tne bond for $1,666.66, paid by the executors of A to K, was subject to the said set-off in preference to and in exoneration of the bonds assigned by K to G and S; and this though the executors paid it without knowledge of the said C’s lien. Both A and his executors were chargeable with constructive notice of said set-off by reason of the recordation of the deed aforesaid, and the liability of said estate resulted from such notice.</p> <p>6. Vendor’s Lien — Settlement of Account. —The bill having been filed to enforce the vend- or’s lien upon the land, it was not necessary that the plaintiff should have a settlement of an account of the personal estate of A for the purpose of exhausting the same in’ tne payment of his debts before he could enforce the charge reserved on the land for the payment of the purchase money. This charge is as effectual as would have been a deed of trust on the land to secure the purchase money; which certainly might have been enforced by a wsale, either before or after A’s death, without a necessity of first exhausting the personal estate.</p>

<p>1. Bill in Equity — Variance.—Though it is true that the case stated in a bill in equity must be sustained by the evidence, this rule will not forbid relief to the plaintiff where the case proved does not materially vary from the case stated; as where two deeds are charged to be without consideration, and intended to delay and hinder the plaintiff, and the proof is that the second being a deed to a trustee for the separate use of the debtor’s wife, was without valuable consideration.</p> <p>2. Consideration — Wife’s Earnings. — In the case of a deed to a trustee for the separate use of a married woman, the consideration was paid by money derived from her earnings, and there wás no agreement, either ante or post nuptial, that she should be entitled to her earnings, and the husband, though during the time of these earnings generally absent from home, had not deserted her. The earnings of the wife were the property of the husband, and the real estate thus purchased is subject to pay his debts.</p>

This was a suit in equity in the circuit court of Rockingham county, brought by The Hagerstown Agricultural Implement Manufacturing Company against J. F. and J. Y. Dong, late partners, and S. G. S. Long, Sarah -Long, Fannie Long and others, the object of which was to subject lands which had belonged to said partners to the payment of a judgment for $910.12, with interest, which the plaintiff had recovered against J. F. and J. Y. Long at the January term, 1875, of said court.

In April, 1870, Martha Ann Martin, executrix of John S. Martin, deceased, filed her bill in the circuit court of Albemarle county, in which 'she set out that -in March, 1859, James W. Mason, Thomas Staples, John S. Martin and John O: Lewis entered into a partnership under the name of Mason, Martin & Co., for carrying on a milling and mercantile business at the town of Scottsville *in said county, which was continued until February, 1862, when it was dissolved by the death of…

<p>This case was argued at Wytheville, and decided at Staunton. It is very fully stated by Judge Moncure in his opinion.</p>

<p>Constructive Notice — Innocent Purchasers.*- — In 1854 C conveyed a tract of land to B in trust to secure, first, debts due to P, and, second, a debt due to K. B being required by K to sell the land, C enjoined the sale, making only B and K parties defendants, and filing the deed as an exhibit with his bill. In this suit there was a decree appointing B a special commissioner to sell the land, and at the sale K purchased it. This sale was confirmed, and B was directed to convey the land to K, and take a deed of trust upon it to secure the purchase money. B conveyed the land to K, referring to it as the land in the bill, &c., mentioned in the suit, but instead of taking the deed of trust upon this land, took it upon another tract of II, which proved to have been conveyed by other prior liens to its full value. In 1862 K sold and conveyed the land bought under the decree to W and VS, the deed referring to* it as the land purchased under th.e said decree. J, as assignee of P, filed his bill against W and S and others to enforce the lion of the deed of 1854 to satisfy his debt, and W and S answered, claiming that they were bona fide purchasers without notice, and they averred that, living some distance from the court-house of the county in which the land lay, and which was difficult of access by reason of the war, they refused to purchase unless K would bring the certificate of the clerk of the court that there were no liens or incumbrances on the land; * and that the clerk did examine the records in his office, and did give the certificate that so far as the records of his office showed, there was no lien or incumbrance on this land. And they then purchased and paid all the purchase money and received the deed — Héi.d: That W and S were bound to know all that the said suit disclosed, and that the certificate of the clerk was not sufficient to entitle them to the defence of bona fide purchasers without notice.</p>

<p>1. Domicile — Residence—Distinction.—There is wide distinction between domicile an- a residence. To constitute a domicile two things must concur: First, residence; second, the intention to remain there for an unlimited time. Residence is to have a permanent abode for the time being, as contra-distinguished from a mere temporary locality of existence.</p> <p>2. Residence — Construction of Statute.— What is the meaning of the word residence as used in any particular statute, must be decided upon its particular circumstances. The word is often used to express a different meaning according to the subject matter.</p> <p>3. Attachments — Residence Construed.*— The word residence, in the statute in relation to attachments, is to be .construed as meaning the act of abiding or dwelling in a place for some continuance of time.</p> <p>4. Same — Same—Intention.—While on the one hand the casual or temporary sojourn of a person in the state, whether on business or pleasure, does not make him a resident of the state within the meaning of the attachment law, especially if his personal domicile is elsewhere, so on the other hand, it is not essential that he should come into the state with the intention to remain here permanently, to constitute him a resident.</p> <p>5.' Statement of Case.- — R, domiciled in Washington, obtains a contract upon tlic W. & S. railroad to construct three sections of the road, and he may be employed to build culverts and bridges in such time as the engineer of the road may fix. He rents out his house in Washington, removes his family to a place on the route of the road, and keeps house. Before the work is finished or the time for completing it has arrived, an attachment is sued out against his effects — Held: lie was a resident of the state, and the attachment quashed.</p> <p>In June, 1869, R. H. Long brought an action of assumpsit in the circuit court of Frederick county, against *P. M. Ryan, to recover the sum of $631.67, with interest on $470.35, a part thereof, from June 14th, 1869; and at the same time he sued out an attachment against the estate and debts of Ryan as an absent defendant. This attachment was served on the Winchester and Strasburg railroad company as garnishee. It is unnecessary to state the proceedings in the cause, as the only question considered by this court, was whether at the time of the suing out of the attachment Ryan was a non-resident of the sate in the meaning ox the statute. The court below dismissed the attachment, and Long obtained a writ of error and supersedeas. The facts are stated by Judge Staples in his opinion.</p>

In 1873, William B. Isaacs & Co. filed their bill in the circuit court of Frederick county, stating therein, substantially, that they were holders of a large amount of notes of the old Bank of the Valley in Virginia, and of the Farmers Bank of Virginia; that their claims as such note holders were audited, reported and confirmed against the said banks in the circuit court of the United States for the eastern district of Virginia, in the chancery *causes therein pending, in…

Thisxase was decided in September, 1876, but there was a motion for a rehearing of the decree, which was overruled at the present term of the court. It was a creditor’s suit in equity, instituted in March, 1870, in the circuit court of Rockingham county, by the executor of Jacob Blose, deceased, against the administrators and heirs of Jacob Miller, deceased, to subject the lands of said Miller to the payment of his debts.

This was a creditor’s suit in equity instituted in March, 1870, in the circuit court of Rockingham county, by Samuel Shacklett against S. B. Jennings and his children, *to subject the lands of said Jennings to satisfy judgments recovered against him. The only question in this case was whether certain lands in the possession of Jennings were his own, or whether there was a resulting trust in favor of his children.

<p>The case is sufficiently stated in the opinion of Judge Anderson.</p>

In April, 1875, Thomas M. Miller, administrator of Cornelius Whittington, deceased, instituted an action of trespass on the case in the circuit court of Frederick county against the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Company to recover damages for having occasioned the death of Whittington. The declaration contained three counts.

This was a creditor’s bill in the circuit court of the county of Rockingham, brought in June, 1874, by the administrator of Jacob C. Spitler, deceased, and 'others, against Hugh Connell, the surviving administrator of George W. Cupp, Enoch L. Brower, administrator of Samuel Parent, deceased, who in his lifetime was one of the administrators of said Cupp, the heirs of Cupp and Parent, Solomon Garber, Abraham Paul, John M. Kiser and a number of other parties, to have a…

This was an action of debt in the circuit court of Warren county, brought by Isaac N. King against M. B. Buck as maker,^ and five others as endorsers, of a negotiable note for $2,000, dated the 21st of February, 1875, and payable one hundred and twenty days after date, and $2.61 costs of protest. The only question in this court was, whether interest was to be allowed upon the amount of money which was the consideration of the note, and if so from what time.

This was an indictment against George Wolf foj arson in the county court of Washington. There was a verdict finding the prisoner guilty and fixing the term of his imprisonment in the penitentiary at six years, and a judgment accordingly. The prisoner thereupon obtained a writ of error to the circuit court, where the judgment was affirmed; and he then applied to this court for a writ of error, which was allowed. The case is stated by Judge Christian in his opinion.

<p>The case is stated by Judge Moncure in his opinion.</p>

This was an indictment in the county court of King William county against Charles Lawrence for rape. The case is stated by Judge Moncure in his opinion.

<p>The facts are fully stated by Judge Christian in his opinion.</p>