30 Ill. App. 3d 140 - Stonecipher v. Pillatsch’s Empirical Analysis
1975
Citation profile
37 state decisions
How this case has been cited
Cited by 39 later decisions — most recently September 2013 · most notably 240 Ill. App. 3d 737 - Grossinger Motorcorp, Inc. v. American National Bank & Trust Co. (1992), 58 Ill. App. 3d 100 - Builder's Concrete v. Faubel & Sons, Inc. (1978)
37 state decisions
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Relies on Lake Shore & Michigan Southern Railway Co. v. Richards · Tony Palmiero and Ruby Palmiero, Husband and Wife v. Spada Distributing Company, Inc., a Corporation · 343 Ill. App. 245 - Sampson v. Marra · Decatur Cemetery Land Co. v. Bumgarner · 11 Ill. App. 3d 856 - Siemans v. Thompson
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 39 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
““In order to justify the adverse party in treating a renunciation as an anticipatory breach of a contract there must be a definite and unequivocal manifestation of intention that the party will not render the promised performance when the time fixed for it in the contract arrives. (Corbin on Contracts §973, at 960 (1952); Williston on Contracts §1322, at 130 (3d ed. 1968). See also Palmiero v. Spada Distributing Company (9th Cir. 1954), 217 F.2d 561,566 .) A definite statement to the promisee that the promisor either will not or cannot perform the contract will operate as an anticipatory breach. (Corbin on Contracts §959, at 941; Williston on Contracts §1322, at 134.) On the other hand, doubtful and indefinite statements that the performance may or may not take place or mere requests to change the terms of a contract are not, in and of themselves, enough to constitute repudiation. (Corbin on Contracts §973, at 960; Williston on Contracts §1322, at 133.) The construction of an oral contract and the acts and conduct of a party as modifying a written contract are matters for the trier of fact, and decisions reached on these issues are not to be disturbed unless contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence. See Palmiero v. Spada Distributing Co. (9th Cir. 1954), 217 F.2d 561, 565 ; Siemans v. Thompson (1973), 11 Ill. App. 3d 856, 858 ; Sampson v. Marra (1951), 343 Ill. App. 245, 256 .” 30 Ill. App. 3d 140, 142-43 , 332 N.E.2d 151, 153-54 .”
3 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority““When a party bound by an executory contract gives notice of his intention not to comply with his obligations, the other contracting party may accept such notice as an anticipatory breach and treat the contract as ended without waiting for the completion of the contract by its terms. [Citations.] In order to justify the adverse party in treating a renunciation as an anticipatory breach of a contract there must be a definite and unequivocal manifestation of intention that the party will not render the promised performance when the time fixed for it in the contract arrives. [Citations.] A definite statement to the promissee that the promissor either will not or cannot perform the contract will operate as an anticipatory breach. [Citations.]” (Emphasis added.) 30 Ill. App. 3d at 142-43 .”
2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.